


JPRS-EER-89-077
7 JULY 1989



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

East Europe

East Europe

JPRS-EER-89-077

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INTRABLOC

Dubcek Responds to Regime Accusations in Hungarian Media

25000286 Budapest REFORM in Hungarian 19 May 89 pp 13-14

[Interview with Alexandr Dubcek by Andras Sugar: "You Want To Reannex Sub-Carpathia: Had I Been an Advocate of Hungarian Assimilation..."; telephone interview; date not given; follow-up interview after the sensation caused by the initial interview with Dubcek on the Hungarian TV program "Panorama," which was also conducted by Sugar]

[Text]

[Sugar] The Czechoslovak ambassador held a press conference in Budapest on May 5.

[Dubcek] Really?

[S] ... and Juraj Zvara said that at the time you were in power you consistently rejected requests regarding the Hungarian minority.

[D] And how did he document that?

[S] He did not refer to any document.

[D] I know of no such thing.

[S] Why, what was your attitude toward the Hungarian minority?

[D] No one has yet spoken about this subject with any connection with me. I would be happy to argue with anyone on television. First he would have to say where and when I did such a thing. Nowhere! My standpoint on the minority issue is absolutely clear, and not only to me but also to Hungarians with whom I worked together.

[S] Am I to understand that you would be willing to engage in a TV debate with Zvara?

[D] Of course, if he is willing.

[S] And would you examine his evidence?

[D] Gladly. But he cannot have any evidence. My Hungarian comrades here have frequently acknowledged how I dealt with them; they have made statements completely contrary to that of Zvara's.

[S] Would an anti-Hungarian attitude be contrary to your convictions?

[D] Well, look. Is it conceivable that, had I been an advocate of assimilating the Hungarians, why haven't I been accused of this earlier? Because so many lies have been said during the past 21 years, and yet I have never

heard about this. I really do not know what they will come up with next! Vasil Bilak spoke at the congress of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society a year ago. And, at the meeting of our Central Committee, he stated, among other things, that we should not bring up 1968 anymore, for he did not want anyone to investigate that issue. Bilak said, "Let us not bring this up anymore. And I will say something else to you: when Dubcek was still in power, he prevented Ukrainian national comrades from making contact with Ukrainians in Ukraine." Bilak repeated the accusation that I strived to reannex Trans-Carpathian Ukraine to Czechoslovakia. But do you know what the truth is? Neither in 1968 nor at any other time has anyone in the Slovak leadership raised this issue. Anyone even mentioning this would have had to be a naive politician! The truth is entirely different. This issue was brought up, in Agcsernyo of all places, by Pyotr Shelest, onetime First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. He and Brezhnev put pressure on us there, and one day he said something like this: "Apart from everything I have heard here, I must say in the name of the Ukraine that you want to reannex Sub-Carpathia to Czechoslovakia." Of course, I stood up and, although the entire Soviet Politburo was sitting there, I categorically stated, "If you want to continue our talk in this spirit, then we cannot talk any further. What you are advancing here is nothing but your own fabrication. You have concocted this yourselves in the Ukraine and even made a poster to this effect. If some Ukrainians have such desires, it is their business. But do not try to put the blame on the leaders of our party and government."

[S] Interesting.

[D] You see, they raised such questions, too. But none of us spoke about such things then or at any other time. Yet Bilak invented this a year ago, and even published it in the paper. So I am not surprised when someone now says that I had been unjust to Hungarian nationals. But why was this not brought up against me earlier? Well, because these propagandists, who are pursuing a specific goal, are content with any lie. But somehow they did not think of this before. However, I was interviewed in April by Hungarian Television and, in order to discredit me in front of the Hungarian public, I was made out to be an anti-Hungarian.

[S] What is the truth, then?

[D] I spent quite a few years working in Besztercebanya and at the Slovak central party organizations. Well, I invite anyone to find from those times just a single evidence of my inability to exchange words with Hungarian citizens. Ask the CSEMADOK [Cultural-Social Association of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia] people, or the specialists of Hungarian culture and education, or anyone else! Then let us see what they say.

[S] So, you reject Zvara's accusations.

[D] Absolutely! And, do you know what caused my very first conflict with Novotny? When I became first secretary of the Central Slovakian party committee in Besztercebanya, I was aware of the importance of Hungarian citizens living in several of our districts. I visited these districts and, in talking with the district secretary, I asked, "Say, how do you speak with the Hungarians?" "Well, we manage somehow," he replied. "Do you speak Hungarian?" "No, not that," said the secretary. "But, then, how can you work in a Hungarian district?" I asked with astonishment. And then, one of my first actions was to recommend at the election meetings in 3 or 4 districts that either a Slovak who speaks Hungarian or a Hungarian should be elected for the post of district secretary. He should be a local person who also knows the Hungarians, and if he is a Slovak, he should speak Hungarian. This can be verified by anyone, even today. Such secretaries were elected in all these districts. Then Novotny began the accusations: "What is going on in Besztercebanya? They are removing proven Marxists!" Even though I had only removed these people from these districts and placed them in the Besztercebanya party apparatus. For if they do not speak Hungarian, what business do they have in a Hungarian district? How can they work there? Well, you see, this is something concrete. But the newer fabrications do not surprise me anymore. A lie has no legs.

[S] Now to my next question. Czechoslovak ambassador Ehrenberger said that it is Czechoslovakia's business when and how it reexamines its history. How do you, as a Czechoslovak citizen, envision the now timely reexamination of your country's history?

[D] It is impossible to make a step forward in Czechoslovak perestroika without taking a look at our past. If we do not tell the truth about the work of the huge communist masses that were active in 1968, then nothing will become of our perestroika. There is much talk today of democracy and glasnost. But if glasnost means that only one opinion may be voiced in the press, then what is the purpose of this chatter? If the party wants to regain the people's trust, then it must allow the telling of truth. For the people know very well what the truth is. If the people are humiliated and silenced, then what kind of a perestroika is this? Our Central Committee took precisely this road. And I tell you, silencing the people is contrary to the idea of perestroika.

[S] What should the first step be then?

[D] There will be no progress if no justice is done to those who have been expelled from the party and the trade union, youth and other movements because they were loyal to our platform and refused to accept its branding as being "revisionist". Everyone who wants to participate in perestroika must be given the opportunity to do so. For the issues are not ones that happened a thousand years ago! There are many living witnesses to the 1968 events who know what the truth is. If one cannot falsify

the history of ancient Rome, then how can one falsify 1968? And one more thing: The people cannot be replaced. Neither the Czechoslovak nor the Hungarian people. What must be replaced is policy that is rejected by the people.

[S] And what do you wish to say about not being allowed to speak in your own country?

[D] Now they say of me, Dubcek is even willing to undermine our relations with Hungarians, he makes statements in Hungarian TV! My response to this is, they should make it possible for me to answer the charges against me that are published at home. For I truly explored all possibilities to speak at home before I made those statements to you. But I am not the only one concerned. No one whose opinion differs from the present official standpoint is allowed to speak. How can the people believe in glasnost when only a monologue is possible in our country? In short, the onetime participants of "obroda", i.e., Czechoslovak renewal, must be granted the freedom of speech in accordance with the constitution and the press law. We said it then, and we say it now, that there is a need for socialism but its distortions must be eliminated and it must be reformed. And I repeat, I am not the only one concerned. All those are concerned who have been unjustly slandered and expelled from the party, the colleges, institutions, and public organizations, and who have been prevented from practicing their profession. They had been accused of being anti-Soviets, antisocialists, opportunists, and revisionists (and this folly is being taught today in the schools). Even though we believe only in glasnost and perestroika, striving for things that now Gorbachev is striving for. Several hundred thousand people who still believe in socialism are concerned here.

[S] Thank you for your statement and I wish you a nice 9 May holiday.

[D] Thank you. That is a great holiday, a real holiday, and great is the crime of those who tarnished Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship when they interfered in August 1968 with our internal issues. These are the people who are now bragging to be the Soviet Union's best friends.

[S] We receive many letters from Slovakia, and even from Hradec Kralove in Bohemia. Most of these people are behind you.

[S] This is understandable since the problem was internationalized in 1968 when they marched in. Since that happened, no one can say anymore that speaking about this abroad is tantamount to interfering with our internal issues. And this question is still weighing on the party. Even on Western communists, socialists, and democrats.

**Romanian Ridicules Views of Kundera, Others on
'Central Europe'**

27000068 Cluj-Napoca TRIBUNA in Romanian
6 Apr 89 pp 8, 10

[Article by Achim Mihu: "Central Europe, a Mythical-Poetic Scenario"]

[Text] The designation of Central Europe has various meanings. We can resort to a simplistic definition indicating which particular part of Europe is meant by those two words. I could tell someone from a country on another continent that I live in Cluj-Napoca, that the city is in Romania, and that Romania is part of Central Europe. For a pupil or even a student from Brazil, the United States or Japan it is not so easy to learn just where Romania is in Europe. In some countries, like the United States for example, the institutes for international problems of some universities include sections for Central and Eastern European Studies. That is true of Columbia University in New York, where the Nicolae Iorga Chair of Romanian History, Culture and Civilization has been functioning. As one of the first holders of that chair I must acknowledge that I have often had problems with students trying locate Romania on a world map, and I have found it useful to appeal to "Central Europe."

In the last decade "Central Europe" has acquired meanings other than the strictly geographic one, namely cultural-ideological and political meanings. Essentially, they are not related to the German term "Mitteleuropa [Central Europe]", which was used in geopolitical contexts after World War I to justify some of Germany's plans for territorial expansion. Thomas Masaryk, the former president of the Czechoslovakian Republic (1918-35), militated for a "Mitteleuropa" wherein the countries of this area would not be merely a bridge between the East and the West. Relatively recently President Erich Honecker pointed out the danger of a nuclear war in "Mitteleuropa" due to the stockpiling of armaments in that area of our continent. Kurt Waldheim, now the president of Austria, organized a symposium with the debatable title of "Heimat Mitteleuropa [A Central European Homeland]." Peter Glotz, a Social Democrat in the FRG, asserts that the FRG is a power that guarantees culture in "Mitteleuropa". For several years Central Europe has been mentioned more and more often in a new sense, especially in Prague and Budapest. This new view of it originated in a highly praised but also controversial essay published in several languages and corners of the world. It appeared in THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (26 April 1984) under the title "The Tragedy of Central Europe" and over the signature of Milan Kundera. Reproductions of it used various titles. JOURNAL DE LETRAS, ARTES E IDEAS (vol VI No 164, 27 August and September 1985), in presenting the record of the "Kundera phenomenon," published the said essay under the title "Europa Central: un ocidente sequestrado" ("Central Europe: A Sequestered West"). One of the best known

reactions which is analytical with a critical emphasis on a western policy, is that of Timothy Garton Ash, expressed in two articles (veritable studies) also published in THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS under the titles "Does Central Europe Exist?" (9 October 1986) and "The Empire in Decay" (29 September 1988). Not only Milan Kundera's essay but also the appearance of some books written around the new theory in one way or another were the reason and the pretext for the articles. The books in question are: "The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central and Eastern Europe," by Václav Havel et al. with an introduction by Steven Lukes and published by John Keane, London, Hutchinson; "Antipolitics: an Essay," by George Konrad, translated from Hungarian, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; "Letters from Prison and Other Essays," by Adam Michnik, translated from Polish, with a foreword by Czesław Miłosz, University of California Press; "Takie czasy... Rzecz o kompromisie" ("These Times... on a Compromise"), by Adam Michnik, Aneks, London, and "KOR: A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981," by Jan Józef Lipiecki, translated from Polish, University of California Press.

The basic elements of the new definition of Central Europe are in Milan Kundera's essay. The way they have been treated, in one way or another, by all the adherents of the respective idea means that any analysis or criticism of the significance of the respective designation must necessarily be based on the attitude toward those elements. The point of departure of the definition is sociolinguistic. That clearly follows from Milan Kundera's question, "What does Europe actually mean to a Hungarian, Czech or Pole?" The new meaning is drastically limited in one respect because it is attributed solely by the members of a few ethnic groups. From another viewpoint it is extended from the level of history and other social sciences to that of an everyday awareness of some human types (a Hungarian, a Czech or a Pole). That way of looking at things raises the question form the very start of defining Europe outside of the contexts of science by attributing an ideological content to it and not an objective one that could possibly be shared by all Europeans. The second main element also follows from the way Milan Kundera posed the aforementioned question. He is not interested in the way the three ethnic groups view Central Europe but, paradoxically, in what they mean by Europe. By proceeding that way he implied the basic idea of his stand that Central Europe is a sui generis way of viewing Europe in general. The logical ground for that stand is an interpretation of Europe as a continent which is deeply and irreconcilably divided in regard to the way it is viewed by the Europeans themselves.

Milan Kundera's answer specifies the elements suggested in his question or others that may be implied in it. It is, "For 1,000 years their (referring to a Hungarian, Czech or Pole—author's note) nations belonged to the part of Europe that is rooted in Roman Catholicism. They participated in every period of its history. To them, the

word "Europe" is not a geographic term but an intellectual one synonymous with the word "West." The Hungary of today is no longer European, in the sense that it is no longer Western. It has deviated from its destiny, beyond its own history, and it is losing the essence of its identity. Geographic Europe (extending from the Atlantic to the Urals, Milan Kundera notes) was always divided into two halves that developed separately, one tied to ancient Rome and the Catholic Church and the other anchored in Byzantium and the Orthodox Church. After 1945 the borders between the two Europes were shifted several hundred kilometers to the west, and several nations that had always considered themselves Western found themselves in the East, where they are now."

In analyzing this reply we should make at least a few comments. In referring to the particular situations of the Hungarian, the Czech and the Pole, Milan Kundera does not take account of the entire histories of countries in Central Europe but reduces them to just one case, namely that of Hungary (An express reference is made to "Hungary of today..."), and that one is idealized. Equating Hungary's history with those of Czechoslovakia and Poland is a most egregious simplification. The Hungarians' participation in "Roman Christianity" was contradictory. The Hungarians coming westward made frequent invasions to the east and to the west at the time. They were defeated by Germans on the Lech River in 955, and they waged wars of conquest against Austria, Silesia and Moravia in the middle of that millennium. In what sense did M. Horthy tie Hungary to the West and to just which West? As for the Czech state's position, it did not have problems with Byzantium alone (and those were not among the most serious ones). It was included in Habsburg Empire in 1526. Its struggle for independence culminated in the 1848 Revolution. The Slovakian people were subjugated by the Hungarians in the first half of the 11th century. Slovakia was under Habsburg rule until 1867, whereupon it was included in Hungary until 1918, when the Czechoslovakian Republic was formed. The danger to Poland as a state did not come from the East alone, the partitions of Poland (first in 1772 and then in 1793 and 1795) among Prussia, Russia and Austria scored the Poles' destiny deeply, as proved by their uprisings in 1830-31, 1846, 1848 and 1863-64, and then the comparison (like the contradiction between good and bad) of Byzantium and the Orthodox Church with Rome and the Catholic Church is wrong. It would be difficult to understand the evolution of Europe without extensive consideration and favorable mention of the Byzantine Empire on several grounds (economic, military and cultural). We cannot forget that the capital of the Roman Empire was moved from Rome to the banks of the Bosphorus in 330, and about 700 years elapsed before the states to which Milan Kundera refers (Hungary especially) were formed, during which time the migrations struck at the walls of Constantinople more than once and in great strength. The European role of Byzantium continued into our millennium. For example, the influence of the Byzantine refugees upon the origin

and development of the ideal of the Renaissance is recognized (v. Stefan Brezeanu, "A History of the Byzantine Empire," Bucharest, Albatros Publishing House, 1981").

The ideas of Milan Kundera and his supporters betray a mentalistic and fatalistic view of society and its course. The schism of the Christian Church into a two-headed one in 860 is considered the factor that had a critical influence on Europe. Our continent had two poles at that time, the West and the East, which grouped all countries around their spiritual paradigms. In time this orientation toward one side or the other lent them an identity and a destiny from which they can no longer escape. Hence the Central European ideologists' tendency to accord history a special role in the creation of Europe's future. Affiliation of those countries with one kind of mentality is so tyrannical that it comes to be exclusivist. The situation since 1945, when the border between East and West was shifted, conflicts with the determination of the bipolar mentality. The countries that were left in that area are forced by a trick of fate to become part of the West again. They are conscious of their own condition, they have taken a number of actions to distance themselves from the East (Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1956, 1953 and 1970), and they are making a number of efforts on several levels, especially the cultural one, to fulfill their destiny. The social forces that have assumed the role of authors of those dialectics are the creators of culture. Whether or not they are accepted by the existing political regimes in their countries, they are oriented toward the West and intend to reintegrate their countries around the cardinal point that shaped and secured their existence. Coming from the ranks of the literati and from the social-scientific disciplines and playing the role of dissidents or near-dissidents, they claim to be counselors and event leaders of movements with a social base other than an intellectual one. Their missionary zeal has taken even more extreme forms. Dissatisfied because the West has failed to realize that Central Europe is a "sequestered West" and because the traditional values of the West have started to deteriorate in the very countries where they originated, the ideologists of this theory wish to revive the true European spirit. It seems they are trying not only to be recognized as the abandoned sons of Western Europe but also to become its intellectual and political mentors. Their position of Eastern Europe is categorical: If one is to speak of Europe, it can be only Western Europe. The Eastern European countries are to be viewed as belonging to another world, just as in the past Byzantium was something other than Rome. The theorists of the new ideology improperly ignore the multitude of factions that were basic to the shift of the capital of the empire to Constantinople (the shift of the empire's economic and demographic center of gravity to its eastern half, the economic decline in Western Europe, the migrations of the peoples, the prosperous and relatively comfortable life in another geographic environment, etc.) or to the schism in 860 (the outstanding material strength gained by Constantinople from the conversion

of the Slavic world to Christianity). Milan Kundera becomes somewhat more realistic in his interpretation of the situation created after 1945, mentioning the Communists' role and Russia's international power. But he regards the intervention of those factors as a deviation from the natural course of the Central European countries. But it is unquestionably an exaggeration to say that the changes in a whole series of countries that have shifted to socialism are due to the export of revolution. The forces of the left were operating within them with traditions that were quite powerful in some cases. In speaking of the existence of a special situation in all the Central European countries Milan Kundera accepts the presence of the political factor (oriented toward the East) in addition to the cultural one (oriented toward the West). But he believes the cultural factor is ultimately determined by their interrelationships. They must revert to the West, where they belong as identities of culture and destiny.

But I cannot attribute the appeal to history to the conception of the evolution and culture of Central Europe. Knowledge and understanding of society must allow for the trends in the various areas of society. But the two extreme positions pointed out by Karl Mannheim are to be avoided. The first is the ideological position that history is a multitude of possibilities narrowly circumscribed by a given system of the existing order. It sees the world as a relatively fixed place, while the burden of the past weighs on it very heavily. There are at best marginal possibilities of changing the status quo. The utopian position, on the other hand, sees the future in terms of a preferred situation. With the aid of the imagination, it creates a new reality that is a clean break with the past. It will undoubtedly be found by those who desire radical changes. The utopians accuse the ideologists of being mere justifiers of the status quo, while the ideologists accuse the utopians of being unrealistic from the historical point of view ("Ideology and Utopia," New York, A Harvest Book, 1936). Milan Kundera takes an intermediate stand. He is an ideologist when he supports bipolar determinism and attaches such great importance to history. But he is also a utopian believing that the current situation in the respective countries, characterized by a multitude of social parameters (economic, political, legal, military, those of social structure, institutional structure, etc.), will be changed by a cultural conversion emphasizing a Western European mentality. Essentially, the theory of Central Europe forecasts a future of Europe while taking account of just one trend, namely that of its cultural affiliation with the West. Due to this simplifying simplicity it does not come close in value to the efforts made by the futurologists of Europe who have imagined some scenarios of what Europe will look like in the next few decades. For example, in "Europe 2000" Peter Hall indicates some trends that will effect our continent in the 1980's and 1990's, namely the international economic crisis, global conflicts over the use of resources, growing alienation, decline and even the collapse of European agrarian society, unequal access to information and polarization

of all society. The theory of Central Europe has nothing in common with science. It is a myth about the more or less remote history of Europe in which the author's own wishes about the future have been projected. The formulation of the myth shows traces of sociological thought, but it comes much closer to the imaginative power of a literary composition or a poem. For those reasons I agree with the opinion of Timothy Gordon Ash, who called the new theory about Central Europe "mythical poetic." I also note the similarity of this theory to the Christian myth of salvation. Its propagators consider themselves called upon to sacrifice themselves in order to complete the divine triad, namely the Father = the world (Eurocentric), the Spirit = Western culture, and the Son = Central Europe (the purifier of all Europe).

The theory of Central Europe is definitely receptive to the present and future. It is advanced, beyond the emphasis on the role of culture in history, as a sociopolitical program that is not just national or regional but global-European. According to its author, the identity of Central Europe and the countries that compose it is selected in culture in a concentrated form. If it is threatened with extinctions, a strong reaction arises to defend it. It is manifested in the growing intensity of cultural activity in step with the danger, until culture becomes the key value around which everyone rallies. They say this situation explains why there is such an active recourse to the culture of the past in the Central European countries today, which is intended to strengthen the collective memory, and why such sustained unofficial efforts are being made to create and promote culture. Carrying the idea even further, Milan Kundera thinks the social movements in Central Europe after 1945 were based on cultural actions. The cultural "explosion" is only a necessary but inadequate requirement for fulfilling Central Europe's western destiny. It must be combined with experience. In trying to find what lies hidden behind that last concept, we come to the very heart of some political problems facing the Europe of our times. We shall refer below only to the most important of them.

In Milan Kundera's opinion the shift of the East to the West in 1945 meant the intensive exposure of Central Europe to the ideology of the Slavic world, which was invented in the 19th century and originally intended to oppose Germany's aggressive tendencies, although it was latently characterized by imperial ambitions as well. In the past this "Slavic spirit" was attacked by Karel Havlicek (a Czech writer) and Joseph Conrad (a writer of Polish origin). Milan Kundera says about it, "I know nothing more ridiculous than this belief in obscure depths, this loud and absurd feeling of the Slavic soul that is attributed to me from time to time." I think his distinction between the "Slavic soul" and the "Slavic world" is correct. The idea of the existence of such a world comprising all of Eastern Europe troubles us, giving rise to undesirable exaggerations in the cultural field (misinterpretation of the place of Slavic words in the Romanian language, imaginary cultural ties with the

East, and indiscriminate imitation and borrowing). Milan Kundera goes on to say, "The division of Europe after 1945, which united that supposedly Slavic world (including the unfortunate Hungarian and Romanians, whose languages are certainly not Slavic—but why should we make mountains out of molehills?), appeared to be an almost natural solution." I cannot overlook the fact that opposition to the Orthodox Church and the offensive of the Catholic Church with its whole ideology often lurk behind the rejection of the "Slavic spirit." There lies the social root of the emphatic assertion of the idea of the division of Europe as an act of religious politics. Even today the Catholic Church harbors a certain nostalgia for some areas of Central and Eastern Europe over which it exercised its power before 1945, and it is still not reconciled today with the social changes that have taken place in the area. In "Does Central Europe Exist?" Timothy Garton Ash says, "When Pope John Paul II speaks of 'Europe' he is looking with the eyes of a visionary and an exile not only beyond the 'truncated Europe' of the EEC to Prague, Budapest and his beloved Krakow but far beyond historical Central Europe..." In its extreme consequences denial of the "Slavic spirit" takes the form of an anti-Russian stand. Russia not only harbors old anti-Western obsessions but, more than that, it is not a part of Europe. Milan Kundera says, "Russia is viewed not only as another great European power but also as a unique civilization, an/other/ (Milan Kundera's italics) civilization." Timothy Garton Ash considers "the exclusion of Russia from Europe" absurd. If we try to discover why Russian civilization is "excluded" from Europe, we find that it is actually due to some psychological traits attributed by some Central European writers (Czeslaw Milosz and Kazimierz Brandy) to some great Russian creators of culture (Gogol for example). In "The Tragedy of Central Europe" Milan Kundera says, "Russia knows another (immense) dimension of disaster, another image of space (a space so vast that whole nations are engulfed by it), another sense of time (slow and calm), and another way of laughing living and dying."

The description of some important aspects of the Central European countries as an "antipolitical policy" is striking. It was suggested by the Hungarian writer and sociologist George Konrad and used expressly by the Czech playwright Vaclav Havel in 1984. This "new" policy actually means taking stands opposed to the legally instituted ones in the countries that make up that part of Europe. When they say "antipolitical" they have "antisocialism" in mind. When they go farther and call their position an "antipolitical policy" they are also stating a program. Essentially, that is nothing but a more or less veiled wish to reinstate the political and economic regime existing in the West, namely the capitalist one. In referring to communism Milan Kundera says without reservation that it is the system that "deprives the nations of their nature and furthermore it is making the Russian people its first victim." He says that today all Central Europe has been subjugated except Austria, "which has preserved its independence more by chance

than from necessity." He thinks there is only one force opposing alienation of Central Europe's self-identity, and that is culture with some of its representatives.

Other Central European theorists come to the policy by way of morals. Michnik, Havel and Konrad regard the categories of left and right, born in another period, as irrelevant, substituting the concepts of good and evil. We find from their definition of the good that they have Judeo-Christian individualism in mind. They reverse the priorities in the theory of socialism, namely the presumption of the controlling role of society. In their opinion individuals are the ones who confirm the political system, implement the system, make the system, and are the system. The three authors "express their conviction that moral changes can have such a disproportionate political effect that conscience ultimately determines existence, and that the key to the future lies not in the external objective conditions of the state (political, military, economic and technological) but in the individuals' internal subjective conditions." But imperceptibly the moral is converted into the political. In Michnik's and Konrad's opinion, individuals can be moral not because of changes in party or state but in "civil society." These authors speak of a civil society that is independent of the political structure and capable of keeping government policy under its control. In other words they favor a dualism of power consisting both of the party-state system and of civil society. Led by dissidents and illegal organizations, the civil society (authentic, autonomous, strong and well organized) would have the role of rebuilding society in a direction other than the socialist one. The following declaration is relevant: "My name is Adam Michnik. I am an antisocialist force." (Timothy Garton Ash, "Does Central Europe Exist?") In interpreting the western movement for peace, the Central European ideologists believe the danger of war does not come from the existence of weapons but from the political realities emanating from them. In developing this idea they come to speak of the necessity of greater respect for human rights and civil rights in Eastern Europe, thinking primarily of a civil society that will change the existing social system. No matter how they approach politics (via culture or morals) they confuse it with a form of human mentality. Actually it is a very strong structure, institutionally organized and defended by an army. Moreover it is built upon a certain economic base. As Timothy Garton Ash observes about this, "Perhaps the most striking defect in their internal analyses is their total neglect of the material aspect of life, their disdain for economics."

Determination of the boundaries of Central Europe is one of the most difficult problems. The first thing that should be said is the fact that its location in the geography of Europe is vague and ambiguous. Milan Kundera says that it is "located, geographically speaking, in the center." But what is the center of Europe? In reference to the initial division of Europe between Rome and Byzantium and between the Catholic and Orthodox churches,

it gives us no precise indication as to the line of demarcation between East and West. As we well know, the map of Europe was disputed between Rome and Byzantium and modified several times. The Roman-Byzantine Empire reached its apogee in Justinian's reign (sixth century). It extended to Italy and Spain, including part of North Africa, Turkey and a large part of the Near and Middle East. At the death of Vasil II (1052) only a small part of Italy still belonged to the empire. Under Alexios I (1118) it lost all of Italy and the border reached the area of Yugoslavia today, undergoing other marked fluctuations as well. The lack of identity of Byzantium with the Orthodox Church is a serious problem. Short of going into historical details we must say that the present territory of Romania did not belong to the Byzantine Empire but was always largely under the influence of the Orthodox Church. In some cases Milan Kundera means by Central Europe the place the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians and others love. The implicit identification of Central Europe with the Habsburg Empire, viewed with some sympathy and seemingly regretted, should also be mentioned. These inaccuracies in the theory of Central Europe again conflict with the historical facts. Milan Kundera, probably noting those defects himself, concludes that Central Europe cannot be defined or determined by political frontiers. But in interpreting this conclusion not merely as a reflection of the epistemological inaccuracies of the theory of Central Europe, we come to the problem of questioning the present boundaries of Europe. Central Europe is considered an inseparable part of the West not only culturally but also politically although it joined the East by chance after 1945. That description is equivalent to the wish to change the line that divides Europe into capitalist and socialist countries. What is more, the borders between some countries in that are debated and disputed in devious ways. The way our situation is presented is an example of this. The Romanians are mentioned as an example to illustrate the cultural community of the nations in the area. In Prague, Milan Kundera says, youths of several nationalities studied together at Charles University. The first translations of the Bible into Hungarian and Romanian were written under the direct influence of that university (of which Jan Huss was once the rector). The connection with the religious reformer suggests to us that Milan Kundera was thinking of the "Belgrade Calvinist Catechism of 1640." If that is actually so, when he mentioned the Romanian language in the indicated context he was referring to the Romanians in Transylvania. This limitation is also implied in the identification of Central Europe with the Habsburg Empire. Only a part of the Romanians were within the borders of that empire. George Konrad says forthrightly, "The Hungarian nation will not rest until it gains self-determination here in the Carpathian basin." Timothy Garton Ash reports an incident that is very illustrative for understanding the obscure part of the problem we are discussing. "I brought up the idea of Central Europe with a very intelligent and sophisticated Hungarian friend. 'Ah yes,' he sighed, 'Perhaps some day there can be something like Central Europe. And, you know, we more

readily blame you for the fact that it does not exist.'" He was referring to the Trianon Treaty ("It should be mentioned that the Trianon Treaty in 1920, and integral part of the peace settlement after the war whose chief architects were Woodrow Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George, deprived Hungary of more than two-thirds of its territory before 1914, including Slovakia, which then became Czechoslovakia, Transylvania, which joined Romania, and Croatia, which became Yugoslavia—Timothy Garton Ash's note in "Does Central Europe Exist?"). Milan Kundera's hazardous dream is a Central Europe with "imaginary borders," "which can be designated and redesignated." To support something like that means to wish for a permanently explosive situation in the middle of Europe. In another version the dream leads him to "a multinational community wherein every nation will be entitled to its own language." The thought reminds us of the Habsburg Empire and some of the "solutions" advanced in the period before World War I (by Karl Renner, a so-called Austro-Hungarian patriot and defender of the empire on economic and political grounds, and not by Otto Bauer, who at least realized that national oppression was a function of class antagonism).

As for Europe [as published...probably Central Europe] before 1945, is a part of Western Europe by virtue of its history and culture, Milan Kundera nevertheless recognizes certain distinctive elements of its own. It was not purely and simply "the part of the West that is now in the East." But it is contradictory in nature. It had its merits but also evident and serious weaknesses. At the beginning of our century it was perhaps the greatest cultural center in Europe. Sigmund Freud's parents came from Poland and the young Sigmund spent his childhood in Moravia, now in Czechoslovakia. Edmund Husserl and Gustav Mahler also spent their childhoods there. Kafka and Hasek of Prague created an immortal prose by their works. Structuralist thought came into being in the Linguistic Circle of Prague toward the end of the 1920's. But Central Europe also had its weaknesses. It was a family of small nations with no ambitions for conquest but, on the contrary, were victims of outside forces (Their territory was disputed more than once by Germany and Russia). By another definition Central Europe means nothing but "an uncertain area of small nations located between Russia and Germany." But what is a small nation? "It is one whose existence is questionable at any point." Therein lies the vulnerability of all Europe, Milan Kundera says. Those who live in Central Europe are keenly aware of this real situation. A Frenchman, Russian or Englishman is not accustomed to questioning the survival of his nation. They speak only of their nations' grandeur and eternity. But those who live in Central Europe know that their nations can disappear. One poem begins with the verse "Poland has not disappeared yet..." In Milan Kundera's opinion, against this existential and psychological background a pure and distinct humanist, democratic, skeptical, tolerant and antiutopian mentality was born. Timothy Garton Ash

doubts the intellectual purity of this historical and cultural area. He mentions the fact that Hitler too was a child of Central Europe, where two world wars broke out. Which is more characteristic of the history of Central Europe, tolerance or nationalism and racism? I do not think the question of the nature of Central Europe is without interest but, on the contrary, highly important. Short of agreeing with its intellectual "purity" I do not think the references to the area of small nations are aimless. The laboratory was there that gave birth, after World War I, to some resolute struggles for national liberation and advancement after centuries of social and ethnic oppression. That has left its mark in the Central Europeans' awareness, especially since World War II made those nation's existence and integrity questionable again. Lying between the East and the West, the Central European countries are constantly affected by the extraordinarily complicated procedures, like rise and fall of certain centers of power in the East and West. In one way or another they are characterized by an attempt, sometimes desperate, to survive as the cope with external trends that often pursue global interests transcending the question of their existence or nonexistence as states. It is their great responsibility to perceive contemporary relationships, the part they can play in maintaining a climate of stability and peace, and especially the possibility that they may again fall victims to some vagaries of history, slyly planned or gone out of hand somewhere else.

In conclusion, I could sum up the whole theory of Central Europe, with all its main consequences, in one metaphor. In a mythical-poetic way, Milan Kundera and its other representatives have "constructed" an enormous powder keg in the middle of Europe, and they have attached a fuse to the keg by saying that it is "sequestered" in the East. Some signs that this theory are in unofficial and dissident politics and even tolerated in some cases on the semiofficial level indicate to us that the fuse has been lit. Only an irresponsible person could want Central Europe to be the place and occasion for the outbreak of a global conflagration (It is difficult to suppose that a possible war could remain localized in Europe alone in view of the concentration of troops and the conventional and nuclear arsenal existing there). Such questions acutely arise as does the West need such a powder keg? If it accepts it, will the game not go on? Or perhaps does it prefer to expedite lighting the fuse and to witness the ensuing explosion. But would not such and explosion seriously affect Western Europe. What I believe anyone living in Central Europe should wish for is a stable area where peace and good will among states and nations will be established and all states' sovereignty and independence will be respected. In such a climate the economy could be developed effectively on the basis of the successes of science, technology and mutually advantageous economic collaboration, and culture could flourish freely in keeping with some real traditions of Central Europe and of each individual country and could be placed honorably in the service of the brotherhood of the peoples and an intellectual and human uplift such as our

continent has never known. Then and only then will an inimitable beauty throw a light of full human happiness upon those who have imagined and then brought such a dream to life.

HUNGARY

Speakers Use Strong Words at Nagy Funeral

Sandor Racz Speech

25000330 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian
17 Jun 89 p 3

[Speech by Sandor Racz: "We Will Continue To Fight for Every Bit of Justice"]

[Text] "We have preserved the spirit of the 1956 revolution with respect, loyalty, and honor, and we will continue to fight for every bit of justice. The 1956 Hungarian revolution demonstrated to the world that there exists only one kind of honest politics, the kind that stems from the people themselves and is accepted by them. We had to wait 32 years for this day, and we Hungarians throughout the world have not been praying in vain to live to see it.

"The bells are tolling everywhere in the world, announcing the Hungarians' very deep mourning. At the same time, however, they are also proclaiming that the Hungarian people have risen again. Is there a chance that Hungarian freedom might blossom from the blood of the Hungarian heroes? No, there is not, because there are many obstacles Hungarian society has yet to overcome. The first obstacle, and the one most difficult to resolve, is the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. These coffins, and our present bitter lives as well, are the results of their presence. Therefore we appeal to every honest individual in the world, let us jointly help the Soviet Union withdraw its troops as soon as possible from the territory of our Hungarian fatherland.

"Another obstacle is the Communist Party, clinging tenaciously to power, even though it is as plain as day that what the communists neglected to do during the past 43 years can never again be remedied. It was they who determined what life was like in Hungary during the past 43 years. The Hungarian people merely had to endure it. And that was what crippled Hungarian society.

"The third obstacle is the diffusion of the social force that Hungarian society represents. We all know that we will be able to resolve the vital question of Hungary's destiny only through cooperation. Therefore I wish to remind every Hungarian that it is our primary duty to join forces and not dissipate the nation's strength into a million political parties.

"I am confident that Hungarians in general will rise above petty interests, to bring Hungarian society into being and to rally around our Hungarian fatherland. The

communists in Hungary have yet to rehabilitate themselves for a very long time in order to regain their credibility. But they have no duty more sacred than to regain Hungarian freedom. Let them join us in the struggle to achieve the sacred objective of carrying out the command of these dead. That is what they died for, and their last wish was a free and democratic Hungary."

Because five minutes was too short a time to review the history and sufferings of the thousand-year-old Hungarian nation, the speaker requested that the crowd—it had swollen to about 250,000 by 12:30—sing the Hungarian church hymn "Blessed Virgin, Our Mother."

After the hymn, Sandor Racz continued: "Today world political opinion sympathizes with Hungarian aspirations. But this attitude also strikes a slightly false note: It is not nurtured by the just political demands of the Hungarian people. Therefore I ask my fellow Hungarians living abroad, use your influence to achieve support from the civilized world for the original political demands that would satisfy the Hungarian people. In conclusion, I have merely this much to add: This mourning and these coffins command us to never let a day go by without remembering Imre Nagy, his fellow martyrs, and the unknown heroes of plot No 301, the Budapest kids without whom there would have been no revolution and will be no freedom."

The next speaker was Imre Mecs, on behalf of the comrades with whom he had been sentenced to death.

Imre Mecs Speech

25000330 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian
17 Jun 89 p 4

[Speech by Imre Mecs: "This Day Marks the Beginning of a New Era"]

[Text] "We are burying several hundred people today. A prime minister, a defense minister, a minister without portfolio, intellectuals, very many workers, peasants, soldiers, and civilians, Christians, Jews and atheists, communists, gypsies and very ordinary people, mostly young kids and young adults, and a few elderly individuals. We are burying the revolutionaries who embodied the wrath and the will of the people, martyrs and victims who came from many walks of life but fought for Hungarian freedom and became united in their accepted destiny.

"We are burying the insurgents, the 'holy youngsters' who took on the world's biggest army and once forced it out of Budapest; who attempted to absorb with their bodies the blows of the second aggression that horrible dawn on November 4th.

"We are burying those who were politicians with a heart and men of integrity, who returned the stolen fatherland.

"We are burying them with honor, noble simplicity, and the dignity of their restored self-respect.

"We are observing a day of general mourning, when we remember and extend our sympathy to the bereaved who have mourned for decades, secretly, swallowing their tears, and to whom belated amends must be made.

"This is a day of mourning when the nation itself takes account of the 32 wasted years. We would be much farther today if the then leaders of the Soviet Union had not drowned our noble revolution in blood and tears! By brutally preventing the Hungarian nation from going its own way, what they committed was not merely a crime but an enormous historical blunder as well. Thereby they also caused damage to their own people! The thread of history has dug up our buried truths.

"Today is a day of remembrance when we recall the heroic episodes of the revolution, and the figures and persons of our destroyed friends, fathers, sisters, and brothers. We bring them to mind bashfully and with slight embarrassment, because in them we also recognize ourselves at that time. They will now remain forever who they were, inseparably linked with the revolution, with the amazing days when the nation, nearly presumed dead, emerged from hiding to live, to exist again, and to unite the people.

"Today is a day for examinations of conscience, when everyone turns inward and examines how he has lived, or how he has been able to live, during the past 32 years, without freedom. The murderers, their helpers, the passive murderers, the ones who turned a blind eye and did not want to know about anything, the resigned, those who put their heads in the yoke, the comfort-loving, the indolent, the unprincipled, the destroyers of their country, the traitors, the nobodies.

"And let also the 'clean' people examine their consciences. How they have been able to tolerate all this for decades. How much this nation has missed!

"Today marks the beginning of a new era. We are burying a system that was bad from the outset, rejected by the nation, forced upon us, and bankrupt in every respect.

"But today is also a day of hope. If we join forces, we will be able to achieve what our forefathers aspired to, what our executed and unburied comrades wanted jointly with us, and what they sacrificed their lives for: an independent, free, and democratic Hungary.

"We must unite, and then not even the forces of hell will be able to get the better of us! And now, let everyone grasp the hand of the person next to him, and then repeat after me: We pledge to the memory of Imre Nagy, Miklos Gimes, Geza Losonczy, Pal Maleter, Jozsef Szilagyi, Istvan Angyal, Janos Barany, Bela Bekesi, Arpad Brusznay, Pal Kosa, Janos Mecseri, Jozsef Nagy, Geza Pech,

Marton Rajki, Lajos Szabo and the several hundred of our executed and destroyed comrades, to win freedom for our people prudently, united, and persistently, and to never let that freedom be taken away.

"We will realize the revolution's legacy in their spirit. 'We swear/Never again/To be slaves./We swear!' [Petofi]."

Tibor Zimanyi spoke on behalf of the detainees, Rask prisoners, and victims of the deportations.

Bela Kiraly Speech

25000330 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian
17 Jun 89 p 4

[Speech by Bela Kiraly: "We Must Become a Free Country, but Without Bloodshed and Violence"]

[Text] "When the horrible news reached us on 17 June 1958 in the United States, Anna Kethly and I solemnly promised never to set foot on Hungarian soil, until the people of Hungary would again be able to pay their respects publicly to Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs. That day has now arrived. If Anna Kethly were alive, she too would certainly be here.

"As we bury our martyrs, let us learn from them.

"Imre Nagy wanted land reform. In contrast to the plans of the Stalinists, however, he did not want to place the land in public ownership. Rather, he wanted to give the land to those who were farming it, in order to have a strong, prosperous, and happy peasantry as one of the nation's staunch pillars. When he urged his audience to take up arms against Hitler, on the Hungarian-language program of Radio Moscow during World War II, concern for the nation's future emanated from his words. That was when the Stalinists began to brand him a 'nationalist.' During his first term as prime minister (1953-55), he wanted to introduce educational reform, to improve the education of the 'small Hungarians.' In 1956, he became the apostle of national independence. Let us learn Hungarian patriotism from Imre Nagy!

"In 1930, at the second congress of the Hungarian Communist Party, he openly opposed the Stalinists on the question of land reform. That was the first time he was branded a "revisionist" for violating a bolshevik idea, a capital crime in those days. 'I shall never stand at attention during the singing of the Internationale,' he retorted. During the 15 years he lived in the Soviet Union, the Stalinists spent their energy in fractional fights, outbidding one another in their loyalty to the Soviet Union. He studied, did research at the International Institute of Agricultural Sciences, and pondered the reconstruction of the country preparing for its liberation. Let us learn from Imre Nagy how to work indefatigably for the nation, wherever our destiny takes us!

"In Hungary during the year of change [1948], he protested against herding the peasantry like sheep into kolkhozes, against the mass violations of human rights, and against the annihilation of the trade unions and coalitional parties.

"Recalling the actions of Imre Nagy around 1947-48, allow me to convey to you the joint wish of Bela Varga, the former speaker of parliament, and Jozsef Kovago, the former mayor of Budapest: 'May the nation's gratitude be with him and his fellow martyrs.' During his first term as prime minister, Imre Nagy began to dismantle the Soviet structure: he opened the gates of the detention camps, began the rehabilitation of persons convicted of political crimes, let the farmers leave their cooperatives and go back to private farming, and supported the development of industries producing consumer goods, instead of the excessive investments in heavy industry. He 'revised' bolshevik theory and its practical variant, the Soviet system. In 1956, the nation that advanced together with the revolution made him a statesman of democracy and national independence. Let us learn from Imre Nagy that the struggle for freedom is not over as long as there is even a single slave left!

"Imre Nagy stood a world apart from the Stalinists in that he knew how ideology could and should be applied to government. The Stalinists forged chains from ideology and used them to fetter nations. To the Stalinists, ideology came first, and man only second. They made our country a lamb sacrificed to ideology and placed at the mercy of the political wolves. But Imre Nagy, in the spirit of utilitarianism, wanted to apply ideology so that it would do the most good to as many Hungarians as possible. When necessary, he modified or 'revised' Marxist ideology, to make it useful in practice. To Imre Nagy the humane scientist and statesman, doctrine was merely a means of achieving the goal: man's welfare. Let us learn from Imre Nagy that social equilibrium stands or falls with the individual's happiness and equal opportunity!

"Imre Nagy taught us to form with the neighboring nations a confederation that would constitute a free and neutral zone of Europe. Restoration of the presently suppressed national, civil, and human rights of the millions of Hungarians living under foreign domination must be a prerequisite for this.

"Some people contend that in 1956 it was the 'mob' that swept Imre Nagy into the 'extremes' into which he would otherwise have never been willing to go. It is true that the prime minister in 1956 was a reformer, rather than a revolutionary. It is likewise true that he wanted to achieve his drastic reforms peacefully, without bloodshed. But let us finally become acquainted with the real Imre Nagy, and note that the reforms he headed during the revolution were the same ones he had been fighting for between 1947 and 1956, including freedom of the

individual, democracy, a multiparty system, and neutrality. Let us learn from Imre Nagy that 1956 was not a series of randomly committed mistakes, but the frank expression of the Hungarian nation's will!

"His enemies attempt to depict Imre Nagy as hesitant and undecided. They can do so only by concealing the fact that Kadar's agents offered Nagy during his imprisonment not only his freedom, but probably also a ministerial portfolio. They should have known his answer, because Imre Nagy had said already in June 1956: 'There is one thing I will not do, and that is to abandon my convictions in an unprincipled manner.' He stuck to this standpoint even in the shadow of the gallows. He did not betray the nation and preferred martyrdom instead. The Imre Nagy accused of being weak was an indomitable champion of freedom. Let us learn from Imre Nagy to remain true to our principles!

"Let the literate teach the ignorant so that the latter, by getting to know the real Imre Nagy, may enhance their national awareness and national pride. But the better we get to know Imre Nagy's humaneness, the clearer it becomes that it would be a desecration of his memory if here, from his graveside, we were to point a finger at his murderers. Although every detail of their crimes should be uncovered, they must not be prosecuted for those crimes. Liberated Hungarian society must quash the death sentence once and for all, it must not yield to revenge and must forestall any retribution. Let the guilty be tormented by their own conscience, if they have one, and let history be their judge. Let us learn from Imre Nagy, but let us also be able to forgive and forget. Because anyone who fails to learn from history, and is unable to forgive and forget, might repeat the mistakes and crimes of the past!

"To make sure that the coming generations do not confuse what has to be forgiven and forgotten with what has to be learned, let us restore the Imre Nagy Institute. Let the institute continue from 1989 on in Budapest the research that it began in Brussels in 1956. Let us find all the written sources on the events that preceded and followed the revolution, and let us record what every living witness has to say! Let their testimonies form a bridge between the emigres and the Hungarians at home. And let the documents restored to the public pave the way for rapprochement. Let us learn from Imre Nagy, the [one-time] foreign minister and interior minister, that the lot of the people beyond and within our borders is neither a foreign affair nor a domestic matter, but the area of intellectual Hungary's public administration. Let us collect all the historical documents. And let us learn from Imre Nagy, the prime minister, that compulsory deliveries must be abolished also in the case of intellectual public property. Instead of the MSZMP's [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] archives, an independent scientific institute should be entrusted with fostering the nation's past. And Imre Nagy's title of academician obligates us to maintain the freedom of scientific research!

"The coming burial of Imre Nagy, Geza Losonczy, Pal Maleter, Miklos Gimes, Jozsef Szilagyi, and 500 freedom fighters does not close anything; rather, it opens a new era. All victims of the 1956 revolution and the subsequent reprisals—whether living or dead, and the unknown freedom fighters in particular—must now be given what they have earned by their sacrifices! Democratic societies have recently been created peacefully, from a totalitarian system in Spain and a bloody military dictatorship in Uruguay. In the same way, our fatherland must transform itself into a country of freedom peacefully, without bloodshed and violence. That is what the memory of the martyrs demands. The memory of the 500 freedom-fighter martyrs, of Imre Nagy, Geza Losonczy, Pal Maleter, Miklos Gimes and Jozsef Szilagyi. Comrades, friends, may you rest in peace!"

The last speaker, on behalf of Hungary's younger generation, was Viktor Orban (FIDESZ [Association of Democratic Youth]).

Viktor Orban (FIDESZ) Speech

25000330 Budapest *MAGYAR NEMZET* in Hungarian
17 Jun 89 p 4

[Speech by Viktor Orban: "That 6th Coffin Also Contains Our Next 20 Years"]

[Text] "Since the Russian occupation and the introduction of communist dictatorship 40 years ago, the Hungarian nation has had only one opportunity, and sufficient courage and strength, to achieve the objectives set already in 1848: national independence and political freedom. Our objectives have not changed to this day. We have not backed down on the 1948 demands, and therefore we cannot yield on 1956, either.

"The young people who today are fighting for European bourgeois democracy are bowing their heads before the communist Imre Nagy and his comrades, for two reasons. We respect them as people who identified with the will of Hungarian society and therefore had to disregard two sacred communist taboos: unconditional service to the Russian empire, and party dictatorship. To us they are the statesmen who even in the shadow of the gallows refused to side with the murderers decimating society, and who did not betray the nation that accepted them and placed its confidence in them, even though their refusal to do so cost them their lives. From their fate we have learned that democracy and communism are incompatible.

"We know very well that the majority of the victims of the revolution and the reprisals were young people of our age and our kind. But that is not the only reason why we feel that the sixth coffin is ours. To this day, 1956 was the last chance for our nation to set out on the Western

road of development and become prosperous. The burden of bankruptcy we are shouldering is a direct consequence of ruthlessly suppressing the revolution and forcing us back into the Asiatic dead end from which we are now trying once again to find a way out.

"Indeed, it was in 1956 that the MSZMP deprived us young people of our future. Hence in that sixth coffin there lies not only a murdered youth, but our next 20 or perhaps more years as well.

"Friends! We young people do not understand many things that perhaps seem natural to the older generation. We are unable to comprehend that those who not so long ago were still reviling in chorus the revolution and its prime minister have suddenly come to realize that they are the continuers of Imre Nagy's reform policies. We also fail to comprehend that those party and government leaders who had decreed that we be taught from textbooks which falsified the revolution are now practically scrambling to touch these coffins, almost as talismans that will bring them good luck. We feel we owe them no gratitude for being allowed to bury our dead after 31 years, nor for the fact that today our political organizations are already able to operate.

"It is no merit of the Hungarian political leadership that, although it could have done so with its force of arms, it has not employed methods similar to those of Pol Pot, Jaruzelski, Li Peng, or Rakosi, against those who have been demanding democracy and free elections.

"Now, 33 years after the Hungarian revolution and 31 years after the execution of the last responsible Hungarian prime minister, we have a chance to achieve by peaceful means everything that the 1956 revolutionaries won for the nation in bloody battles, although merely for a few days. If we have confidence in our own strength, we will be able to bring communist dictatorship to an end. If we are sufficiently determined, we will be able to force the ruling party to submit to the ballot box. If we do not lose sight of the ideals of 1956, we will be able to elect a government that will immediately start negotiations on beginning the withdrawal of Russian troops without delay. If, and only if, we are bold enough to want all this, we will be able to accomplish the will of our revolution. Nobody can expect the party state to change of its own accord. Remember that on 6 October 1956, the day of Laszlo Rajk's funeral, SZABAD NEP, the party daily, ran a headline in large print that read "Never Again!" And only three weeks later the Communist Party ordered its AVH [State Security Authority] henchmen to fire at unarmed, peaceful demonstrators. And not quite two years later, in a show trial similar to that of Rajk's, the MSZMP had hundreds of innocent defendants sentenced to death, among them its own comrades. We will not be satisfied with the communist politicians' empty promises that are not binding at all. The ruling party must not be able to use force against us even if it wants to. Only that way will we be able to avoid more coffins and belated funerals like the one today.

"Imre Nagy, Miklos Gimes, Geza Losonczy, Pal Maléter, and Jozsef Szilagyi sacrificed their lives for Hungarian independence and freedom. To Hungarian youths these ideals remain inviolable even today. We bow our heads to your memory.

"May you rest in peace."

The commemoration on Hosok Tere ended with Viktor Orban's speech, a few minutes before 2:30 pm. About 250,000 persons paid their respects in the approximately 5-hour-long funeral ceremony. Laying wreaths and flowers, Hungarians bade farewell to their martyrs. After the eulogies, the band played Ferenc Erkel's "Ceremonial Overture." The coffins and the immense quantity of wreaths and flowers were loaded on motor vehicles, and the funeral procession started off for the cemetery. Relatives and guests accompanied the vehicles with the coffins and wreaths to the new public cemetery in Rakoskeresztur. Crowds of varying size had gathered along the way, waiting for the funeral procession, to pay their respects in this manner to those who had sacrificed their lives for Hungarian independence.

Politburo Ponders Proposals for Party Conference

Preparing for National Party Conference

25000295a Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
20 May 89 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Recommendations to the CC [Central Committee]: About the Tasks of Preparing a National Party Conference—A Report"]

[Text] At its latest meeting the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] Politburo considered the main tasks related to the preparation and organization of the national party conference, and to issues pertaining to the institution of local and national elections to party offices ["party voting"]. The Politburo intends to submit the two proposals at the next CC meeting, scheduled for 29 May. The proposals have been forwarded to the CC members. The following is an abbreviated description of the documents, in order that the party membership may convey its views and make remarks to CC members on time.

The document indicates that party public opinion demands the renewal of the organizational process of the election of delegates and of party conferences. The key issue is the order by which delegates should be elected, because county party committees appointed delegates to the May 1988 party conference. This prompted much justifiable criticism in those days. It is a fundamental requirement that delegates be elected on the most democratic basis and as directly as possible.

The Election of Delegates

In the Politburo's view it would be best to hold a national party conference in the fall. Every 800 party members would elect one voting delegate to the conference, and the members of the CC and the Central Control Committee would also be voting delegates.

Democracy and the direct vote would require local organizations to ensure the following: (1) that every party member is able to nominate his own delegate, and that any party member can become a delegate; (2) that any party member is able to participate in the selection of the delegate he nominates, by casting either a direct vote or a proxy vote he may control; (3) that the party membership is able to become familiar in advance with the political views of candidates, and is able to elect delegates on the basis of such knowledge; and (4) that platforms that have evolved within the party are represented in an appropriate manner.

In regard to these general principles, city and municipal party committees—in coordination with county party committees and party committees with the authority of county party committees—shall make independent decisions concerning the rules and methods of delegate selection, based on their own experiences. (The recommended order in which delegates should be selected would demand that nominations receive the greatest publicity in the party press, the mass media, and on election rallies.)

To guarantee the prevalence of general principles pertaining to delegate selections, it is recommended that the CC establish a permanent committee to examine mandates. Resolution of disputed issues may be assisted by this body by publicly taking positions; these, however, would not be mandatory and binding. Changing the rules for local elections and proceedings in response to irregularities should be under the authority of party organs with jurisdiction.

Continuous Dialogue, Cooperation With the Membership

In preparing for a party conference it is an elementary requirement to permit the party membership to express its views concerning documents and proposals placed on the agenda, and to allow delegates to caucus and make decisions, aware of the views held by their constituents.

So that the party membership has sufficient time for the consideration and formulation of views, the election of delegates must be completed by the middle of this coming July. Thus, the CC could prepare for the party conference (including the documents to be submitted, as well as organizational and personal proposals) in continuous cooperation with the delegates. The Politburo recommends that delegate groups from Budapest and from the counties elect spokesmen for their groups at the

organizational meeting. These spokesmen would convey the delegates' opinions in the course of preparing the political program, the operating rules, and the personal proposals.

The Politburo's proposal includes a requirement that the Party Policy Committee publicize a concept paper in early June concerning the organizational rules, and that it continuously gather and summarize views received—the independent, diverse recommendations of persons advocating different platforms. The committee should involve in its work the spokesmen for the various delegate groups elected to deal with this subject.

The Party Policy Committee should work out joint compromises, consulting regularly with representatives of the platforms. In regard to unsettled issues, the proposed rules should clearly delineate the alternatives, and should be submitted in that manner to the party conference.

The Establishment of a New CC

The method by which a new CC should be established is related to the development of party democracy. According to the Politburo proposal, the Budapest and county party organizations, as well as party organizations having the authority of county party organizations, shall delegate to the CC one comrade for each 15,000 party members. (The above basic principles apply to nominations and elections, while practical issues should be decided at the local level.)

MSZMP groups involved in trade union activities and in cooperative movements will delegate representatives to the CC pursuant to independently developed rules of procedure.

The Politburo proposal finds it desirable for the leadership of the MSZMP parliamentary delegation to receive CC membership at the same time.

Members of the Politburo and the CC secretariat would be elected directly by the party conference. Members of the CC holding public offices at the national level, or who are nationally known representatives of scientific and artistic life, would also be elected by the conference.

The proposal recommends that consideration be given to the idea that the chairman and executive secretary of the MSZMP be elected on the basis of votes cast by the entire party membership.

A nominating committee would make recommendations regarding CC members to be elected directly at the party conference, and regarding members of the Central Control Committee. Elected spokesmen of county party organizations and of party organizations with the authority of county party organizations would also receive places in the nominating committee.

Local, National Election of Party Officials
25000295a Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
20 May 89 p 3

[Text] The paper submitted by the Politburo for debate states that party referendums are a suitable means for the direct expression of the party membership's views in which a recommendation may be either accepted or rejected. A party referendum may be held at the national, county, or municipal level, or in any party organization.

Two theoretical situations apply to party referendums. One involves the after-the-fact affirmation or rejection of a position taken, or a decision made by one of the bodies. (If the majority votes in the affirmative the measure will take effect. If the measure is rejected it is nullified.) The other situation involves politically definitive cases, in which the party membership's position binds the given elected body.

Who Can Initiate Party Referendums and How?

Who can initiate a party referendum, how is it done, and on what subjects can a referendum be called? A national referendum may be called for by the CC, by the county party committees acting as a body, and by the membership. Local party referendums may be called by the party committees having jurisdiction in an area, by organizational bodies directly under their jurisdiction, by party organizations functioning in a given area (representing a common view as a body), and by party members registered in these bodies. Whoever initiates a party referendum is obligated to inform the party committee having jurisdiction.

Party referendums may not only be initiated, they may also be ordered. At the national level, the CC, and the party committee having jurisdiction in an area have the right to order a party referendum. It is mandatory to order a party referendum if, in a given area, 10 percent of the party membership, or 40 percent of the bodies having the right to initiate a referendum, support the mandatory referendum. (An example for the latter: a countywide party vote must be ordered if the county party committee and 40 percent of the party committees under its direction support a mandatory referendum.) In the event that support falls short of the required 40 percent, the party body having the authority to do so may decide whether it deems a party referendum necessary.

Preparation and Administration

According to the proposal, the body ordering a referendum would have to establish a party voting committee. This committee would be responsible for the preparation and administration of the referendum, and for the tallying of the votes. The body ordering a party referendum

must submit the subject matter for debate, and must provide thorough information relative to all related and important issues at least 30 days before the vote is taken.

Party members may exercise their right to cast a party vote in the party organization to which they pay dues. The casting of votes should take place at basic organization membership meetings, by open or secret ballot, according to the members' decision. A secret ballot should be cast in regard to personal matters. The results of the vote must be recorded, and a duplicate of the record must be preserved by the basic organization.

The tallying of votes would be accomplished by a party voting committee established by the organ which ordered the referendum, or, in the case of a national referendum, by county or local party voting committees, based on the minutes of membership meetings.

Party voting committees should ensure the purity of the tallying of votes, and should enable the membership to check the voting records. Based on the votes cast, a proposal may be deemed accepted or rejected if:

Alternate "A": more than half of the registered (dues paying) party members supported or rejected the issue;

Alternate "B": more than half of the votes supported or rejected the issue at an election in which at least two-thirds of the registered (dues paying) party members took part.

(Alternate "A" must be applied in personal matters.)

The partial results, the summary data, and the final result of a party referendum must be publicized within the party. Complaints against the ordering or the holding of party referendums, or against the administration of a party referendum in violation of organizational rules may be submitted to higher party bodies (to the congress), or to the Central Control Committee.

Bibo's Concept of Separation of Powers Discussed
25000278 Budapest TARSADALMI SZEMLE in Hungarian No 5, 1989 pp 11-17

[Article by Janos Sari: "On Istvan Bibo's Concept of the Separation of Powers"]

[Text] Within European societies between the two world wars there developed strains and conflicts that split apart the period's institutional framework for exercising power: the evolved forms of parliamentary government rendered impossible or seriously hampered society's government; the emergence of fascism destroyed, or threatened to destroy, traditional political values; and the complete liquidation of basic civil rights and human rights had to be faced. The present generation in the

socialist countries is confronted with the onerous historical legacy of show trials, although the tragic consequences of the ones staged in the Soviet Union became known in many parts of the world already then, in the 1930's.

Why Separation of Powers?

It was in this critical world of political thinking, creating institutions and engaging in politics that Istvan Bibó attracted attention with his concept of the separation of powers. And at this point let us immediately dispel a rather common misconception. Bibó expounded his systematized thinking on this subject in 1947, in his inaugural lecture at the Academy [of Sciences]. Unfortunately, the peculiarities of that genre did not allow Bibó to analyze the discussed questions in all their interrelations and nuances. Therefore we may compare this inaugural lecture to an aerial photograph of the political thinking of several centuries. Some parts of that aerial photograph may be blurred and perhaps cannot be distinguished clearly. On the whole, however, it presented a large-scale and accurate overview not only of the major trends in political thinking, but also of the possible directions that could have lead the world out of its crisis at that time.

The cause of the misconception is that Bibó burst into political theory not with his concept of the separation of powers, presented in his inaugural lecture at the Academy, but with the stance he adopted in the debate that unfolded over the 1942 publication of Zoltan Magyary's textbook of public administration, or rather over the views Magyary expounded in it. Here, we may safely say, Bibó's concept was of epochal significance. But before we attempt a more detailed analysis of his concept, we have to answer in general the question as to why Bibó turned specifically to the theory of the separation of powers. Why did he find, discover, specifically in that political philosophy his principal message for his period, a message that practically had been "written off" as obsolete, was constantly criticized and rejected for over a century, and survived more or less only through those rejections and critiques?

Obviously, this was not simply just a matter of a reciprocal phenomenon of some sort. In other words, it was not that forgotten theories can always be counted on to surface again, after a certain length of time has elapsed. It would be closer to the truth to say that conditions of absolutism and dictatorship regularly and repeatedly bring with them in political thinking a renaissance of the concept of the separation of powers. At any rate, the aforementioned relationship already indicates that this trend in political thinking cannot be associated exclusively with the period of bourgeois transformation that followed feudalism in society's development. Well, the reason why Bibó "resurrected" the concept of the separation of powers is its very essence: this is the concept which, since its birth in modern times, introduces the value approach, the value element, to political thinking

and the creation of institutions. Social justice, the ethical behavior of individuals and politicians, accountability, the shouldering of responsibility, selflessness in serving the public cause, etc.—all these are elements that are relegated to the background, or are replaced or eliminated by the majority principle inherent in the theories on popular sovereignty or its exclusiveness, by the long-term average interest that asserts itself under a parliamentary system of government, and by the deterministic or avant garde ideas of certain social concepts. Therefore Bibó's following quotation from St. Augustine, which frequently puzzled Bibó's contemporaries, was no accident: "*Remota itaque iustitia quid sunt regna, nisi magna latrocinia? Quia et ipsa latrocinia quid sunt, nisi parva regna?*" (Which in English reads: "For, once justice has ceased, what do countries become if not large gangs of robbers? For what are gangs of robbers, if not small countries?")¹

The theory of the separation of powers, and the creation of institutions based on it, offer to enforce at many points the moral elements in the exercise of power. The first and perhaps most important element (central to the entire theory) is that laws must regulate in advance the actions and behavior of individuals. And that such laws are equally binding on the citizens and the government, on rulers and subjects.

Individuals can be held accountable for their actions or behavior only on the basis of laws enacted and promulgated beforehand. In the period when the theory of the separation of powers burst into bloom, of course, a law was not simply a "normative act" of parliament; it was also the vehicle or setting for metajuristic values, a synonym for Justice, in the sense that Janos Batsanyi also used this word. Even a statute or law that is devoid of moral content, but has been enacted and promulgated beforehand, will prevent the prevalence of subjective intentions and considerations—of despotism, in other words—in the subordination of individuals to power.

This preexistence of the statute or law, and also accountability and liability to prosecution or action based on it, are the basis of the (political) philosophy underlying the theory of the separation of powers. It is more a "mere" consequence that it is the court which hears the final and decisive argument under a constitutional system of government organized along its legislative, executive and administration-of-justice functions. This applies also to conflicts between the citizen and the power structure. Thus, when a dispute arises between them, it is decided by an organ or person answerable "only" to its or his conscience, but not accountable politically.

In another context, Harrington's "two daughters" example clearly illustrates the moral nature of the mentality behind the separation of powers, and the creation of institutions based on it: in dividing a cake between them, one daughter slices the cake in half, and the other daughter chooses one of the halves. This mentality considers it morally reprehensible that a citizen should

participate in the administration of his own public affairs, because that would make him biased, and he might promote his own selfish (!) interests. Therefore the most familiar basic principle of the theory of the separation of powers states that anyone who participates in exercising legislative power must not be allowed to participate in implementing the legislation. Speaking more generally, we may ask: Where is the dividing line, if one does exist, between the opportunity and duty to participate in public affairs, and the ban on participation in them? The dilemma of the socialist separation of powers is different and could be the subject of a separate study. But this much may be noted also here: the doctrine of combining legislative and executive power neglects, almost to the extreme, specifically the moral elements of the separation of powers.

To sum up, Bibo was concerned primarily with the moral elements of the theory of the separation of powers. It can be attributed to this fact that he hardly paid any attention to the separation of powers as a technique of governing. It is practically impossible to determine what exactly he meant by the separation of powers as a technique of governing. A division of powers—or functions—under which representatives exercise legislative power, and the government exercises executive power? Or one under which the same legislative power is exercised jointly by the representatives and the government (the system of checks and balances)? Various contexts seem to indicate that Bibo leaned toward the first interpretation.

Public Administration's Social Service Role

Within the theory of the separation of powers, then, Bibo was not interested in the technique of governing. And why should he have been? During the past two or three centuries, conditions have changed so drastically that the solutions for, and the debates on, the separation of powers at the time would be completely outdated today. In the period preceding World War II, two or three factors have to be taken into consideration that shed "revolutionary" new light on the problems of institutionalizing the separation of powers. One such factor was the transformation of the nature of the state's functions (primarily in the economy and in the sphere of social welfare). The second factor, a concomitant of the first one, was the growth of bureaucracy. Finally, the emergence of modern mass parties and their dominant role in the political processes created a new situation in the institutionalization of political power. Of the three factors, Bibo was interested mainly in the first two. But not from the viewpoint of the traditionally interpreted technique of governing or system of constitutional government based on the separation of powers. Rather, in terms of the original, inherent logic of the separation of powers, according to which it should not be possible to exercise power without control.

In the modern state, also known as the post-industrial state, application of the requirements set by the theory of the separation of powers caused the most problems in

conjunction with bureaucracy, in public administration. Which led many authors to completely reject that entire trend in political thinking. Indeed, the traditional forms of control could not very well be applied effectively to public administration. The balance of power between the legislative branch on the one hand, and the executive enlarged by public administration on the other, was completely upset or threatened to be upset. The traditional concept of the separation of powers appeared unable to cope with public administration.

In this seemingly almost hopeless situation, Zoltan Magyary came out with his new concept of public administration. According to his concept, the state's new economic and social functions could not be exercised by means of the state's traditional, command-directed tools. Consequently, the forms of controlling public administration based on its system of legal norms were inadequate under the conditions of modern statehood. In this sense Magyary declared the concept of the state ruled by law to be obsolete. Namely, the legal-normative forms were serving to maintain the legality of public administration. Realization of the state's increased economic and social functions presupposed the effectiveness and efficiency of public administration, in addition to its legality. The functioning of public administration based on the principles of effectiveness and efficiency required, in Magyary's opinion, the application of those principles of organization that proved suitable at large industrial plants, in the United States.

The dividing line between public administration and private administration was blurred in this concept. And let us add that this concept rated public administration as a politically neutral activity. (Here we wish to note only parenthetically: on this point Magyary's concept agreed with the socialist thinking that public administration could function like the post office and the railroad, operating on the same principles that large-scale industries employed. Incidentally, Magyary quoted fairly frequently statements by Marx, Lenin and Stalin on public administration.)

On this occasion we are unable to undertake an analysis of the following: the extent to which the disillusionment reflected in Magyary's concept stemmed from the inability of the representative bodies between the two world wars to cope with their new tasks; how well public administration's rational organization and self-policing can serve as a substitute for society's influence through its representative body; and how quickly the American solutions, regarded as the examples to be followed in this respect, were eroded over time.

From among Bibo's reflections we will dwell on the elements that have been confirmed by the latest developments in the exercise of power based on the separation of powers, and in the perception of the separation of powers.

On the one hand, Bibo pointed out that legality was a requirement of long standing, and manifested itself in different forms in the various periods. On the other hand, effectiveness was not an entirely new requirement for public administration, either. After all, "a certain effectiveness is the objective of every public administration," he said. And what he stressed, in addition to legality and effectiveness, was "the modern concept of state tasks performed as services." Both the effectiveness and the social service role of public administration can be judged in its entire social context. "By effectiveness in the sociological sense," Bibo wrote, "we mean not only public administration's orientation on specific results and its perception as the provider of services. Instead, we may examine entire public administration's impact on society's whole substance and seek there the modern meaning of effectiveness."

The warning against the dangers of the "effectiveness" of a public administration that is viewed divorced from its social environment is horrifyingly timely. "Namely, thirst for power and a tendency to dominate are not the only dangers that could make society's external power structure the seat of injustice and of the destruction of values. Excessive technical means, and tyranny determined to make society 'happy' against its will, are likewise such threats. For, an effective public administration whose instrumental perfection makes it capable of subjugating and governing entire society, on both the material and the intellectual planes, harbors dangers of reification and alienation that could make effectiveness an abstract idol divorced from society's real needs and values, dominated by notions of success distorted into inflexible and autotelic chimeras. To cite an example: if need be, an executive that is effective in the modern sense could carry out huge resettlement projects, in the interest of the most diverse economic, military or political objectives."²

Bibo's raising the questions of effectiveness and efficiency in public administration's social context foreshadowed the modern pluralistic concepts of today, according to which—as this follows from the relationship outlined above—public administration must function under entire society's influence. Hence this social influence is transmitted in part by the state institutions, and in part by community organizations. In this concept the representative body retains its significance but does not become public administration's sole point of reference. This idea is new, finding its modern formulation and confirmation in the various pluralistic concepts. But it is also old in the sense that already Montesquieu's concept of the separation of powers treated in their unity the questions of civil society and the state, of the citizen and the power structure.

In the debates on Magyary's concept of public administration, it was in conjunction with the effectiveness of public administration that Bibo himself first considered the power structure's social background and determinism. Bibo clarified that social background in his inaugural

lecture at the Academy, and he also outlined the social background's function in controlling the newly emerging—economic, cultural and bureaucratic—powers. But his message on these issues was closely linked to the question of the strong or weak executive branch.

When Is the Executive Strong or Weak?

Constitutions between the two world wars incorporated the concept of a strong executive. The gist of this concept is that politically the executive is not accountable to parliament. The parliament may elect the government, but the government's term of office continues until the next general election. Thus the government cannot be brought down by a vote of no confidence, etc. In constitutional law, the roots of the so-called strong executive are far-flung. Among the inspiring solutions it is customary to cite the American Constitution with its presidential system of government. But the truth is that the political intentions encountered in the concept of a so-called strong executive are more important than its roots in constitutional law. One of these political intentions is undoubtedly based on consideration of the real processes that took place between the two world wars, regarding the functions of the state.

The scope of the state's new economic, social, etc. activities raised more widely than ever before the question of the suitability of parliaments to cope with their spheres of authority. Parliaments found themselves in a crisis, both intellectually and morally. Strengthening the executive offered a solution, a way out. Because the requirements of professionalism in exercising the state's new functions could be ensured better in the executive than in the parliaments. Actually, of course, the decisive element behind laying the foundation for the executive's superiority was the intention to quench social tensions by dictatorial means: i.e., in many instances, to gain ideological acceptance of dictatorship. Often the references to the economic and social functions were nothing other than a pretext to suppress democracy.

In the debates on a strong or weak executive Bibo made a very nuanced distinction, but one that was of epochal significance, we might say. He pointed out that a strong executive could be interpreted in two ways. In one interpretation, a strong executive meant the state had such a concentration of power that it could use coercion. In the other interpretation, a strong executive "means the very effectiveness, in its modern sense, that modern economic and social development demands."³

That the categories of a strong and a weak executive respectively are not very applicable theoretically is only one element, and perhaps not even the most important one, in Bibo's concept. Another, far more important element is the one that follows from the distinction. Namely, that the exercise of the state's two types of function requires the use of two entirely different sets of

instruments. One type of function, let us call it the state's traditional function, can be exercised with the instruments of coercion. Here, therefore, the concentration of power is not permissible. In the sphere of such functions, application of the requirements set by the theory of the separation of powers means the curtailment of the state's power, regardless of how the powers are separated: with a representative body exercising the legislative function, and a government [executive] responsible for implementation; or under a system of checks and balances, where the legislative function is divided between the representative body and the government.

The situation is different in the case of the state's economic and social functions. Here the "strength" of the executive—in other words, a strong executive—is a prerequisite for effectiveness in its modern sense, "that modern economic and social development demands." In the first case [separate legislative function] the point is that the law, as a normative form, sets constraints for the exercise of the state's traditional or coercive functions; but that would not work very well, or might fail, in exercising the state's economic and social functions. The law enacting the national economic plan, for instance, cannot be "implemented" in the traditional sense of prescribing rules of behavior. Today's modern constitutions are already applying extensively the consequences of this relationship and are restricting the parliaments in exercising their legislative authority in economic and social matters.⁴

The other solution for the separation of powers, the one based on a system of checks and balances, is likewise unsuitable for exercising the state's economic and social functions. Modern American authors are critical of the American technique of governing, based on a system of checks and balances, because it involves making political decisions by compromise. But, they argue, decisions of an economic or social nature—such long-range plans, for instance—do not tolerate compromises very well. Primarily because none of the decision makers will subsequently accept responsibility for a compromise decision. Therefore a summary of these views⁵ concludes that the requirements of the manager-type state do not tolerate very well a technique of governing with separation of powers based on a system of checks and balances. Thus the political thinking of the late 1980's has confirmed what Bibo recognized in the early 1940's; but, unfortunately, it has left Bibo's name relatively unknown, and his thinking without any world response. Yet his concept retains its timeliness to this day, in devising the relationship between the legislature and the executive, or in defining the authority of parliament with due consideration for the social and political reality.

Incidentally, the debates between the two world wars on a strong or a weak executive sprang essentially from the same roots as today's problems in conjunction with shaping the relationship between economics and politics. Then, just as now, the question was how to influence the social and economic processes by means of the state's

political instruments. Of course, the difference is by no means negligible that, in principle, policy decisions between the two world wars were shaped in parliament. In contrast to the present conditions, moreover, the possibilities of state intervention in the economic processes came up against the barriers of private ownership. But so far as the relative nature of parliament's ability to influence the economy politically is concerned, the one-time debates on a strong executive, and Bibo's standpoint in them, may still be relevant even today.

Naturally, Bibo's concept of an executive that is strong in handling the social and economic processes, but strong only in that respect, cannot mean unlimited state interference in the spheres of the economy and ownership. Therefore, contrary to what some people assume, there is no contradiction between what Bibo suggested in 1944 regarding a strong executive, on the one hand, and his warnings about the modern dangers of power concentration, in his 1947 inaugural lecture at the Academy, on the other hand. He accepted the concept of a strong executive to the extent that it meant "effectiveness in the modern sense, that modern economic and social development demands."

But Bibo saw also the dangers, already directly perceptible in 1947, that arose as a result of "the expansion of state power in the economy," the concentration of power in the sphere of intellectual life and culture, and the growth of bureaucracy accompanying this process.

For in Bibo's "strong executive" concept we sense a twofold qualification. One qualification is that this category applies to defining the relationship between the executive and parliament. In this relationship the government must have at its disposal instruments suitable for keeping the social and economic processes in hand. The other qualification is that "concentration of power" is permissible only with respect to controlling the social and economic processes. Thus the idea of parliament's superiority cannot be abandoned particularly in the sphere of the traditional state functions that can be exercised by means of coercion. Therefore in one relationship it is parliament that must be, if you prefer, strong; and in the other relationship, it is the executive.

On the basis of the developments taking place at present, Bibo's concept could be shaded or refined by adding that parliament, in the course of exercising its traditional functions, must be in a position to judge the effectiveness of the government's activity, how it is managing the social and economic processes. Generally speaking, the democratic exercise of the state's traditional functions is a prerequisite, as it were, for adopting a decision regarding the government's economic success or failure, together with drawing the necessary conclusions.

Naturally, an executive strong in the handling of social and economic problems, which Bibo mentioned in his 1942 essay, is not identical with "the bureaucratic and command-directed organization of the economy" that

Bibo regarded as the most serious potential consequence of "the expansion of state power in the economy." To the contrary. But the traditional institutional instruments are not enough to prevent or remove the harmful social consequences that arise, or might arise, in the wake of the expansion of state power in the economy. "As a result of modern economic development, the state's activity in the economy is much broader than ever before in history. First of all, and irrespectively of ideology, this economic activity corrupts financially the organs of state power concerned with economic policy. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it brings with it the bureaucratic and command-directed organization of the economy." But all this cannot mean, he claimed, that "we want to bring back systems under which these dangers did not yet exist. However, the question does arise as to what kind of organizations exist or could be established to counter the financial and power corruption. Such organizations have sprung up and grown before our eyes, because the state's economic activity cannot dispense with the active and spontaneous cooperation of individual producers and their groups. Various, in part autonomous and in part professional, organs have developed: trade unions, corporative bodies, chambers, professional and industrial self-managing groups, cooperatives and cooperative federations."⁶

In Bibo's concept of the separation of powers, the traditional institutional boundaries of the separation of powers disappear: in addition to the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, there appear new "powers": economic power, scientific and cultural power, public administration's bureaucratic power, etc. It is within the entire social system, rather than in relation to one another, that all these powers become parts of the balance so often mentioned in the theory of the separation of powers. This is how the traditional theory of the separation of powers turns into Bibo's modern pluralistic concept, and it becomes clear that the modern pluralistic concept is nothing other than the separation of powers tailored to the conditions of the 20th century.

In conclusion we have to refer to a prediction of Bibo's which seemed improbable until recently. In his inaugural lecture at the Academy he said: "The principle of the separation of powers, and the moral and practical truth inherent in it, have not met with any response in the Soviet Union so far." After analyzing the causes of this, he noted: "But I am convinced that, in the course of the Soviet state structure's further development, the need for this principle will become evident, and also its applicability in cases other than class struggle!" The developments are well known that brought with them into Hungarian political and political science thinking the concept of the separation of powers, even though often in naive and archaic form.

But we have before us a fairly recent issue of KOMMUNIST, the theoretical journal of the CPSU, in which a prominent constitutional lawyer begins his article⁷ by noting that, in the current debates on reforming the Soviet

political system, the frequency is increasing of calls to put into practice the principle of the separation of powers. The article itself reflects critical acceptance of that principle.

Footnotes

1. Cf. Istvan Bibó, "Valogatott Tanulmányok" [Selected Essays], Vol 1, selected by Tibor Huszar, annotated by Istvan Vida and Endre Nagy, Budapest, 1986, pp 274 and 675.
2. Op. cit., p 292.
3. Op. cit., p 289.
4. Cf. Kornel Pikler, "A parlamenti kormányzati rendszer és a közigazgatás irányítása" [The Parliamentary System of Government and the Supervision of Public Administration], Program Bureau for Political Science as Principal Direction of Research, Budapest, 1983, Part 1.
5. Cf. "President vs. Congress. Does the Separation of Powers Still Work?" (American Enterprise Institute), p 10.
6. Op. cit., Vol 2, pp 393-394.
7. L. Lazarev, "'Separation of Powers' and the Experience of the Soviet State," KOMMUNIST, No 16, 1988.

POLAND

Freedom of Speech: Songwriter Appeals Censor's Rulings

26000528 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
No 21, 27 May 89 p 9

[Article by Zbigniew Krzyzanowski: "Songs on Trial"]

[Text] Anybody can sing, but not everything. On 19 April, the Supreme Administrative Court in Warsaw reviewed a complaint brought by the Actors' Entertainment Agency [AIA] against a decision rendered by the Main Office for the Control of Press, Publications and Entertainment [GUKPPiW]. This decision banned the distribution of Andrzej Rosiewicz's songs "Pierestrojka" [perestrojka] and "Ksiąteczka wojskowa" [Military I.D.].

Lawyer Andrzej Lewandowski represented the AIA agency; director Justyn Sobol represented the GUKPPiW; Waldemar Grudziecki, public prosecutor from the Voivodship Public Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw, represented this office. Andrzej Rosiewicz, author of the banned texts, also participated in the hearing. However, there was no representative present from the Supreme Voivodship Prosecutor's Office, although this had been requested by the court at the recommendation of the GUKPPiW. Why should the latter institution have any

interest in the matter? Because, according to the GUKP-PiW, "Ksiąteczka wojskowa" meets the conditions defined in article 2 item 5 of the law dated 31 July 1981, which governs the control of publications and entertainment (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, item 99, amended 1983, DZIENNIK USTAW No 44 item 204). In other words, it threatens state defense.

Lawyer A. Lewandowski took issue with this interpretation of the cited regulations: article 2 item 5 of the law in question speaks of prohibiting the distribution of texts that violate state secrets, including economic and official secrets, that relate to defense and the armed forces. Rosiewicz's song does not reveal any of these secrets. Moreover, since the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, regulations of a lower-level law should not be interpreted in an extended manner. What's more, "Ksiąteczka" already had its premiere on a national television program. Was this, by any chance, what caused the censor to intervene?

Lawyer A. Lewandowski asserted that he was aware of pressures exerted on television producers to take the song off the air. The lawyer left it up to the court to assess the nature of such actions. Rosiewicz, practically a national institution as a comic, should not be treated as a statesman. He has the right to say that he does not want to enter the army, and he has the right to propose that the army should disband and all the soldiers should go home. After all, that is entirely in agreement with the disarmament trend now in existence all over the world, with the tendency to reduce armies in very different types of countries. It is the same in Poland. Moreover, the last line of "Ksiąteczka": "If not we, then who? If not now, then when?" has become so incredibly famous that it is at least a little too late to ban it...

The censor justified the ban on the distribution of "Pierestrojka" by saying that it strikes out at one of the principles of PRL foreign policy: the strengthening of friendship and cooperation with the USSR and the other socialist countries (article 6 item 2 of the PRL Constitution). "Today, when there is such talk about eliminating the blank spaces in the history of Polish-Soviet relations, the charges leveled at 'Pierestrojka' are incomprehensible," said A. Lewandowski. The song praises the process of restructuring in the USSR and the entire socialist block. Moreover, "Pierestrojka" merely continues the thinking and views expressed in the song "The Spring Is Blowing in from the East." Or does it not?

Director Sobol maintains that while it is true that times change, every joke has its limits. Of course, the court decides whether Rosiewicz has exceeded these limits. The censors have already made a decision. "Pierestrojka" clearly strikes out against the principles of the foreign policy of the PRL and its allies. The distribution of publications that treat the fundamental political problems of an allied country with grotesqueness and irony is

unacceptable. Blank spaces from the past have nothing to do with this: the content of "Pierestrojka" is the future. It asks what will happen if perestrojka fails.

Another point: In his song, Rosiewicz openly sympathizes with the separatist movements in the individual USSR republics. If this is praise of perestrojka (which Rosiewicz mocks by his very spelling of the word according to its Russian pronunciation "pirestrojka")... I get the joke. Of course, we are not studying the author's intentions or his sense of humor. We are simply reading the text itself literally, nothing more...

Does "Ksiąteczka wojskowa" threaten state defense? In the opinion of Director Sobol it does. However, before proving this, he would like to quote, in its entirety, the end section of article 2 item 5 of the law governing the press and entertainment. The section reads as follows: "or threatens state defense in another way." Thus, not only state, economic and official secrets are included in this concept, but also actions that undermine the morals and prestige of the army, actions that may evoke an unfavorable attitude to military service or the army itself. The dissemination of the idea that liquidating the army would enable Poland to emerge more rapidly from its economic crisis is also disturbing. Concluding his address, Director Sobol adamantly denied the suggestion that the GUKP-PiW made its decision in this specific case as a result of any sort of pressure. He said: "We turned to the Polish Army Main Political Directorate, but only for an expert opinion, which we submitted to the court for review."

Public Prosecutor Waldemar Grudziecki spoke last. The pacifist nature of "Ksiąteczka wojskowa" is unquestionable in his opinion. However, the question must be asked: does this song negate the need to defend our borders? No, nor is there any denying that if such a need arose, the author himself certainly would defend these borders as well. Consequently, does the text endanger state defense? Neither the text nor the circumstances attending it indicate this. Various forms of alternate military service are being introduced, negotiations are being held to reduce the numbers of those in the service and entire regiments are being disbanded. All this rather harmonizes with Rosiewicz's text.

It is also difficult to agree with the GUKP-PiW claim that "Pierestrojka" is not a paean to the changes occurring in the USSR. The prosecutor finds it impossible to interpret this text in any other way, in spite of the fact that, as he indicates, he is likewise reading the text literally.

Government and political party representatives point out the benefits Poland is deriving from the development of perestrojka and glasnost in the USSR, and they also note the dangers emanating from the breakdown of these processes. Is this a curtailment of Poland's sovereignty? "Since we are speaking of sovereignty—in this light, how will the ban on performing this song be received by

society?" asked the prosecutor regarding the reversal of the appealed decisions based on article 270 paragraph 2 item 7 of the Administrative Procedures Code.

Waiting for the verdict to be announced, the beaming Rosiewicz shakes the public prosecutor's hand. Is the prosecutor hopeful? A. Lewandowski explains: "I did not forget the regulations, but for my client's needs it was unnecessary to quote them in their entirety... Mr. Rosiewicz, perhaps you will sing one of the 'forbidden songs' for us. Maybe not, let us just wait for the verdict."

Marian Flasiński, chairman of the judiciary body, reads the verdict: The court has decided to repeal the ban on distributing "Ksiązeczka wojskowa," finding no evidence to uphold the charge that it threatens state defense and to continue in force the ban on distributing "Pierestrojka." In the latter case, it shares the reservations expressed by the GUKPPiW, especially on the issue of propagating separatist attitudes in the USSR.

Excerpts from the court's justification of the verdict follow: "An analysis of the text of the song 'Ksiązeczka wojskowa' unquestionably leads to various ultimate conclusions, depending upon which viewpoint and which criteria are used as a basis for this assessment. (...) Taking into consideration: an improvement in the atmosphere of international relations, and increase in mutual trust, universally recognized achievements in the field of the reduction and control of armaments, a reduction in numbers in the military (including the USSR and Poland), a reduction in arms production and the use of existing equipment to meet the needs of the national economy (on which subject the mass media have provided and are providing extensive information) and the efforts of the USSR and the socialist states aimed at the further reduction and elimination of certain kinds of weapons—one cannot say that the author's vision of a world free from every sort of weapon and military trespasses beyond the framework of the constitutional principle of freedom of speech and press and could threaten state defense." On the other hand, analyzing the text of "Pierestrojka," the Supreme Administrative Court concluded that: "Contrary to the claims made by the plaintiff, the text does not contain praise of 'Pierestrojka,' but it ponders the visions and consequences of its breakdown. It is clear that even the pondering of such visions would not be contrary to the law if it did not poke fun at the complex domestic problems of the USSR and the methods for resolving them, and if it also were not an attempt (if an unintended one) to somehow interfere in resolving nationalities problems (e.g., the verse beginning with the words: 'Naprimier republika Uzbecka' [the Uzbek Republic, for example]).

"Thus, even if we adopt the broadest 'tolerance margin' associated with the specific nature of the genre, i.e., the songwriter's creativity, we still must share the arguments and assessment of the organs of control of publications

and performances contained in the arguments of the appealed decisions regarding the ban on distributing the text of the song 'Pierestrojka.'"

PS. On 21 April, during a concert at the Palace of Culture and Learning in Warsaw, Andrzej Rosiewicz sang "Ksiązeczka wojskowa" for the first time. Nothing happened.

YUGOSLAVIA

Programs of New Political Movements Presented

28000133 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
8 Jun 89 pp 7-10

[Documents from political alliances and movements recently established in Yugoslavia; first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] In recent months, several different political alliances and movements have been established or are being established in various parts of Yugoslavia; they have different programs, differing levels of social recognition, differing organizational principles, and a differing number of members. In this supplement, BORBA is publishing their programmatic platforms as a contribution to the upcoming discussions in the SAWPY and League of Communists about political pluralism and in the belief that their documentary representation will contribute to the quality and soundness of the upcoming debates.

PROGRAMMATIC STATEMENT OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE OF SLOVENIA

Out of the conviction that every citizen of Slovenia has the right to live in freedom and prosperity, to elect and remove leaders on the basis of procedures defined in advance, and to live a creative life in peace and without fear of arbitrary interventions of the authorities,

we hereby establish

the Social Democratic Alliance of Slovenia.

Slovenia and Yugoslavia are in a general social crisis. The causes of that crisis lie in the undemocratic and ideologically burdened political system, and its consequences are obvious in all domains of the life of society—in the economic crisis, in cultural impoverishment, in the scientific lag, and in the individual's powerlessness.

The Social Democratic Alliance of Yugoslavia (SDS) is an autonomous political organization. We are inspired by the independent and freedom-loving principles of European Social Democracy, which are based on the ethics of European humanism, social justice, and human dignity.

Since we Social Democrats desire to exercise the right of all citizens of Slovenia to freedom and prosperity, we will above all be striving, in a peaceful and lawful manner, for reforms in politics, the economy, social welfare policy, and the armed forces.

1. The Political System

Social Democrats will strive to abolish those foundations of the present political system which maintain in the political sphere undemocratic forms of decisionmaking on public issues. We will do everything toward consistent exercise of freedom and the right of the individual regardless of his political and religious conviction, nationality, origin, sex, or general inclination. We desire to achieve full freedom of political association and organization, freedom of public expression, and freedom of the press and other sources of information.

It is our firm conviction that the foundations of an up-to-date political system would include the following:

- separation of the legislative, judicial, and executive powers;
- an electoral procedure based on free, direct, and secret elections;
- parliamentary democracy.

Social Democrats will strive for a parliamentary system in which representatives of various political parties, organizations, and other alliances and individuals on the basis of support of a specified number of signatures may run for political office. The parliament, as the supreme representative and legislative body, must be sovereign in its actions, free of any extraparlimentary interventions. It must constantly oversee the executive bodies, the police, and the armed forces.

The government administration must not serve any particular interest (class, group, political party, or individual), but must guarantee only respect for the legal and legitimate forms of public activity.

We favor establishment of the referendum as a form of direct democracy. Citizens should decide as many important issues as possible directly within local communities, opstinas, and the republic.

The Socialist Alliance of Working People is acceptable to us only if it amends those provisions which give the League of Communists a privileged and monopoly position within it and also those which require unification of views and programs and thus frustrate the expression and pursuit of differing political initiatives.

2. The Judicial and Legislative System

We advocate a state regulated by law and criminal legislation that would protect citizens against abuse of

government power. Among the most important tasks which Social Democrats set themselves is the drafting of a new Slovenian constitution that would be based on the Declaration on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and on the documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In the new Slovenian constitution, we must precisely define and protect Slovenian sovereignty and statehood, and in that connection define once again the sociopolitical system, which must be based on full equality of sociopolitical entities. The courts and Slovenian defense policy should be thoroughly redefined and restated.

On the basis of broad public discussion in which it will be possible to supplement the various proposals for the new constitution, the constitutional assembly of the people of Slovenia, in which various organizations, associations, and interest groups will be represented, should draft the proposed version of the new Slovenian constitution. The proposal prepared in that manner should be decided on by the citizens of Slovenia in a referendum, which for Social Democrats is the only legitimate way to adopt the supreme law of Slovenia.

3. The Economy

Out of the conviction that efficient conduct of economic activity is necessary to social prosperity, we Social Democrats are in favor of the following:

- reaffirmation of work as a contribution and as an achievement;
- enterprise;
- multiple forms of ownership.

The worker must receive appropriate compensation for his contribution of work, but within the standards that apply in present-day market economies, the employer should possess without hindrance those powers which are indispensable to performance of the entrepreneurial function.

The concept of integral self-management should be replaced by decisionmaking, and the concept of social ownership should be abandoned. Provision should be made for the workers to purchase shares of stock.

We support an open market economy with business organizations that are not dependent on political organizations and which bear full economic liability for their actions. A system should be formed which in view of the differing nature of economic interests will define only the basic rules of behavior, rules which may not differ essentially from the rules in other present-day market economies.

We favor up-to-date development of agriculture and abolition of the maximum landholding. In its economic

policy, the government should assist the development of agriculture, which should be based on peasant family farms and should guarantee protection of arable land.

The restructuring of the economy should repair the environment, and to that end we favor ecologically clean activities that conserve energy and raw materials.

The state should protect national resources through tax policy and monetary policy. It should encourage enterprise and guarantee elementary social security, economic stability, and respect for the rules of the legal system and financial system, it should manage the infrastructure, it should prevent the emergence of monopolies, and it should perform the other functions of the state in present-day market economies.

The tax system and tax policy should serve the purpose of economic growth. Taxes must stimulate productivity and enterprise and in this way help to improve the standard of living.

The burden placed on the economy and on individuals must be at the level of the industrially advanced states.

We are in favor of Slovenia's independence in shaping the economic system and economic policy which are suitable to itself. The market cannot be brought about through centralization of macroeconomic management, but through the total independence of business organizations.

4. The Trade Union

An autonomous trade union is the most important factor of industrial democracy. That is why we favor the free establishment of independent and pluralistic trade union organizations and their linkage with one another. They should at the same time fight to win the right to total legalization of the strike.

Today's trade union must free itself of the tutelage of the League of Communists, and in future it must not be subject to the influences of any political organization. That is why we Social Democrats will consistently strive for the trade union to be the sole organizational form in enterprises and institutions. Other sociopolitical organizations should operate outside enterprises and institutions, since only in that way will the trade union become the truly independent organization of the workers. That is the way in which we will break up the tandem that has existed up to now between politicians and enterprises, and this will have a favorable impact toward more effective selection of personnel within enterprises and thereby also toward more responsible and efficient business operation of enterprises, and that will in turn repair the worker's material condition.

5. Social Welfare Policy

Social welfare policy depends upon the political and economic situation. Its possibilities are determined by

the level of production and the size of the social product. Our social welfare activities have been drastically curtailed because of the economic crisis and because of the complicated, unmonitored and therefore inefficient government administration.

The situation is steadily deteriorating and could result in a total collapse of social welfare activities, in particular the health system and the educational system. It is clear that poor economic management does not guarantee quality services and does not abolish poverty and emigration, but increases social inequities. Regardless of the situation, everyone should be afforded equal opportunities—a reasonably equal basis for starting out in life.

Over the long run, we will strive to build a welfare state, which means that every member of this society will have the opportunity for his personal development and education and the opportunity to build a family and good living conditions. Basic services (education, health care, social welfare, pensions, and cultural services) must be accessible to all citizens regardless of their social status.

The foundation of the social security of all citizens, we believe, lies in their work. We recognize assistance on the basis of solidarity only for persons who are physically or mentally impaired, for children and the elderly, for the unemployed, and for other population groups. We will particularly strive for protection of children and the family as well as for more effective resolution of the housing situation.

We favor the drafting of programs to create jobs for young people and social welfare programs for workers and their families who in the transitional period of economic renewal will be left without jobs. We will help them to gain the new knowledge required by a modern economy as soon as possible. Aside from these measures, we will also propose other ways of resolving unemployment that have been tested in the contemporary world, in particular the possibilities of self-employment in both private and socialized enterprises.

We oppose adoption of any additional money contributions (participation) in the health system and educational system, and in child welfare...which do not guarantee the beneficiaries quality services or their decisionmaking on how those services will function and in what way they will be financed.

In order to prevent the unification of services and to increase their efficiency and improve their quality, we Social Democrats will support development of the public and private sectors in all domains of the social services. Citizens will be able to use their resources as they see fit in either sector.

6. Slovenia's International Position

Slovenia is a part of Europe and destiny has marked us with the achievements of Western civilization, which we

will not renounce in the future either. Social Democrats will consistently strive for the inclusion of Slovenia and Yugoslavia in European space and in West European economic, technological, and cultural integrations.

One of the priority tasks of Social Democrats will be to bring about the political and economic conditions for membership in the European community. We will consistently work for open borders and free flows of people, goods, and information.

We will respect the international conventions in effect that compel respect for human rights and freedoms. We will join the Socialist International, whose other members are the Social Democratic countries, but we will also maintain contacts with similarly oriented political parties and movements in the world.

7. The Position of Slovenes in Yugoslavia and Neighboring Countries

We will join in the aspirations of Slovenes and other citizens of Slovenia, which have been expressed several times already, in connection with the sovereignty of the people of Slovenia and all other Yugoslav nationalities and will join in that kind of community in Yugoslavia in which there will be perfect expression of all the differences and developmental needs of the republics in keeping with their own capabilities and their creativity, their culture, and their tradition.

We feel that specific features, aside from economic and cultural elements, also include the right to one's own value system and the political system that corresponds to it. In Yugoslavia, we should be bound together by common interests which truly do exist, but this should be verified by self-determination.

We will consistently develop the common Slovene cultural space, which should embrace all Slovenes regardless of their political and religious convictions or the place where they live, and should be based on the language criterion. We favor a Slovene cultural forum as an advisory body of all Slovenes.

Particular concern should be paid to the Slovene ethnic community in neighboring countries. Economic and cultural aid should be furnished for their development, and all states must be required to consistently respect their ethnic rights, which have been guaranteed at the international level.

8. Defense Policy

We Social Democrats favor complete subordination of the military administration to the democratically elected parliament. We favor abolition of the military courts. The financing of the armed forces should be exclusively in the domain of civilian authorities.

In the short run, we will favor a radical reduction of the size of the armed forces and respect for the dictates of conscience, and in the long run our objective is a numerically small, professional military oriented toward defense. One of the things this certainly would mean is a reduction of the general required military service. We are convinced that the present militarization of everyday life does not reflect [as published] a possibly tense international situation.

We Social Democrats will strive for total control of the Slovenian people over the military administration on the territory of Slovenia. When we were able to have such a conception of defense during the National Liberation Struggle, there is all the more reason for us to carry it over into peacetime. We Social Democrats, then, will strive to organize the Slovenian army district in which command and training in the units, staffs, and other entities of the Slovenian army district will be conducted in the Slovenian language.

(SDS Initiating Committee, 21 January 1989)

RULES OF THE SLOVENIAN PEASANT ALLIANCE

1. The Slovenian Peasant Alliance is a voluntary organization of peasants and farmworkers within SR Slovenia formed pursuant to the decisions of the Law on Societies and is a member of the SAWP of Slovenia. The organization operates as the Slovenian Peasant Alliance. In addition to the name "Slovenian Peasant Alliance," the abbreviation "SSS" may be used.

2. The Slovenian Peasant Alliance is a juridical person.

The Slovenian Peasant Alliance has a round seal 35 mm in diameter with three spikes of wheat in the middle, with the words "Slovenacki Seljacki Savez" inscribed around it.

3. The headquarters of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance are in Ljubljana at Komnenska 11. The Slovenian Peasant Alliance operates within SR Slovenia.

4. The tasks and objectives of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance are as follows: to bring about conditions whereby peasants and farmworkers cooperate creatively according to their convictions in the shaping of political and self-management decisions in the assemblies of sociopolitical communities, self-managed communities of interest, and other self-management communities and organizations. Within that framework, the Slovenian Peasant Alliance will particularly favor development of family holdings as basic production units in agricultural activity, abolishing the maximum landholding, a tax policy that will give an incentive for the most efficacious cultivation of the land, identical treatment of all farm holdings regardless of ownership in legislation and other measures of government power, the development of

cooperatives in which the peasant will be a direct participant in management and in defining cooperative policy, cooperative ownership, and ownership of cooperators, effectiveness in the protection of arable land, the legal security of peasant farms and of the peasant as the one who cultivates the land, as well as legal regulation of inheritance of farm holdings so as to guarantee the integrity and development of family farms, the complete improvement of agricultural land and agricultural space, a policy of agricultural development that will guarantee the best possible utilization of production capacities and will restore abandoned farmland to use, the achievement of good conditions, especially for young families which decide to engage in agriculture, treatment of the farm as a rounded economic entity that includes agriculture, forestry, and other supplemental activities, reestablishment of balance between agriculture and forestry, development of private pisciculture, beekeeping, and other activities which are related to food production, and the abolition of all types of monopolies, such as those in forestry, hunting, agriculture, livestock raising, and industry, which are harmful to the development of peasant economic activity.

We will favor the sound production of food of the highest quality. Establishment of a new ethics concerning agricultural production and living and inanimate nature, man's return to a close relation to the natural environment, the development of agriculture as the tilling of the land, which was the original source of development of human civilization and culture and an important foundation of human ethics, the overcoming of human selfishness, which is manifested both in the aspirations to an agroindustry and establishment of a new balance in man's exchange with nature.

In that environment, the Slovenian Peasant Alliance will advocate harmonious combination of man's economic, technical, scientific, and human abilities for improvement of the quality of life and for protection of our environment. We are particularly concerned about the culture and architecture of our rural areas, about the beauty of our natural and cultural environment, and about the presence of wholesome human relations in rural areas, as well as about new relations between urban and rural areas that will overcome the one-sidedly industrial orientation of the economy.

The Peasant Alliance will operate in the direction of establishment of the social status of the peasant as a member of the social community with equal rights and will establish his self-awareness as a food producer and a custodian of the environment on which the survival and development of the entire society depend to a large degree. It will establish an awareness of members of a social occupation which has made a decisive contribution to the preservation of our people throughout its entire history, especially in the last National Liberation War.

Within that framework, the Slovenian Peasant Alliance will work to bring the social status of peasants onto a par

with the status of the working people in other areas of society, for revival and particularly conservation of farms in the hilly and border areas, since these farms have particular importance to national defense, for the highest possible professional competence of peasants and for a development and content of agricultural schools, cooperative schools, the development of scientific research, and development of the service for optimum acceleration of production consistent with those objectives. The Slovenian Peasant Alliance will attempt to achieve those objectives through its cooperation within the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Slovenia, through proposals and demands made to sociopolitical communities and administrative agencies, and in other appropriate areas.

5. A farmer and members of his family and also an agricultural worker or forestry worker who professionally participates either directly or through a cooperative in cultivating his own farm, a specialist who through research and teaching has cooperated in the development of agriculture, and all those who to meet their own needs engage directly in any of the farming activities, although agriculture is not their calling, may become members of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance. The Slovenian Peasant Alliance may also enroll as members other individuals whose activity may in its opinion contribute to achievement of the goals and tasks of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance.

6. Enrollment takes place by virtue of signing an application form in which the bases for membership enumerated in Point 5 must be stated. Membership rolls shall be kept in the Slovenian Peasant Alliance. The members shall pay dues in the manner and in the amount fixed by the Annual Assembly of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance.

7. Membership ceases by virtue of withdrawal, cessation of the bases of membership enumerated in Point 5, by deletion from the membership rolls, and by expulsion on the basis of the ruling of a disciplinary commission. Expulsion is possible only if it is proven that a member has acted contrary to the goals and tasks of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance or has not been fulfilling obligations as a member which he has under these rules. An appeal may be filed against deletion from the rolls.

8. The rights of members of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance are as follows: to cooperate in the activities of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance and to share in the results of activities, to participate in the Annual Assembly of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, to submit proposals and to share in decisions when resolutions are adopted. The right to be elected to the bodies of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance and the right to elect those bodies.

The duties of the members are as follows: to behave in keeping with these rules and to carry out the resolutions of the bodies of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, to pay dues, and to achieve the objectives and perform the tasks of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance.

9. The sources of financial resources of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance are as follows: membership dues, voluntary contributions and gifts, as well as other revenues. Finances and material transactions shall be managed in keeping with the legislation in effect. Sources of income and conduct of business are public. Every member has the right to examine documentation on finances and inventory.

10. The work of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance is public. The minutes are accessible to anyone. It informs its members and the broader public about its work by making its positions known in the media. The work of the Alliance is founded on the principles of public scrutiny and socialist self-management. The public is informed about every annual meeting through daily newspapers, invitations, and advertisements, which give the agenda, the time, and place of the Annual Assembly. Newspapermen who want to attend the Annual Assembly are sent the documents prepared for the Annual Assembly. The assembly of the Alliance may be attended by any adult citizen of the SFRY. The minutes of meetings of the bodies of the Alliance are accessible to all members. The Governing Board informs the public about its work and fulfillment of tasks through the daily newspapers. The Alliance provides for public scrutiny of its work through the news media as follows: it affords representatives of the media to attend meetings and sessions themselves. It gives to representatives of the media the documents for its meetings and sessions and other informative materials concerning its work, takes part in press conferences with representatives of the media, insofar as it is able it provides the organizational, physical, technical, and other conditions for the unhindered performance of the tasks which the news media have.

The issuance of the data and information on matters covered by the first paragraph of this article may be refused only if an article of a law or general act has pronounced them to be a state, military, official, or trade secret or if divulgence of the same would be contrary to other social interests as defined by law.

11. The bodies of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance are as follows: the Annual Assembly, the Governing Board, the Executive Board, the Oversight Board, and the Disciplinary Commission. The term of delegates to the Annual Assembly and other bodies of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance is 4 years. The procedure for termination is the same as the procedure for election. The members of the bodies of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance may be elected for the following term. They are accountable for their work to the Annual Assembly.

12. Chapters represent the working procedure of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance and are organized on the geographic principle. The chapters create a Governing Board on the basis of resolutions of the assembly. The chapter is made up of members who permanently reside

or who have permanent employment in the area the chapter covers. The chapter is not a juridical person and must act in keeping with decisions.

The supreme body of the chapter is the chapter assembly, which has the following powers: it adopts an operating procedure to govern its work, it prepares the work program of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, it makes proposals and suggestions concerning that program, it nominates candidates to the bodies of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, it elects the president of the chapter and the chapter's board, and it dismisses and elects delegates to the assembly of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, and it works on and solves current problems in its area.

The chapter assembly meets at least once a year, and must unfailingly meet just in advance of the meeting of the Annual Assembly of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance. The chapter is directed by the chapter's board. The number of members of the board and their term are specified by the operating procedure concerning the work of the chapter.

The chapter's delegates are required to defend the positions and conclusions of their members in the Annual Assembly of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance. They are also required to inform the members about resolutions adopted and stands taken in the assembly.

13. The Annual Assembly is made up of delegates directly elected by the members of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance in chapter caucuses. The number of delegates is determined by the Governing Board in view of the number of members of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance on the principle of one delegate for an approximately equal number of members.

14. The Annual Assembly is the supreme body of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance. Its powers include the following: adoption of the rules of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, adoption of the work program of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, and definition of the general guidelines and policy for performance and realization of the program adopted, debate and decisionmaking on matters of decisive importance to relations between the Slovenian Peasant Alliance and government institutions and other sociopolitical entities when they pertain to the objectives and tasks of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance.

Its powers also conclude adoption of a resolution concerning the report of the Governing Board, the Oversight Board, and the Disciplinary Commission, election of the Governing Board, the Oversight Board, and the Disciplinary Commission and president, settlement of disputes and disagreements between the various bodies of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, and final decisionmaking on appeals of members against decisions of the Governing Board and Disciplinary Commission. It decides termination of the Alliance and confirms or accepts the financial plan and year-end statement.

15. Assemblies are regular and extraordinary. Regular assemblies are held every year in the 1st quarter and are called by the Governing Board, which issues invitations at least 14 days in advance of the meeting. The extraordinary assembly is called by the Governing Board at its own discretion or at the request of at least a third of the members of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance. An extraordinary assembly may also be called by the Oversight Board or president of the Alliance. An extraordinary assembly may pass resolutions only on the matters for which it was called. The body proposing or convening the extraordinary assembly must propose the agenda and corresponding material.

16. The assembly makes decisions by a majority of the votes of the delegates present. If the decision concerns amendment of the rules of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, a two-thirds majority is required. The assembly has a quorum if the number of delegates present represents more than half of the members of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance. If there is no quorum after the time appointed for commencement of the assembly has passed, commencement shall be postponed for 1 hour. Then the assembly makes decisions in the presence of at least enough delegates to represent one-third of the members of the Alliance.

17. The assembly is called to order by the president of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, who chairs it until the working chairman and bodies of the assembly are elected. The assembly is conducted according to the operating procedure adopted by the delegates at the outset. Minutes are kept in the assembly and signed by the chairman of the working presidium, by a person whom he certifies, and by the secretary.

18. The president of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance is at the same time the chairman of the Governing Board and represents the Slovenian Peasant Alliance and acts as its agent before third parties.

19. The Governing Board is the supreme executive body of the assembly and of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance. Aside from its chairman, who is directly elected, the Governing Board consists of at least 15 members elected by the assembly. The Governing Board elects from among its own members two vice chairmen and an Executive Board.

20. The Governing Board is responsible for the following: for decisions on all matters concerning conduct of the policy and program of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance which have been adopted, for the handling of current business, for settlement of issues related to membership in the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, for regulation of relations among chapters and between the chapters and the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, for calling regular and extraordinary assemblies, for preparation of the agenda and materials for the assembly, for presentation of the complaints of members or other bodies of the

Alliance in the assembly, accompanied by its own position, for compiling and carrying out the financial plan and year-end statement of the Alliance, and for election of the Executive Board and two vice chairmen.

21. The Governing Board may appoint special commissions from among its members and other specialists or those whose information could contribute to clarifying the issues in order to prepare positions on individual matters. The commissions of the Governing Board may be standing committees within the limits of its term or may be ad hoc.

22. The Governing Board may organize a conference for its members on particular matters which concern an area of interest of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance: the Slovenian Peasant Alliance may also organize public discussions and the holding of caucuses.

23. The Disciplinary Commission is made up of three members and alternates. They elect their chairman from among themselves.

24. The task of the Disciplinary Commission is to make the decision in the first instance on breaches of members of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance. Breaches include failure to abide by the rules of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, failure to carry out the resolutions of bodies, and any activity harmful to the reputation of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance. The Disciplinary Commission conducts proceedings, making appropriate use of the decisions of the Law on Administrative Proceedings. The commission issues a resolution containing its observations. It may pronounce the following measures: reprimand, public reprimand, and expulsion. An injured party has the right to appeal a resolution of the Disciplinary Commission before the assembly, which shall make the final decision on the case.

25. The Governing Board may appoint a secretary to handle professional, technical, and administrative matters, the secretary shall perform this activity as his professional duty. The secretary must be a member of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance.

26. The Oversight Board accepts and oversees the work of the Governing Board and all other bodies of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, examines the financial and cash transactions, and reports on this to the assembly and on the basis of its conclusions proposes a bill of dismissal or clearance of the Governing Board. The members of the Oversight Board may be reelected.

27. The Executive Board is the operating body of the Governing Board. It is made up of the president of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance, both vice chairmen of the Governing Board, and two members.

The Executive Board above all coordinates the work of the commissions of the society, conducts material and financial transactions, and carries out the resolutions of the Governing Board and prepares the meetings of the Governing Board.

28. Should the president of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance be absent, he is replaced by one of the vice chairmen. The Governing Board defines the tasks and duties of the president.

29. **Social Self-Protection and Nationwide Resistance:** Through its activity, the Slovenian Peasant Alliance strengthens the sophistication of citizens about security, stimulates an awareness about healthy food and moral, physical, and professional fitness and health for performance of the tasks of self-defense and preventive and humane tasks in a possible war, natural and other disasters, within the framework of nationwide defense and social self-protection in that by carrying out the programs of its activities and in line with its capabilities it contributes to the greater production of food and to the defense and self-protection of society.

30. The Slovenian Peasant Alliance ceases to exist if a decision to that effect is made by the Annual Assembly by a two-thirds majority of all members of the Peasant Alliance. In that same meeting, the assembly also decides on distribution of the property of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance. Should the Slovenian Peasant Alliance terminate its operation on the basis of a decision of the competent administrative agency for internal affairs concerning prohibition of its activity, or should the numbers fall below 10, the property of the Alliance shall be deposited with the Slovenian Republic Conference of the SAWP for a period of 10 years and held in keeping for a new organization with similar objectives. If a new organization is not established within a period of 10 years, the property shall belong to the University Clinical Center in Ljubljana.

31. These rules shall take effect upon adoption by the Initiating Committee of the Slovenian Peasant Alliance. The rules may be used when the competent administrative body for internal affairs establishes that they are in keeping with the decisions of the Law on Societies.

PROGRAMMATIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SLOVENIAN DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE

Because of the ineffectiveness and lack of success of the political system up to now, because of Slovenia's unsatisfactory position, which is characterized by both the unitaristic and centralistic tendencies in certain parts of Yugoslavia, because of the lag of Slovenia and Yugoslavia behind European development, and because of the repetition of violations of basic human and civil rights in Slovenia and Yugoslavia, we will establish the Slovenian Democratic Alliance [SDS], which has the following objectives:

1. The principal objective of the Slovenian Democratic Alliance is a movement to establish parliamentary democracy, and therefore it will dedicate its activity to that objective: establishing parliamentary democracy. It will cooperate with other democratic forces in doing so.

2. The SDS judges and arranges Slovenian social and political relations to the measure of advanced Europe. The SDS advocates political pluralism and guarantees the opinion of the minority. This means that it stands for a parliamentary system, for a competition among political ideas, and for free elections. The SDS relentlessly strives for the sovereignty of the Slovenian state, and in this connection Yugoslavia is treated as a community of the nationalities living on its territory created by treaty.

3. The SDS sets as its first task the drafting of a new Slovenian constitution which will be based on the rights of man and which will clearly redefine Slovenian statehood, that is, with the other nationalities of Yugoslavia, Slovenian defense policy, and the institutions of political and economic democracy in Slovenia. Together with other communities which think similarly, the SDS will prepare the calling of a constitutional assembly on the basis of self-determination and offer the Slovenian people an acceptable constitution. We are convinced that the only legitimate constitution is one which the citizens accept in a referendum. Without democracy, there is no sovereignty, nor is there democracy without sovereignty.

4. The SDS is in the SAWP, although it operates autonomously, and at the same time it favors autonomy of the SAWP in the Slovenian and Yugoslav framework. The SDS takes in good faith the publicly declared intention of the SAWP to democratize itself. The SDS takes seriously the plan of the League of Communists to "step down from power" and offer its help when it steps down. The SDS rejects the personnel policy conducted throughout the postwar years, which has been founded on the political monopoly of the party. Until a "still better and more democratic" system is invented, it will favor the right of all citizens to have access to public services regardless of origin, sex, conviction, religion, or sexual orientation.

5. Government power must be divided in order to prevent tyranny: the judicial authority exercises oversight over the legislative power and executive branch of government. The key question is the independence and civic probity of judges, above all the judges of the constitutional court. The SDS thinks that the military courts should be discontinued in peacetime. The SDS will adopt clear positions on its own toward the issues of economic, educational, cultural, scientific, health, pension...policy. The SDS will in political competition nominate and support its own candidates, and it will take part in setting up public and unbiased oversight of decisionmaking.

6. We favor effective oversight of the state and civilian society over the armed forces, the police, and the intelligence services. A necessary part of that oversight is to discontinue the military courts in peacetime. Strip military personnel of what amounts to extraterritoriality and control of the military budget, eliminate the ideological bias of the armed forces, and stimulate civilian investigations of their activity, which must be lawful. It is self-evident that we will take a position in favor of equality of languages in the YPA [Yugoslav Armed Forces] and recognition of conscientious objection.

7. The SDS supports the concern and organizes actions to preserve the natural, cultural, and historical legacy of Slovenes within and outside the borders of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. It therefore rejects the "cultural revolution" which has made man into a direct producer in associated labor, economic megalomania, and political degradation, which have sponsored destruction of the land of Slovenia.

8. Through public criticism and influence through lawful institutions, the SDS will be concerned that no political, economic, or any other machinations and speculations remain hidden from the citizens of Slovenia. The SDS will fiercely oppose the squandering and "draining off" of the capital formed by the Slovenian economy. The lack of economic resources threatens equality and poverty, social unrest, interethnic conflicts, and ultimately large-scale emigration and extinction of Slovenes.

9. One of the principal areas of the SDS's activity is the establishment of democratic relations in the public: in information, culture, science, and education...and in that connection it will advocate broader social interests open to view. The SDS will push for surveys of public opinion and will resolutely contest the monopoly of information. It will commit itself to breaking the state monopoly of the schools.

10. SDS will favor a neutral foreign policy, open national borders, and free movement of people and free flow of information.

11. Along with an analysis and proposal for reform of the Slovenian government system, it will affirm the principle of understanding among differing interests. The idea of any unity determined in advance is alien to the SDS.

12. The SDS will strive for the entry of Slovenia and Yugoslavia into the European community.

THE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT: ENTRY OF SLOVENIAN CHRISTIANS INTO POLITICS

Present Status

We Slovenian Christians are entering political life after 4 decades. The first thought that occurs in connection with that decision is this: Why as Christians? The answer could not be clearer: because it is precisely as Christians

that over the entire postwar period we have been expelled not only from political life, but indeed from all public life. That is why we take it as a sign of authentic democracy for Christians to be able to take part in politics as Christians. That means that we can act with our entire person—and also with the Christian ethos and religious dimensions—everywhere and without difficulties.

We Slovenian Christians are deciding to enter politics after difficult historical trials. For decades, we have been thrust to the outer edge, the sense of being second-class citizens has become deep-rooted in us, and a particular burden has been placed on us by history. Disappointment because of the trampled alliance in the Liberation Front both during the war and especially after the war gave rise to deep distrust of the party and its totalitarian ideology, which can renew itself uninterruptedly. The errors of the integralism of the church institution and its doctrine, of which Christians have mainly been the victim, and those who have abused that policy, as well as those who have opposed it, have left a particularly critical attitude toward the church institution. That is why our decision is necessarily accompanied by a large dose of self-criticism and doubt, but also courage and above all soberness.

Historical Foundations

By this act, we fulfill our civic duty, our Christian ethical [original reads "ethnic"] task in view of the crisis our society has entered, and we are also discharging a historical debt to the Slovenian Christian Social Movement, which toward the end of the last century began a modern [word missing as published] and a modern social and cultural transformation of the Slovenian people. So, we have ties to the political action and social thought of the vehicle of that movement, which is represented in our minds above all by three great figures: Janez Krek, Andrej Gosar, and Edvard Kocbek. That movement has left behind it a rich message and it did pioneering work in restructuring Slovenian social, cultural, and political life. It deserves the credit for the Slovenian people's growing out of backwardness into a European nation with modern development. That is why its message has encountered such a response in the Slovenian historical consciousness, so that even the postwar monolithism has not erased it from our memory. On the contrary, even 20 years ago the movement of 2,000 saw in it its own historical roots and founded its activity on it. That is why the only natural thing is for we Slovenian Christians—as we make our political commitment today—to trace our historical and ideological links to what Krek began back in 1894. Our social activity, then, is nothing new, but a legitimate continuation of the most creative political action in modern Slovenian history.

The Christian Social Movement first became established in peasant nations in the form of organizing peasant cooperatives and savings banks, accompanied by extensive educational work, and then among craftsmen with

craft cooperatives, and finally in the worker stratum just before the war with the strongest trade union and other social, educational, and organizational forms. It established a presence in intellectual and cultural circles, academic societies, and reviews. In its political activity, it committed itself to cooperation both in the national front movement and later in the Liberation Front.

Certain constants have been important to the movement as a whole. Above all the work on historical emancipation and liberation of the Slovenian people as a whole. Then the work among the socially threatened strata of the Slovenian people to correct the social injustice of the social system. That accounts for its original socialist orientation in the sense of a new cultural and civilizational restructuring that would bring the Slovenian people a more just social system that would be more acceptable in its civilized features. They were led above all by the idea that a social system can be set up only on firm ethical foundations, on man. That is why the Christian ethic is emphasized as a guarantee of a just social system.

Those historical foundations, the commitment to the ethnic and social emancipation of the Slovenian people, to an independent ethnic position and devotion to the Christian ethic remains the foundation of the present-day sociopolitical activity of Slovenian Christians.

Philosophical Foundations

When we speak about our philosophical and ethical [original reads "ethnic"] foundations, we give emphasis to the personalistic view of man. Man is the starting point and the goal of all cultural, economic, and political effort. The primacy of the individual must become the guiding principle of the activity of individuals and a basic criterion of the social system. This concentration toward man leads us to the Christian ethic. That is, the basic imperative of that ethic is a fully developed human being who exists in his full essence and all his dimensions. Thus, the Christian ethic dictates an independent political foundation embracing the concepts of justice, humanity, and respect...which in turn makes it necessary to favor all the attributes of man and his existence which are scorned today. And also respect for the total human personality—not for so-called human rights, but rather, for example, the person's right to life beginning with conception, the right to protection of the family, and the right of the concern of society for every individual. What this actually demands is priority of ethical criteria over pragmatic principles. All of those values and criteria are not any special domain of the Christian ethic, although it is the Christian ethic that reveals them and sets them forth and promotes their affirmation.

In forming our ideological foundations, we also draw on European and Christian thought that inspired our predecessors. That thought has been intensively enriched in the recent past. The review of the 2,000 set itself the

particular task of bringing contemporary Christian thought and philosophy into our space, and at the same time to analyze it and build its own vision in doing so.

Political Foundations

The operational foundations of our political activity ought not to be a problem in view of our historical and ideological point of departure. But that is not the case. There is uncertainty because this is an area that has been closed to us and that is why we enter it as an activity foreign to our outlook. There is awkwardness about the risk of crossing the Rubicon of what has been prohibited. A still greater difficulty is represented by the consequence of the privatization of Slovenian Christians: our deep-seated, markedly negative attitude toward politics. As a consequence, the Slovenian Christian overlooks the possibility that the historical destiny of his own people can be shaped only through lawful institutions. The group of 2,000 has felt with pain all the dilemmas of that position during the entire time of its existence. It has been criticized for helping the church to invade the political life of society, that is, of being an expression of clericalization, while at the same time it is accused of being a tool of political structures to break up the unity of the church and to pattern the life of the church after the model of politics. Those difficult experiences demand of us that we take certain clear positions:

A spirit of dialogue and of respect for all participants in the life of society must imbue our political activity. Dialogue remains the foundation of our behavior, which means full respect for man's autonomy. At the same time, we assert that commitment to dialogue automatically follows from the correctly formed Christian ethic, when the latter arises out of the spirit of the messages of the gospel.

We cannot build our political activity on anticommunism. It is impossible to shape for Slovenes a creative policy and confrontation with that historical force which in an alliance with other forces of the Liberation Front won for the Slovenian people the greatest sovereignty it has ever had in modern human history, although this process has not been carried out consistently. We should not forget here the historical mistakes of the party, nor its ideological exclusivism and social violence. On the contrary, we insist that the party acknowledge its mistakes and discharge its debt to the Slovenian people and to its political allies, that is, the debt to the Slovenian Christian socialists and Christian popular masses. We have no need to anchor ourselves politically on dissension from the party or anticommunism. Our ideological and historical foundations stand on their own and have been clearly verified in many tests. We are guided, then, by a marked [original reads "market"] and critical orientation toward the socialist social reality in which we live. In so doing, we strive for human life to be valued in that society.

Our political action tends toward instituting a convergent Slovene political program, which would rally around it all Slovenian social forces desiring a constructive development of the Slovenian nation. We can shape that program only in an open dialogue and cooperation. We need the kind of Slovenian national program that would afford us a more tolerant, more cultured, more civilized, more socially and politically secure, and more spiritually rich life. Political life in Slovenia at the moment shows up the sterile manifestations of parcelization of political space, the intolerant polarization of opinion, which is understandable when democratization has just awakened. But our people's historical position drives us to join our efforts. This kind of political behavior also demands an independent ethnic political orientation, on which our movement insists.

We would make a great mistake if in the general euphoria of politicization we place all of our energies and hopes on politics, which is only one segment in the life of society. Our social commitment obliges us to extend our activity into all areas of human creativity, especially those which are crucial to our survival today as human beings and as a nationality, but political work alone—though it should be continued—cannot achieve the spiritual, ethical, cultural, and also economic and social level of the life of the people. The spiritual dimension of human existence is also a prophecy of his successful historical and social mission.

For a Political Movement

On those grounds, we think that political action would be mistaken if it became caught up in the framework and squabbles of political parties. We need broader and more integral political action. Restricting ourselves to any association as a political party would be to smother in the armor of our own institution and its ideology. Nor is that in the spirit of our historical message. The Slovenian Social Movement, that is, has not aspired to the formation of its own political party of the conventional type, but has advocated independent ideological orientations toward a broader frontal form of political linkage and activity. Our political commitment can clear the way for Slovenian Christians to an authentic political life only if it is organized in the form of a movement. That form best corresponds to the possibilities of the moment and is open to all possible forms of our political development. Whether the movement will be reshaped into some other political form depends on the reform of our sociopolitical system, which will perhaps take the direction of a nonparty self-managed society or the direction of parliamentary pluralism of political parties.

If we want to carry out a constructive sociopolitical program convergently oriented and open to dialogue, a program that is founded on Christian ethical [original reads "ethnic"] and spiritual foundations, then it is best for us to organize in the flexible form of a movement. This does not mean that we should neglect the organizational aspect and orientation of our political action. On

the contrary. We conceive our organization, then, as springing from a central origin—which means from the nucleus of the Christian personality and not ensnared in the limited framework of ideological and organizational environments. That is why we favor the organization of Slovenian Christians into the appropriate and historically legitimate Slovene Christian Social Movement.

BYLAWS OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR A YUGOSLAV DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVE

1. The purpose of the Association (substantiated in its basic features in the program contained in the Manifesto for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative) is political and cultural activity on behalf of democratic institutionalization and integration of Yugoslavia.
2. Any citizen of Yugoslavia who accepts the program can become a member of the Association. Enrollment takes place by written application.
3. Membership in the Association does not contradict membership in other organizations.
4. The Association operates publicly and independently, using the periodicals that exist and those which it establishes itself insofar as it is able; the views and announcements of the Association are published in the written and spoken languages of its members.
5. The Association operates on the basis of resolutions adopted in the Assembly, the Council, the Executive Committee, and geographically organized chapters, as well as by means of the public statements of its members.
6. The chapters of the Association are established by members of the Association—on the basis of their own need—in a city or region where at least 25 members are active. The chapter elects an executive committee of at least three members. The Association establishes sections on the basis of particular interests of the members.
7. The Assembly is made up of representatives of the chapters, so that every chapter has two representatives, and every chapter which has more than 5 percent of the members of the Association receives one representative in the Assembly for every additional 100 members of the Association. No chapter may have more than 25 percent of the members of the Assembly as its representatives. In case of financial or transportation difficulties, the chapter may be represented in the Assembly by one representative, who on the basis of proxy—pertaining to the views which the chapter adopts—shall be allowed the number of votes to which the chapter is entitled on the problem to which the views adopted by the chapter pertain.
8. The Assembly meets regularly once a year, decides on the work program and other basic questions in the activity of the Association. It elects the Council and Executive Committee of the Association, as well as their

chairmen; the Assembly determines in advance the number of members of these bodies. The Assembly makes decisions on the basis of the votes of the majority, and its decisions are valid if representatives of members from at least four federal units take part in its proceedings.

9. The Council meets at least once a year and makes decisions that are programmatic in nature. The Council elects a deputy chairman.

10. The Executive Committee carries out the decisions of the Assembly and the Council, organizes the everyday activity of the Association, coordinates the activity of chapters and sections, represents the Association, conducts the financial transactions of the Association, and calls the regular assembly. The Executive Committee must convene an extraordinary assembly if this is demanded by the Council, by 20 percent of the membership, or by at least three chapters. The Executive Committee elects the secretary of the Association, who replaces the chairman of the Executive Committee when the latter is absent. If the chairman of the Executive Committee ceases to perform his duty, the Executive Committee elects an acting chairman until the next assembly. On the basis of reports of the chapters and sections and examination of the public activity of the membership, the Executive Committee presents in the regular assembly the roll of members who in the past year have taken an active part in the work of the Association and on that basis constitute the current membership base of the Association. Representatives of chapters and sections also take part in the work of the Executive Committee—in keeping with technical and financial possibilities.

11. The revenues of the Association consist of the dues collected (which for all employed members amounts for the year to 10 percent of the average monthly personal income in the federal unit where the member of the Association is employed), voluntary contributions, auxiliary and earmarked resources, and earnings from the sale of its own publications and copyrights. The Oversight Committee elected by the Council shall monitor the financial transactions of the Association. The report of the Oversight Committee is submitted to the regular assembly.

12. The Association is registered as an association of citizens with the competent government agencies.

13. The Bylaws take effect after adoption in the Founding Assembly.

14. The headquarters of the Association are in Zagreb, Trg zrtava fašizma 13.

15. Should the Association terminate its work, any property it might have shall go to the Yugoslav Red Cross.

Manifesto

Statement of the Executive Committee of the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative when the Association's application to be entered in the Register of Citizens' Associations was rejected:

The political, cultural, and economic state that Yugoslavia has been in for years now is destroying all the potential of its earlier development and is driving an immense number of its inhabitants into essentially more difficult conditions of existence. Ethnic and social discord is frustrating life together in the country on a daily basis, and especially as a prospect for the future, and the absence of a democratic system is preventing a possible change of direction.

1. In this situation, the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative considers the basic reason for its establishment to be the fact that in Yugoslavia today there is no political initiative that would be both Yugoslav and democratic.

2. In its effort to bring democratic initiative into Yugoslavia's political life, the Association proceeds on the following premises:

a) Yugoslavia exists today as a state which is neither democratically organized, nor has it been democratically legitimized, nor do its present constitutional form and legal system allow for the establishment and activity of a public that would reflect the existing diversity of interests and ideas, individuality, and particularities on the basis of their public confrontation and would create prerequisites for arriving at a general position that would suit the majority and would be valid under conditions acceptable to all;

b) in many political matters today, Yugoslavia is possible only as the result of decisionmaking legitimized by the nation-states, so that the federal level of its organization has almost no independent status of its own that would arise out of the direct decisionmaking of its citizens;

c) Yugoslavia—with immense political, economic, and cultural difficulties—is functioning by means of a political system imposed on society and particularly on the economy, so that it prevents individuals—as independent entities—from organizing their own existence and joining with others on behalf of material, spiritual, and political improvement on principles of personal interest and adjustment through solidarity;

d) because of the privileges which the system has granted to the leaders of the government and party, the process of establishing the democratic sovereign—the people (the masses), which embraces all citizens regardless of their ethnic, sexual, occupational, religious, political, social, cultural, and other differences, which are necessarily respected, is not possible in Yugoslavia.

3. The Association will therefore strive to act so as to make the following possible:

a) set up Yugoslavia as a democratic and federal community, i.e., as a community of citizens and of federal units;

b) constitutional guarantee of the role of the citizen as the basic prerequisite of democratic integration of the community at the level of the Federation as well as at the level of the federal units and local communities;

c) political organization of Yugoslavia as a representatively and democratically arranged federal community—by means of the Yugoslav parliament (with houses in which Yugoslav citizens and federal units are directly represented);

d) creation of the political, cultural, and legal prerequisites for a pluralism of political views that is legally guaranteed, not merely allowed at the whim of powerful individuals, so that the good of the community would be ascertained through their public confrontation at least at the Yugoslav level, and as far as is possible in the future at the European level as well;

e) preservation of a legal guarantee of the influence of every employed citizen on management of work in the environment in which he is active.

4. So that these objectives might be achieved and so that their participation will be possible for future generations, it is assumed that members of the Association:

a) have joined the Association by their free will in an endeavor to assist achievement of those goals;

b) are aware of the limited nature of consenting to Yugoslavia as a mere derivative of "primarily ethnically" predetermined existence of its inhabitants, since their point of departure is that there are essential aspects of the life of all inhabitants of the country which can be optimally regulated only at the level of Yugoslavia as a whole;

c) have accepted mutual ideological, ethnic, political, religious, interest-oriented, and other differences as facts that should be taken into account, so that it is possible on democratic principles to gradually formulate a solution to every problem that would be maximally acceptable to all;

d) have taken as their point of departure that the democratic solution is the one which signifies government on the basis of the will of the majority expressed in a vote, accompanied by procedurally established guarantees of minorities of all institutional types as well as the inviolable rights of the individual and toleration of differences among them;

e) are convinced that only by democratic and public action is it possible to achieve the goals which have been meaningfully defined as democratic.

VIEW OF THE CROATIAN REPUBLIC CONFERENCE OF THE SAWP ON INITIATIVES FOR FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN CROATIA

1. It is obvious that pluralistic initiatives in SR Croatia have found inspiration on the one hand in the formation of various associations and movements in SR Slovenia and on the other in the effort of the Croatian LC and Croatian SAWP to contribute to further democratization of society in the search for solutions for getting out of the socioeconomic and political crisis consistent with our socialist principles. We thus have the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative as an association of citizens which objectively has a favorable response from the public, and a few days ago we had the initiative for formation of the Croatian Social Liberal Alliance and for formation of the Radical Association for the United States of Europe, which in their programs offer different visions of our future development and contribute to the instability of our political situation.

So, there are initiatives on our political scene for formation of political associations or parties inspired by nationalistic programs that have been superseded and based on an awakening of Croatian nationalism. Their initiators mainly belong to a segment of those forces which at the time of the mass movement in Croatia came into conflict with the policy of the League of Communists and our society and were condemned by the public. Along that line we have the initiative for formation of the Croatian Democratic Community, whose program is based on an ethnic foundation and on unacceptable nationalistic positions, and we will see today what the final position will be of the initiatives of the Croatian Social Liberal Alliance.

Not a single official agency in SR Croatia has so far taken a position concerning all these initiatives, and the public is getting confused when the powers that be tacitly tolerate their creation and thereby even the creation of a new political system in Yugoslavia.

At this point, a clear position needs to be taken, even though it is well-known, since the SFRY Constitution does not allow the formation of new political parties, but because of the simultaneous desire for us to create the conditions for political pluralism, we need to say what is what and what our commitment is today.

2. Within the limits of the open options, initiatives and efforts to form parties or associations on an ethnic basis such as the Croatian Democratic Community are unacceptable to the Croatian SAWP. The discussion organized by the Society of Croatian Writers, which was

attended by a segment of well-meaning intellectuals and creators, was used a few days ago to launch in public the well-known ideas and programs for renewal of the Croatian mass movement.

This example shows clearly what is being offered to a potential membership and the public by programs which at first glance seem to be substantially based on the same content for which the League of Communists and Socialist Alliance have been fighting, but objectively contain the programmatic foundations of conventional nationalism, ethnic exclusiveness, and anticommunism. We find unacceptable programs which derive their inspiration solely from the past of the Croatian people, which very cleverly take as their point of departure values for which that people has fought in its remote past, but which skips over or minimizes the period of the National Liberation Struggle and postwar socialist construction. That program is also written in a language which is inevitably associated with the time of the Croatian mass movement. It passes over in silence the fact that the new relations in Yugoslavia and Croatia are turned toward socialism and that our society cannot be built or develop further without relying on what is the objective achievement and accomplishment of the struggle of all the nationalities and ethnic minorities and of the working class itself in Croatia and Yugoslavia. It is clear to us all that our present and future cannot be derived solely from the position of Croatianism, but must be derived from the position of the Yugoslav community. That is why this program and its authors and all other programs of similar content cannot have our support.

3. The SFRY Constitution and Constitution of SR Croatia have this to say in part about human freedoms and rights: "In the framework of democratic political relations which make it possible for the individual to pursue his interests, the right to self-management, and other rights—he can do this in the bodies of self-management...and in sociopolitical and other public organizations and citizens' associations which he creates himself and through which he influences the development of social consciousness and the broadening of conditions for his own activity and for realization of his own interests and exercise of his rights."

Our Constitution does not recognize conventional political parties, but speaks exclusively about the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and sociopolitical organizations to which the working people and citizens freely belong, and sociopolitical and public organizations and citizens' associations are an integral part of the system of socialist self-management. The Constitution, then, has defined the following: the League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance of Working People, and the Trade Union Federation.

Article 203 of the SFRY Constitution has stated that the manner of exercise of individual freedoms and rights may be prescribed only by law. In the domain of the organization of society in SR Croatia, the 1982 Law on

Public Organizations and Citizens' Associations is in effect. Under the provisions of that law, to form any new public organization the founders must apply to the Socialist Alliance, which gives its opinion. Citizens' associations are entered in the register kept by secretariats of internal affairs, and it is in their competence to dispute the possibility of recording individual associations if its goals or the individuals who are the founders do not fulfill the conditions of that law.

4. The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Croatia has opened up room in its ranks for a plurality of initiatives and programs which are oriented toward the development of socialism, self-management, brotherhood and unity, and equality of nationalities and ethnic minorities in SR Croatia and the SFRY, which are oriented toward the equality of citizens in their rights, duties, and freedoms, which are oriented toward the development of an effective economic and political system, and which terminates the monopoly of any interested party or program in the Socialist Alliance. Within the framework of these possibilities which the Socialist Alliance is offering today, initiatives, associations, and movements cannot be accepted if they negate the foundations of the SFRY, if they question the overall concept and results of the struggle of the LCY and its subjective forces, if they are based on a demand to build a new democratic society or if a society on altogether different foundations. It is unacceptable to establish those associations which negate the legitimacy of the LCY and everything that the working class and people in Yugoslavia have accomplished as achievements of their struggle—the federal system of the SFRY, the equality of the nationalities and ethnic minorities, brotherhood and unity, self-management.... So, within the framework of the Croatian SAWP we are in favor of pluralism, we are also in favor of self-management political pluralism, but a pluralism which is premised on the fundamental commitments and values of our socialist self-managed society, on the principles of AVNOJ, on man and his fundamental interest, and that is to bring about the conditions for complete equality in economic, cultural, ethnic, and every other respect, that is, to strengthen the position of the workingman and citizen in our political system. That future lies in further development of self-management, not in a one-party or multiparty system.

It is our unambiguous position that political parties cannot be established or legalized either outside or inside the Croatian SAWP. That is, not only is this not possible under the Constitution and law, but also the political pluralism of self-management necessarily starts from the position of man in the self-management system and in efforts to bring about a political system in which self-management will be totally achieved, when matters of a political nature are resolved through dialogue, debate, and creative synthesis of the protagonists of self-management interests and initiatives within the framework of the Socialist Alliance and assemblies.

Zagreb, 2 March 1989

[Letter]

[To] Coordinating Committee for the Work of Public
Organizations and Citizens' Associations
Split Opstina
Croatian SAWP [Illegible stamp]

[From] Initiating Committee To Establish the Citizens'
League for a United Europe
Split, 12 March 1989

We would like your committee to evaluate whether there
is a public interest in establishing the Citizens' League
for a United Europe as a public organization.

On behalf of the Initiating Committee,

(Signed)
Ivan Tadinac
Jurica Stambuk

[Letter]

[From] Split Opstina Conference of the Croatia SAWP
No 87/2
Split, 17 March 1989

[To] Republic Conference of the Croatia SAWP,
Zagreb
Attention: Comrade Marinka Panic

I am hereby submitting for your examination the request
of the Initiating Committee for establishment of the
Citizens' League for a United Europe, the draft of the
League's programmatic foundation, the draft of the rules
of the League (submitted to the Split Opstina Conference
of the Croatia SAWP on 13 March 1989), along with
the rest of the material related to the programmatic
tasks, objectives, and methods of the League's activity.

We will agree on further activities of the Split Opstina
Conference of the Croatia SAWP through direct con-
tacts.

Comradely greetings,

(Signed) Zoran Buric, chairman

Received 22 March 1989
Republic Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Work-
ing People of Croatia
Zagreb

**STATEMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
FOR A YUGOSLAV DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVE
IN CONNECTION WITH REJECTION OF THE
ASSOCIATION'S APPLICATION FOR ENTRY IN
THE REGISTER OF CITIZENS' ASSOCIATIONS**

1. A decision of the Croatian Republic Secretariat for
Internal Affairs dated 3 April 1989 rejected the applica-
tion of the Association for entry in the Register of
Citizens' Associations on the grounds that "the purpose
and objectives of establishing the UJDI go beyond the
character of citizens' associations." Since this decision
does not state that the Association cannot register at all
(for example, because it exceeds existing geographic or
ideological limits), it can only mean that the UJDI is
being directed to register as a public organization.

2. On this basis, it is quite clear that the decision follows
from a political position, or, more accurately, from a
tactical political position. After all, it does not follow
unambiguously from law or in any other manner that
citizens' associations are a lower form of assembly which
the objectives of the UJDI program would exceed. The
essential—political—difference between a citizens' as-
sociation and public organizations is that in the process of
establishing public organizations the law provides con-
sultation with the SAWP, so that the Association, con-
trary to the professions that have been made so far, has
been subjected to direct coercion to participate "within
the framework of the SAWP."

3. Since its Founding Assembly, the Association has tried
to be an independent organization working on the
urgently necessary democratic reconstruction of the
Yugoslav community. In the conviction of a majority of
those who spoke in the Founding Assembly and also in
later meetings which the Association has organized, such
activity can be trusted only outside the existing institu-
tions, which are mostly nonfunctioning, that is, by
means of an independent new institution, however,
rudimentarily it may be organized.

4. Therefore, restricting the right to register is not only an
effort to hinder the activity of the UJDI, but above all an
expression of the desire to fundamentally prevent even
initial activity in the direction of political pluralism, and
that means a political pluralism supported by legally
guaranteed and independent organizations (pluralism of
opinions, fortunately, cannot yet be simply prohibited).

5. The members of the Executive Committee of the
UJDI, on the basis of what is stated above, do not
recognize the decision of the Republic Secretariat for
Internal Affairs as a legal position, and they will try to
achieve annulment of the decision and at the same time
continue to work on the further spread of democratic
ideas and practice.

Zagreb, 7 April 1989

(Signed) Zarko Puhovski
On behalf of the Executive Committee

[Letter]

[To] Croatian SAWP Coordinating Committee
for the Work of Public Organizations and Citizens'
Associations
Split Opstina

[From] Initiating Committee for Establishment of the
Citizens' League for a United Europe, Split

17 February 1989

We, members of the Initiating Committee for establish-
ment of the Citizens' League for a United Europe
approve by our signatures the program foundations and
draft of the rules of the League, and we ask you to
evaluate our project and support it.

(signed)
Kleidi Grgas
Djordje Paro
Juliya Sumic
Ivan Tadinac
Sanda Kosanovic
Jurica Stambuk
Snjezana Reic
Andjelka Petrovic
Senka Domazet
Zlatan Moric

PROGRAMMATIC DECLARATION OF THE CROATIAN SOCIAL-LIBERAL ALLIANCE

We are witnesses of the worldwide historical failure and
utter bankruptcy of the one-party methods Communists
have used so far to rule society. In Yugoslavia, while a
protracted crisis is reaching its incandescent culmina-
tion, the country is ruled by agitated powerlessness and
dangerous meandering. A renewal of monolithism and
variously based dictatorships is offered as a way out of
that situation, which would suspend for the foreseeable
future our participation in the life of contemporary
civilization.

Convinced that it is our obligation and duty to oppose
that situation and its totalitarian prospects, which are
still worse, we are establishing the Croatian Social-
Liberal Alliance (hereinafter "HSLS").

I. The HSLS starts from the principle that the only free
community is one in which every individual is free and
socially secure. That means that the HSLS takes the view
that the individual is the supreme value. He ought to be
protected in his fundamental rights against unlawful
ideological and government coercion. That means a
return of the individual from the anonymity of class
contempt and utopian oblivion to historical events. The

HSLS feels that only on such values is it possible to
found the changes and innovations that would lead us
out of the present situation and return us organically to
Europe.

In keeping with these principles and convictions, the
HSLS sets the following goals:

1. physical and spiritual inviolability of the individual;
2. establishment of civil and political liberties and legal
and social security;
3. free association of individuals according to their own
convictions and needs;
4. the right of all subjects—the individual and juridical
persons—to own property and free access to the entre-
preneurial stratum;
5. lasting prevention of any political or other program
which advocates or carries out violence or ethnic, reli-
gious, ideological, political, or racial intolerance;
6. equality of the sexes in the workplace, under the law,
and in social status.

In the exercise of his rights, the individual may not
deprive others of their rights.

II. The HSLS will strive for establishment of a state
based on law in which law would be the most important
standard of behavior of citizens instead of the ideologi-
cal monopoly and arbitrariness of the party. In order to
achieve that objective, the HSLS will advocate the fol-
lowing:

1. political pluralism, a multiparty and parliamentary
system, direct elections, and strict division of powers
and independence of the judiciary;
2. equality of all forms of ownership;
3. a free commodity market and freedom on the labor
market and the capital market;
4. a mixed economy with highly developed small busi-
ness and direct forms of association;
5. worker participation and self-management depending
on the type of ownership relation, and free formation of
trade unions;
6. abolition of the maximum landholding and encour-
agement of the development and modernization of agri-
culture in every way.

A state based on those premises, guided by the idea of justice, offers social security even to those citizens threatened by the competitive attitude inherent in the market and the pluralistic society. Our goal is a welfare state such as has already been achieved in the most advanced democracies through evolution based on enterprise, education, science, moral responsibility, and work, not on revolutionary violence. If achievement of that objective is to become possible, the HSLS is convinced that its program can be carried out solely on the basis of a renewal of the value and dignity of work and workers. The HSLS will consider a part of its own program all those achievements of democracy, socialism, self-management, and liberalism which advance the freedom of the individual and the prosperity of society and which have confirmed their value in practical life.

In its effort to achieve its objectives, the HSLS will cooperate most closely with the alliances and political organizations that already exist as well as with all liberal- and social-democratic, socialist, democratic, Christian-socialist, and self-management-oriented individuals, groups, movements, and organizations in all the republics and provinces of the SFRY which adopt similar or identical views on particular social problems as the HSLS.

III. The HSLS will advocate its program in a balanced way and will gradually carry it out through the lawful institutions, above all through the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Croatia. It will strive to transform the Croatian SAWP into a Popular Alliance of Equal Political Organizations. It will propose constitutional, political, economic, and social reforms intended above all to resolve the acute and universal crisis of Yugoslav society, but also at establishing the foundations for the permanent prosperity of all. It will strive to instill knowledge, experience, and material assistance from our fellow countrymen outside the homeland into all domains of the life of society.

Starting from the idea of a state based on law in which law is binding on all citizens, institutions, and agencies of government power, the HSLS will abide by the Constitutions of SR Croatia and the SFRY.

The program of the HSLS expresses the democratic and European tradition and Croatia's orientation as well as the desire of the Croatian people, the Serbian people, and other nationalities and ethnic minorities in the Socialist Republic of Croatia to achieve mutual understanding, concord, and linkage with all nationalities and ethnic minorities in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the basis of respect for differences and in full equality and freedom.

The HSLS offers its program as a program for Croatia and as a program which Croatia offers to Yugoslavia.

IV. The HSLS respects the fact that there are many profound differences, conflicting interests and opposed national ideologies in Yugoslavia. That is why a policy based on the abstract citizen is unsuitable in it, and a policy of one-sided imposition of will is intolerable. That would threaten the economy, culture, and institutions of the republics and provinces, that is, of the nationalities and ethnic minorities. That is why the HSLS takes the position that the nationality question in Yugoslavia can be resolved only by a federalism based on consensus, in which the nationalities have the right to self-determination all the way to cessation. Federal institutions should have power only over what has been agreed to by consensus, while all the rest would be in the power of the republics. The HSLS will work for a broadening of parity and consensus in all areas, legislative, judicial, and executive, of federal power, and administrative authority, adhering to the principle of parity, must adopt the organizational principles of modern states.

V. The HSLS will work persistently for Croatia to keep alive its place in European culture and civilization, to develop further in accordance with that place, preserving its peculiarities and working for the European orientation of Yugoslavia. The ultimate goal is complete integration into the technological, economic, scientific, and cultural life of Europe.

Zagreb, 27 April 1989

Initiating Group for Establishment of the Croatian Social-Liberal Alliance

BYLAWS OF THE CROATIAN SOCIAL-LIBERAL ALLIANCE

Introduction

Article 1. The Croatian Social-Liberal Alliance is a public organization whose objectives have been set forth in the Programmatic Declaration of the Founding Assembly.

Article 2. The name of the organization is: Croatian Social-Liberal Alliance (hereinafter "HSLS"), and the headquarters are in Zagreb, Djordjiceva 3b.

Article 3. The HSLS has the status of a civil juridical person. The Alliance is entered in the register of public organizations kept in the Republic Secretariat for Jurisprudence and Administration of SR Croatia.

Article 4. The Alliance operates within SR Croatia, but it cooperates with related associations and organizations in other republics, and through the public media and public statements it advocates its program over the entire territory of the SFRY.

Article 5. The HSLS cooperates with related organizations abroad, with public and private institutions, with the media, and with emigre organizations.

Article 6. The HSLS has its own seal and logo.

Principles

Article 7. The HSLS as a whole belongs to the Croatian SAWP in order to develop and cooperate with other organizations within its framework on behalf of further democratization and general advancement of sociopolitical life in SR Croatia and SFR Yugoslavia.

Article 8. The Alliance will nurture mutual understanding and respect equality among all the nationalities and ethnic minorities of SFR Yugoslavia, and in that and in every respect will abide by the provisions of the Constitutions of SR Croatia and SFR Yugoslavia.

Article 9. The work of the HSLS is open to public scrutiny.

Membership

Article 10. Any adult citizen of SFR Yugoslavia who adopts the Programmatic Declaration of the Alliance and these Bylaws may become a member of HSLS.

Article 11. A member enrolls in the HSLS by signing the application. Every member can freely make his proposals and has the right to take part in all decisions of the Alliance through free discussion and direct voting, including elections of the bodies of leadership. Every member is required to respect the Bylaws and to advocate the program and pay dues.

Article 12. Membership in the Alliance ceases upon withdrawal, deletion from the rolls, and expulsion because of a violation of the provisions of law, the Bylaws, or other acts of the HSLS.

Official Bodies

Article 13. The supreme governing body of the HSLS is the Assembly, and in the periods between assemblies the supreme governing body is the HSLS Council.

Article 14. The Assembly adopts and amends the Program and Bylaws, elects the Council and Executive Committee, as well as their chairmen and vice chairmen, debates their official reports, and approves and confirms the policy of the Alliance.

Article 15. The Assembly is convened by the Council or Executive Committee in agreement with the chairman of the Council. The Executive Committee cooperates with the chairman of the Council in preparing the agenda of the Assembly and determines the method of election of representatives. The proceedings of the Assembly are chaired by the chairman of the HSLS Council.

Article 16. The decisions of the Assembly are valid if the session of the Assembly has been attended by at least two-thirds of the representatives and are passed by a majority, but amendments to the Bylaws and Program require a two-thirds majority of the votes.

Article 17. Between assemblies, the HSLS Council may by cooptation expand or change the membership by one-third, and it may appoint new members of the Executive Committee. The Council debates the reports of the Executive Committee and approves them.

The Council is convened by its chairman independently or on the recommendation of the Executive Committee. Should the chairman of the Executive Committee be prevented from performing his duties, the Council appoints a member of the Executive Committee to replace him. The Assembly debates all personnel decisions which the Council has made.

Article 18. The HSLS is represented by the chairman of the Council and its vice chairmen, the chairman of the Executive Committee, and those members of the Council and Executive Committee authorized by the Council.

Article 19. The Executive Committee operates independently in accordance with the Program, the Bylaws, and the decisions of the Assembly and Council.

Article 20. The Executive Committee also handles the financial affairs of the Alliance, and it appoints a person among its members to take particular responsibility for those matters.

If necessary, the Executive Committee appoints its own committees for various activities.

Article 21. The Council consists of between 21 and 33 members and the Executive Committee of 7 to 11 members.

Organization

Article 22. The HSLS is organized on a geographic basis in chapters as the basic unit. A minimum of seven members of the HSLS may establish their chapter and elect a president and secretary. Every chapter independently advocates the program of the HSLS in its area in keeping with the Bylaws and decisions of the Alliance's bodies of leadership. Chapter presidents have the right to take part in the work of the Executive Committee and Council when problems in their area are being debated.

Article 23. The Alliance operates through its chapters, through its own periodical and other publications of its own, through other media and periodicals, through public statements by its members, through press releases of the Executive Committee and other bodies, through

political and reform proposals which are sent to government bodies or put up for public discussion. The Alliance will regularly report on its activity to the competent bodies of the Croatian SAWP.

Article 24. The HSLs finance its activity with revenues from members, voluntary contributions, public funds, newspaper and book publishing, and various events. The principles governing financial transactions are adopted by the Assembly, and individual decisions are made on collection and expenditure, on distribution among chapters and central bodies, on records concerning cash transactions, and on accounting records by the Executive Committee.

Article 25. As the supreme body of the HSLs, the Assembly is made up of representatives of at least two-thirds of all the chapters. The representatives are elected in caucuses of the members of each chapter in proportion to the number of members, as specified by the Council in convening the Assembly. The representative's term is 1 year. The Assembly session may also be attended by any member of the HSLs, but without a right to vote.

Article 26. The regular assembly is held once a year, and the extraordinary assembly as needed. Abbreviated minutes are kept in the Assembly and signed by the chairman and two witnesses certifying the minutes. The minutes are verified in the next session of the Assembly.

The Council is required to convene an extraordinary assembly when this is requested by at least one-fourth of the members of the Council or at least one-fifth of the members of the Alliance, no later than 30 days from the date when that request is received.

Article 27. Members of the Council are elected to a term of 3 years, and the same applies to the chairman of the Council, chairman of the Executive Committee, and members of the Executive Committee.

Article 28. The term of office of members of the Council, the chairman of the Council, the vice chairmen of the Council, and the members and chairman of the Executive Committee may be terminated by recall because of inactivity, because of action contrary to the Bylaws and decisions of the Alliance's Assembly, and contrary to the objectives and tasks of the Alliance. The recall proceedings are conducted in the manner prescribed for elections.

Article 29. The Executive Committee submits a report on its work in the annual assembly.

Article 30. The HSLs cease to operate if the Alliance's Assembly so decides.

Article 31. Voting on programmatic issues is public, but voting on personnel matters is secret.

Article 32. The HSLs will assist the establishment of related organizations in all the republics and provinces of SFR Yugoslavia.

Article 33. Social-liberal alliances in other republics and provinces of Yugoslavia operate independently as organizations, but they voluntarily enter into association with one another in the Federation of Social-Liberal Alliances of Yugoslavia (hereinafter "FSLSJ").

Article 34. The FSLSJ is an association whose members accept the joint social-liberal program. The joint program is adopted by the FSLSJ Assembly. The decisions of the FSLSJ Assembly are made by consensus of all the members.

Article 35. If it should not be possible in one of the republics or provinces to establish a social-liberal alliance, citizens may join the alliance of any republic or province.

Final Provisions

Article 36. Should the HSLs cease to operate, the chairman of the Council is required to inform in writing the body in which it is registered.

Article 37. Should it cease to operate, the property of the Alliance belongs to the Regional Bureau for Protection of Monuments of SR Croatia.

Article 38. The Bylaws shall take effect after adoption in the Founding Assembly.

Article 39. The Bylaws and other general acts are published on the bulletin board and in the periodical of the HSLs.

Chairman of the Council
Zagreb

The text of the draft was adopted in a session on 21 March 1989.

BYLAWS OF 'GREEN ACTION'

Article 1

"Green Action" is an association of citizens that arose out of an identical ecological initiative of citizens of Split in order to fight the aggression represented by pollution of the environment and man, the threat to human health, disturbance of man's peace, and the threatening of animals and plants.

Article 2

Citizens join "Green Action" for the following purposes:

1. Spreading knowledge about global, European, Yugoslav, Croatian, Dalmatian, and local environmental

problems, especially those manifested as any form of pollution, devastation, aggression, and intolerance.

2. Creation of a democratic environmental public capable of and interested in monitoring and influencing public activities and private activities which are or could become aggressive polluters.

3. Urging the public to action to increase effectiveness and accountability of government and other public services responsible for protecting and preserving the environment and for the fight against pollution.

4. Bringing together critical specialists who will evaluate the findings and proposals of the professional services of public and private institutions whose activity is related to environmental problems or could cause them.

Article 3

"Green Action" does not intend to replace any existing institution or service, to displace any society, association, organization, initiative, or action, nor is it fighting for any kind of power or to take over institutions or organizations. At the same time, "Green Action" will cooperate with scientific, health, educational, and cultural institutions, with public and political organizations, initiatives, and movements, in short, with all those who pursue similar goals.

Article 4

"Green Action" will in its activities use exclusively nonviolent and lawful means.

Article 5

"Green Action" brings together all those who are willing to devote a part of their time, knowledge, and courage to environmental action.

No difference based on ethnic background, class, religion, occupation, sex, race, age, region, nationality, property, political ideology, education, or any other difference shall be grounds for withholding or infringing the right of membership in "Green Action" or the right to participate in its activities.

Article 6

A person becomes a member of "Green Action" by free enrollment, by filling out and submitting the application, or by making a statement of enrollment.

Any physical or juridical person and movements or groups which do not have the status of a juridical person may become members.

Article 7

Membership ceases by withdrawal or expulsion.

The decision on expulsion is made by the Board. If a member behaves in a manner incompatible with the rules of these Bylaws, he must be given an opportunity to defend himself before the decision is made.

The member has the right to appeal a decision on expulsion to the Assembly. The Assembly's decision is final.

Article 8

Membership in "Green Action" is voluntary and brings with it no privileges whatsoever. If a member performs jobs for "Green Action," he may be reimbursed for the expenses incurred in the tasks assigned.

Article 9

The proceedings of "Green Action" are both public and open to all those interested. Every member has the right to examine all documents of "Green Action."

Article 10

"Green Action" has an Assembly, a Board, an Oversight [original reads "People's"] Committee, and sections.

Article 11

The Assembly of "Green Action" is made up of all members, each with one vote.

The Assembly decides by a majority of the votes of the members present.

Article 12

The Assembly meets several times a year. The Board calls and prepares the regular meetings. A group of at least 15 members may also convene an extraordinary assembly.

Article 13

The power of the Assembly is as follows: enactment and amendment of the Bylaws, enactment and amendment of the work plan, enactment and amendment of the financial plan, and also monitoring the work of the Board, ruling on appeals against expulsion from "Green Action," and election of the Oversight Committee.

Article 14

The Board is the Executive Body of the Assembly.

The powers of the Board are to carry out the decisions of the Assembly, to provide the conditions for its work, to keep and preserve documentation, to collect, preserve,

and augment financial and other resources, to make decisions on proposals for expulsion, to represent "Green Action" within the country and abroad, and authentic interpretation of these Bylaws.

Article 15

The Board numbers between 11 and 17 members elected by secret ballot in the Assembly.

Every member has a right to nominate members of the Board, to be elected to the Board, and to present his program in the appropriate manner.

The member who receives a majority of the votes is elected.

The Board is elected for a 1-year term, and submits to the Assembly a report on its work at least once a year.

Fifteen days before the end of its term the Board is required to prepare a financial report which it submits to the Assembly before it is dismissed.

Article 16

Membership on the Board may be terminated because of inactivity, failure to carry out obligations assumed, and grounds which otherwise would signify termination of membership in "Green Action."

The decision on termination of membership on the Board is made by the Assembly in secret ballot.

Article 17

The Board adopts an operating procedure which regulates its operation in more detail.

Article 18

Members of "Green Action" establish sections:

1. Sections for various environmental problems;
2. Regional sections of the general type;
3. Regional sections for the particular environmental problems.

The sections are required to regularly inform the Board concerning their formation and proceedings, and especially concerning the plans for public action.

The sections must elect representatives for liaison with the Board.

Article 19

Resources for the work of "Green Action" come from dues, voluntary contributions, subsidies, grants, sponsorship, publishing and propaganda activity, the organization of games of chance, the organization of tourist services related to environmental actions, and other activities permitted by law.

Article 20

In its activity, "Green Action" informs its membership and the public by issuing press releases, bulletins, newspapers, leaflets, and other periodicals.

Article 21

"Green Action" has its symbol, which must be displayed during all actions and on all publications of "Green Action."

The decision on the symbol is made by the Assembly.

Article 22

Only members of the Board have the right to accept obligations on behalf of "Green Action," which they shall do on the basis of written authorization of the Board.

Article 23

The headquarters of "Green Action" are in Split.

Article 24

"Green Action" has a seal whose shape and dimensions are.....and on which the following are inscribed and in the center the symbol of "Green Action."

Article 25

These Bylaws have been adopted in the Founding Assembly of "Green Action" heldin Split and take effect immediately.

Article 26

If the number of members of "Green Action" falls below 10, it ceases to operate.

Should its members become inactive, the resources of "Green Action" belong to the fund for uncared for children or an appropriate service for child care.

DRAFT OF THE PLATFORM OF THE CROATIAN DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY

1. In momentous and crucial moments of history, when the crisis of economic, sociopolitical, and interethnic relations in the SFRY, as well as the universal crisis of

one-party socialism in the world—has reached dramatic proportions, and—from the left and from the right—some sort of old utopian ideas are not only being offered, but indeed people would like to impose recognizable neohegemonistic programs by force, it becomes a historical necessity and need, in the interest of both the Croatian people and other peoples with which it must arrange its relations on the soil of the SFRY and Europe, to hear the original and authentic voice of that Croatian public opinion that is based on the undiluted historical legacy of the Croatian people and of the others to whom Croatia is homeland, and which yearns for the general humanistic ideals of the contemporary civilized world.

2. The Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), taking as its points of departure objective historical perceptions and realistic judgments of the overall causes of the universal crisis, wishes to make its contribution to finding the most painless and purposeful way out of the present unsupportable and untenable situation.

3. To that end, the HDZ wishes to be the expression and rallying point of all those democratically committed people—creators of nonmaterial and material goods—in the homeland and in the world who are agreed on the issues essential to the life of the individual and the people.

4. In the contemporary era, humanity has reached a level in its historical progress at which pluralism of opinions and human activity are a precondition of its very survival. No one idea, ideology, or political doctrine any longer has the right to the exclusive truth, nor the ability to impose itself on the world by force. However, that force, coercion, and violence, or claims to impose ideological monopolism on the citizens of individual countries, and to hegemonistic domination of other peoples, still exist in certain parts of the world can be seen even in the case of the SFRY. In the general revival of unitaristic and great-power intentions, with respect to the Croatian people this is expressed even in unscientific reevaluations of historical events, all the way to theories about the genocidal nature of any Croatianism.

All historical experience, especially that of all the socialist countries, including the SFRY, no longer leaves any space for any unscientific and unrealistic utopian conceptions at all, and indeed they have always cost the world and our country dearly.

5. The way out of the abyss of universal crisis that is manifested in social and interethnic convulsions is possible only on the premises of respect for the universal democratic and civilized achievements of human society. This applies first of all to the guaranteed nature of civil rights and the freedoms of man both as an individual and as a member of the social community.

Without man's inviolable right to his own opinion and spiritual creativity, to enterprise and private property, and to the disposition of the results of his labor—there can be no well-being nor progress for the individual and

family, the social community, and the people. Without recognition of the rights of individual peoples to free and unhampered development, to full equality with other peoples, to the sovereign right to make decisions on whether and under what conditions they will belong to a governmental community with other peoples—there is no true progress of individual peoples, nor the preconditions for their harmonious life together, nor stability of any kind of multinational community of states, nor peace in the international system.

And recognition of that right presupposes opposition to all nationalistic exclusiveness and chauvinistic aggressiveness. In the historical struggle for freedom and emancipation of peoples all over the world, both formally and today, these phenomena have been the principal causes of interethnic discord and of many historical failures.

6. The HDZ believes that contemporary democratic Croatian national consciousness, specifically all activity in all domains of cultural, economic, and political life of the Croatian people, should be built on those components which have essentially contributed to shaping the Croatian historical and cultural entity.

There can be no dilemma that in the earlier history the credit for the survival and civilized development of the Croatian people goes to the Croatian masses, to all its levels of status and leadership strata, from the nobility to the clerical and secular intelligentsia with the most widely differing spiritual (and religious) commitments.

In the more recent history, the modern Croatian national consciousness has been built and should continue to be founded on positive and freedom-loving traditions of the rebirth: Starcevician government in Croatian history, Radic's humanistic and democratic republicanism, and then on the visions, but also experiences, of the Croatian left, the Marxists and Communists in the joint struggle with the Serbian and other peoples for a socialist self-managed society and for the free homeland of Croatia and a community of peoples enjoying equal rights founded on the historical decisions of ZANOH and AVNOJ.

7. In the context of the sociopolitical ferment and developments today, but also within the context of the present constitutional order, the HDZ maintains that the practical achievement of recognition of the natural right to a pluralism of self-management interests and ideas can be achieved by transforming the Socialist Alliance into a democratic tribune of differing currents and ideological aspirations. The prerequisite for that is to free it as an open popular front of the ideological tutelage and the organizational transmission belt operation of the Communist League, which has its own separate organizations for its program.

8. The HDZ declares itself in favor of regulation of interethnic relations in the SFRY in a spirit that is consistently that of AVNOJ.

But that spirit is being betrayed by those who—either with neohegemonistic or socialist-integralistic or allegedly with general democratic tendencies—tend toward centralism and unitarism. As well as those who unilaterally condemn confederalism as though it were separatism.

Both of them are forgetting those principles of Titoism which are still relevant to the effect that the SFRY, established as a self-managed and federal government community, can survive only if it guarantees the freedom and sovereign rights of each individual people.

9. The failures of all the reforms to date in other socialist countries, and indeed in the SFRY as well, indicate that there is no way out of the economic crisis without transforming the government and political system and without a transition to a civilized democratic society.

Pluralism of democratic thought and a free market economy (with mixed forms of ownership) will share the same destiny in the struggle to overcome dogmatic bureaucracy.

10. The HDZ maintains that the efforts of all factors in the political and public life of SR Croatia must above all be directed toward creating the spiritual (moral-political) climate and material preconditions for halting the demographic retrogression of the Croatian population and to invigorate economic and cultural and scientific life. The problems of rural areas and agriculture (we are for abolishing the maximum landholding) impose themselves as the primary task here, followed by the problems of the transportation infrastructure and maritime economy, technological innovations of industry, and the rise of small business and enterprise, and especially efforts in scientific creativity so that we could keep pace with the world in building a postindustrial, informatic, and democratic society.

11. The HDZ takes the position that it is in the vital interest of every people, including the Croatian people—to be involved in civilized, technological, and democratic integration throughout the world. But it equally maintains that in and of itself this does not solve all the problems of national survival and participation in the world community of nations.

In that respect, the Croatian people has particular reasons for concern, if for no other reason because historical failures up to now have had the result that about a third of the nation is scattered over all the continents of the world. Further erosion needs to be prevented, and encouragement given for the return and establishment of ties with the homeland of such a large emigre community for such a small people. Today, that emigre community possesses an immense potential—technological, financial, cultural, and scientific—which could greatly contribute to the recovery of its old homeland.

The prerequisite for that is that people working abroad either permanently or temporarily, as well as those in the

homeland—derive satisfaction for themselves, their families, and their homeland in a free market economy and general democratic development in an order guaranteed by law.

12. The HDZ is resolutely in favor of inclusion of Croatia and the SFRY in the European Community.

But, recalling that the European Community is not being built on the ulterior motive of some pan-European nation, nor on the possibility of hegemony of any of the European nations over the others, indicates the untenability of the demand that before entering the European Community the SFRY should itself become some "unified," i.e., centralistic-unitaristic state, even though it be with allegedly pluralistic democratic features.

13. The HDZ does not wish to be a separate political organization, but—in the absence of a pluralism of political parties—it wishes to be a rallying point for citizens committed to democracy.

Today, no one can any longer reserve to himself the right to prevent and frustrate participation in public life of any democratic tendency, especially a tendency which wishes to be based on the foundations of constructive national traditions as have been set forth of the Croatian, or indeed any other people, which are in keeping with the civilized and democratic developments in the contemporary world.

The HDZ opens its doors to all members of the Croatian people who favor a democratic renewal of national, sociopolitical, and economic life, regardless of their world outlooks and their political-ideological and religious convictions.

It is also open to all citizens of the Serbian nationality as well as of other nationalities (Italian, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, and Jewish...), who wish to take part in that democratic renewal. Respect for their ethnic and human identity is a democratic achievement and obligation of our common history. It must also be guaranteed by the civil and civilized principles of a state based on law, which also presupposes their respect for the common homeland and joint commitment to creation of mutual trust and a harmonious life together in a democratic society.

14. The HDZ desires to establish its own independent periodical for social and cultural problems.

This and the manner of inclusion in the Socialist Alliance and other forms of public activity are to be debated in the meeting of the initiating group and will be decided in the Founding Assembly.

Zagreb, 28 February 1989

DRAFT OF THE RULES OF THE CITIZENS' LEAGUE FOR A UNITED EUROPE

1. The Citizens' League (hereinafter "the League"), established in the SAWP, is an independent, self-sufficient, and equal political protagonist of the idea of European community and a united Europe over the entire territory of SFR Yugoslavia.

2. The League's symbol consists of six stylized male and female figures with hands outspread, forming a symbolic circle of community. The symbol is blue and under it, in one of the languages and scripts of the Yugoslav nationalities and ethnic minorities, is inscribed the shortened name of the League: Citizens for a United Europe.

3. The League operates publicly and in accordance with its programmatic principles.

4. The League enrolls all men and women who approve its programmatic principles and rules.

Enrollment is based on an application.

Members who act contrary to the programmatic principles and rules of the League are expelled from membership.

Membership in the League is terminated in the case of members of organizations whose programmatic principles are directly opposed to the programmatic principles of the League.

5. Members of the League pay dues as fixed by the League's Executive Committee.

The League obtains the resources for its activity through the dues of its members, money contributions, the sponsorship of individuals and organizations, as well as from other sources.

6. The Assembly of League members is the supreme body of the League.

The Assembly is convened at least once a year, and it is made up of representatives of the regional committees of the League elected in regional assemblies.

The regional committee of the League consists of at least 30 members of the League.

7. The Assembly:

- proclaims the program and rules of the League and debates them;
- decides on the political orientation of the League;
- elects and recalls the bodies of the League;
- debates and makes a decision on the annual accounting and plan for financial transactions.

8. The Assembly elects:

- the chairman and members of the League's Council;
- the chairman, vice chairman, and members of the League's Executive Committee;
- the League's Oversight Committee.

9. The League's Assembly meets in plenary session.

The Assembly is conducted by a working presidium which the Executive Committee nominates and the Assembly elects.

The work of the Assembly conforms to the operating procedure of the League's Assembly.

10. Regular and extraordinary assemblies of the League are called by the League's Executive Committee.

An extraordinary assembly is called on demand of the League's Council or the Oversight Committee, or on demand of at least 11 members.

11. The League's Council is elected from among candidates nominated by members of regional committees of the League or the Assembly of the League.

The League's Council debates the political orientation of the League and advises the League's Executive Committee.

The Council has 15 members—the chairman, the vice chairmen, and 13 members.

Members of the League's Executive Committee and Oversight Committee as well as other persons are invited if necessary to meetings of the Council. The meetings of the Council are public and as a rule shall be held once a month.

12. The Executive Committee is elected from among candidates nominated by the Initiating Committee for establishment of the League and later by the League's Council.

The candidates nominated for the chairmanship of the Executive Committee present their work program for the Executive Committee to the League's Assembly.

The Executive Committee has seven members—a chairman, vice chairman, and five members.

13. The Executive Committee:

- represents the League in public;
- organizes and conducts the League's activity;
- appoints the secretary and treasurer of the League;
- oversees the League's financial transactions.

14. The League's treasurer proposes the annual accounting and plan of financial transactions to the League's Assembly, which debates them and makes a decision on them.

15. The League's Oversight Committee is nominated by the League's Assembly.

The members of the Oversight Committee, which consists of five members, themselves elect the chairman of the Oversight Committee among themselves.

The Oversight Committee oversees the work of the Executive Committee, monitors execution of decisions adopted in the League's Assembly and proposes dismissal of the Executive Committee when this is necessary.

The Oversight Committee also oversees the work of the other bodies of the League's Assembly and interprets the provisions of the rules of the League.

16. The headquarters of the League are in Split, Ulica K. Luxemburg 22.

DRAFT OF THE PLATFORM OF THE CITIZENS' LEAGUE FOR A UNITED EUROPE

1. The Citizens' League for a United Europe is an independent political protagonist of the idea of European community and of a united Europe; it sprang from its founders' realization of the meaning of human mutuality and natural community of all the continent's people.

2. Citizens for a United Europe live in continuing opposition to all manifestations of our world which frustrate that sense of community: ignoring the person and individuality, exclusiveness of a political world outlook, chauvinistic frenzy, ideological obsessiveness, untouchability of public office and activity, the command system in the economy, environmental and esthetic negligence, and so on, and so forth.

3. Citizens for a United Europe pay no attention to ideological commandments, because they are never in tune with the times in which we live, nor with the authentic needs of citizens.

The untouchability of sacred books is a fundamental obstacle to human understanding, because they cast man in a mold of an enemy of human difference.

4. The present sociopolitical and self-management institutions of the SFRY are the point of departure of the League's political activity.

5. Diversity of political opinion and activity decisively influences the development of the human community.

Diversity of world outlook and political views are of absolute importance in bringing up young people, since it is by examining and analyzing diverse [original reads "homogeneous"] phenomena that they form their critical consciousness and individuality.

Human individuality is the main driving force and vehicle of all exceptional social processes, so that smothering it frustrates development of the human community.

6. We favor upbringing and schooling based on diversity of world outlook. 7. Free speech is the foundation of a free human community and of civilized life.

Citizens for a United Europe speak freely.

8. Equality of women, achieved everywhere, always, and without exception, is the foundation of all human equality.

9. Citizens for a United Europe found their attitude toward the government and legal system on the traditions of the legal and social state and constitutional patriotism springing from a constitution based on basic human rights.

10. We favor a reform of the right to vote on the principle of one man, one vote.

11. Citizens for a United Europe take their orientation from the principles of the Charter of Human Rights (General Declaration of Human Rights), from the European Convention on Human Rights (the Helsinki document), and from the best and most humane traditions and values of the entire space of Europe.

12. The Citizens' League for a United Europe proclaims the principle of nonviolence in its entire activity.

[Poem]

For a United Europe

Citizen! Your bigwigs are leading you
Into the land of no return.
They have stopped up your mouth,
Since you perhaps know better what we should do.
Your humanity has been trampled upon.
They have taken away your speech and your thought.
A shudder of infinite misery runs down your bones,
citizen.
Ideals have emptied your barn
Tomorrow you will not have bread for your children.
Roar, citizen!
Roar, to hell with him, this is your home,
Your only homeland.
Roar like a wild animal, since you have been
Gravely wounded, citizen.
Do not let them take away your bread.
Do not give up your self-respect.
Do not give up, citizen.
The Europe of a unified prosperity is calling you.
A Europe of mutuality and love of man.
A Europe with legal security and peace.

A Europe without Article 133.
A Europe of your Truth.
Europe has learned the task of humanity.
Europe is your continent, citizen.
Europe is our source of confidence.
And it can be yours.
Citizens' League for a United Europe.

(signed) Jurica Stambuk, Ivan Tadinac
General Delivery 58000 Split
Split, 10 December 1988

DEMANDS [CITIZENS LEAGUE FOR A UNITED EUROPE]

1. Citizens for a United Europe are making ready for a speedy and complete community with the United States of Europe.

That is why they continuously resist all aspects of our world which frustrate that community; ignoring the individual and individuality, ideological obtuseness, political untouchability, untouchability of political office and action, the inequality of women, the neglect of young people, the ban on free speech, economic, environmental, and esthetic negligence, and so on, and so forth.

2. Citizens for a United Europe respect the law and the legislator.

Civil disobedience, as a sincere, broad, and well-argued rebellion resulting from the unresponsiveness, inability or helplessness of legal institutions in dealing with the demands of citizens is approved.

3. Citizens for a United Europe take their lead from the best and most humane traditions and values of the entire space of Europe.

4. Citizens for a United Europe pay no attention to ideological commandments, since they are never in keeping with the times in which we live, nor with the authentic needs of citizens.

The untouchability of sacred books is a fundamental obstacle to human understanding, because it casts man in the mold of an enemy of human diversity.

We demand the following:

1. Our city Split must live a European life in its squares and streets. We open our home to the entire world. Let the world live with us and we with the world.

It is time that we drive away all our fears and our intolerable limitedness.

Let us be host to all good people.

Let Split be a pilot city, a city of reconciliation, a city of civic courage and experiment.

Let Split be a city with a European reputation.

2. Let our city Split become the first city that is a partner of unified Europe.

A proposal has already been sent to the European Parliament.

Let us not be afraid to encounter the new and different.

Let us show the strength of our own city and its exceptional spirit.

Split must buzz with friendly foreign speech.

3. Let us proclaim Europe Week in our city.

4. Let us establish a prize of our city for civic courage.

We will reward our brave and tireless fellow citizens who by their exceptional effort and persistence, and in their resistance to institutionalized forms of all kinds of idleness, negligence, and irresponsibility, both in private institutions and also in private life, enrich the quality of life in our dear city.

5. Let us establish a summer school for the Croatian or Serbian language in our university.

We will open a school for the children of our emigres and workers employed abroad as well as for all other enrollees.

We will draw young people from all over the world with an attractive program for their stay, with exceptionally well-organized quality instruction and equally with our completely natural hospitality.

The school might even remain in session throughout the entire year.

A similar school in the University of Zagreb is almost exclusively oriented toward future students in Yugoslav higher educational institutions and has nothing in common with our project.

6. Let us establish departments for industrial and graphic design.

Their establishment would also signify an official declaration of war on everything that is making our city ugly.

Our eye must become accustomed to space that has been ennobled.

Generations of trained designers will bring about a different attitude of citizens toward the shaping of articles for everyday use and the shaping of industrial

products, as well as toward the art of esthetic configuration of all urban spaces, our books, magazines, newspapers, advertising messages, our stairways and stores, our announcements and posters, in short—toward the shaping of our urban space as a human manifestation.

7. Let us establish an office for evaluating the esthetic and architectural value of all new additions to the city.

The office must also have retroactive powers, which means that it is also being authorized to evaluate the content that already exists, that is, to intervene for the reshaping of content that is in dispute.

Otherwise, we will never get rid of the shameful association of primitive service facilities and the Croatian National Theater.

8. Let us establish a society of women of our city who have been abused and molested.

9. Let us establish an office for child welfare that would protect children from the attacks of abusive parents.

10. Let us establish an independent body of citizens in the Croatian SAWP to oversee the work of all opstina departments.

11. Let us establish an independent body of consumers in the Croatian SAWP consisting of specialists in the appropriate analysis of all types of goods.

To that end, we need to begin to publish a consumer bulletin that would contain the results of professional analyses, and those of foodstuffs would be extremely precise.

We will not permit anyone to poison us anymore.

The organization for consumers would be available to every citizen, even when only one citizen is requesting the assistance of trained personnel.

12. Let us establish an office for independent monitoring of the parameters of the soil, air, and water in association with the Croatian SAWP.

The experience of almost all the European countries following the disaster at Chernobyl indicates the interwoven nature of the interests of government agencies and big energy producers. They lie to the citizenry every day in the name of higher justification and supposed professional competence.

Let us establish an alarm for poisoned air, for the polluted sea, and for the endangered soil.

Our children will no longer swim in municipal sewage.

13. Let us apply all our energy to building plants to treat sewage and to the removal and processing of raw and harmful waste.

Let us send yet another cry for help to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, since we are going to drown in our own excrement.

14. Let us establish in association with the Croatian SAWP an independent professional body for standardizing the enactments and normative texts of all municipal institutions of importance.

The body would be open to the suggestions and cases of all citizens who have been in some manner damaged by inappropriate or incomplete interpretation of enactments, by discrepancies between them, or by their vagueness, or by their senselessness and outdatedness.

The body would also study the mutual compatibility of all other legal texts as well as their consistency, and would send its observations to a republic or federal center for professional refinement.

We absolutely have to demand legal security in our state.

15. Let us establish a committee to liberalize housing construction, adaptation of existing housing, and additional work on unoccupied housing.

To that end, the committee would work on enactment of new regulations and the updating of existing ones as well as on drafting of proposals for spelling out and updating regulations on the letting and renting of housing that is socially owned or privately owned.

16. Let us establish a society of lovers of Split that will be concerned with refinement of the city's basic spaces.

Let us pave the waterfront and Theater Square. Let us remove that senseless building between the Croatian National Theater and "Prima." Theater Square will become the lively and spacious center of the city.

PRINCIPLES OF THE YUGOSLAV ALLIANCE

The basic purpose, task, and objective of the Yugoslav Alliance [JS] is to work for Yugoslavia.

1. The area of activity of the JS is the entire space of the Yugoslav state;

2. The JS will operate on the principle of long-term adaptation to the situation, in which the purpose and orientation (policy) of the Alliance will constantly be sought in a synthesis of well-known philosophies which have guided humanity up to now and those specific features of the Yugoslav space which demand adaptation;

3. The JS will primarily operate in the direction of cultural, political, and economic integration of the South Slav peoples, respecting real and objective particularities;

4. The attitude of the JS toward minorities is founded upon the provisions of international law regulating minority questions;

5. The JS will commit itself to Yugoslavia's democratic development on the principles of a state based on law, respect for the rights of man, and protection of the environment. It will also commit itself to long-term and rapid adaptation of the political and economic system which time and situation will require, but always in the sense of strengthening Yugoslav statehood;

6. The members of the JS freely and equally use the Slovenian, Serbo-Croatian, and Macedonian written and spoken languages and the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets. Understanding is based on the principle that everyone use one of these three languages so that we understand one another.

On behalf of the Initiating Committee,

Matjaz Anzurjev
Branislav Repic
Slavko Ozbalt

Temporary address: Yugoslav Alliance, Gestrinova 6,
61000 Ljubljana

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Price Bureau Minister Rejects Market Pricing

24000137c Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech
No 15, 1989 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Eng Jaromir Zak, minister in charge of Federal Price Bureau, by Anna Wurmova and Mirolav Kana: "We Will Not Let Prices Get out of Hand"; date and place not given]

[Text] Over the past two years HOSPODARSKE NOVINY conducted an open discussion about prices. We provided a forum for many authors and enabled them to voice their views about the purpose of prices and about the comprehensive restructuring of wholesale and retail prices, which is scheduled to be introduced as of 1 January 1989. In all, we published 40 such contributions, not counting items dealing with prices in the context of other topics, or readers' response. Most of those articles were written by theoreticians from various research institutes and by economists from enterprises. Far fewer contributions came from staff members of central agencies. No doubt, that affected also the overall tone of our debate. Unambiguous statements by the agencies responsible for government pricing policies did not reconcile contradictory opinions and controversial views about price-setting and control, about the type of prices, etc, and therefore, many incentives as well as objective issues remain open. However, we could not stop here, and so we sought an answer at a meeting of members of our editorial board with Eng Jaromir Zak, minister appointed to administer the Federal Price Bureau.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Perhaps most of the criticism in our articles on prices concerns the unwillingness of price agencies to introduce more radical changes in this area.

[Zak] I have reread your articles about prices, so I am familiar with your debate. Prices cannot be changed according to the views of individuals, no matter how well intentioned they may be. What we need is a conceptual and systematic approach; that was, and still is, our weak point, and not in terms of prices alone. Equally important is an assessment of all impacts—for society, manufacturers, consumers, the state and foreign relations—that the change of prices may trigger. At present we are dealing with two issues, namely, the principles for continuous updating of prices, which the CSSR government approved in late March, and furthermore, we are formulating the policy on retail prices. As you know, the only idea in the 1950's was to cut prices; prices remained stable, with occasional surprises in the form of adjustments—or rather, increase—of prices.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Let us stay with the updating of wholesale prices because the restructuring of their market values after 5 or 8 years cannot be regarded as the best possible solution.

[Zak] If prices are to fulfill their economic function and correspond with social costs, they must be updated on an ongoing basis. If the price is changed once in 5 to 8 years, it does not accurately reflect the economic reality anymore, because it takes 2 to 3 years to plan prices. Just look how long it took to meet our goal-oriented objectives in the area of wholesale and retail prices in the planning stage of the most recent restructuring of wholesale prices. First, it makes possible changes of prices on a large scale at the central level and, to the extent that our economic conditions permit, also gradual decentralization of price-setting and price-changing. This policy affects the creation of conditions for the operation of the market mechanism.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Well, how then will the development of prices be controlled?

[Zak] The approved process stipulates that the development of prices be managed and controlled by categorization of prices. This includes prices set by our central agencies, which are of vital importance for the production, for the development of services, and for personal living costs. Other categories will include centrally controlled prices whose level and changes will be determined by central price agencies. According to regulations, enterprises will set prices within the stipulated price range after discussing them with their consumers. The last category includes the enforcement of contractual prices, or agreements on contractual surcharges or discounts, depending on the supplier's agreement with the consumer either according to market conditions as free price, or if need be, according to certain binding regulations. The CSSR government and the governments of the republics will approve the framework for expansion of contractual prices. The list of products or groups of sectors where they will apply will be approved by appropriate price agencies.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] This immediately prompts the question often posed by our authors: On what basis will the prices be set—on costs, or on the basis of prices in world markets?

[Zak] The more extensively we use markets in socialist countries, and the more we intensify our economic cooperation with other countries where the market system applies, the more flexibly we must react in order to accelerate our economic intensification. However, our economy cannot summarily and automatically adopt values from the world market, because the differences in labor productivity and other economic conditions are considerable. For example, the costs of our electronic industry are so high that we would have to close it if we wanted to apply in it world prices. This means one thing: Costs are not in line with the competition, and so the factory is closed, with all the ensuing consequences. Otherwise, world prices, which function as parameters for management, have no purpose. They serve as guidelines for decisionmaking, for cost-cutting or for phasing out production. This does not concern electronics alone,

but the entire national production. We intend to look at the prices of exports and imports, to consider the prices of potential imports when determining domestic prices, and, naturally, to work as much as possible with world price relations. However, that is a gradual process.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] All of a sudden, it makes no sense to you to adopt world market prices in all of our economy. However, it seems that considerations of the costs of manufacturers who now include all kinds of inefficiency in their prices make no sense whatsoever.

[Zak] First of all, we have no prices of a purely cost type. We are operating on the basis of average national costs. These are not individual costs, so long as it does not concern monopoly production. Price-setting follows a number of parametric methods, and where that cannot be done, we consider world market relations as well. To speak of any world value or price makes sense only in case of specific manufacturers, and not in general.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Nevertheless, contractual prices are more in line with the factors of the market system which are contained in the new economic mechanism.

[Zak] If we speak of the market, we must, first of all, determine whether there is a market, so long as we do not refer to our domestic market alone. Thus far, conditions have been created in our country for a fully functioning national market. Market means abolition of monopoly production. It begins with demonopolization and continues with the development of competition and liquidation of deficit in production. For that reason, we are reorganizing our organizational structures—but not very successfully everywhere; in some instances, the signboards are just painted over. Of course, by that I do not mean that it would be wise to break down all large production units. However, in certain cases additional production cannot even be organized only to ensure economic competition of all goods in our market. Imports may offer a solution. Nevertheless, many products are completely unavailable in the CEMA countries and moreover, there is the contingent exchange which must be planned well in advance. Therefore, goods must be imported for convertible currency. And does it look? Our deficit in convertible currency is getting worse instead of better.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] And therefore, do you think that we may expect more contractual prices?

[Zak] That decision must be based on specific economic conditions. For now, our economy is considerably off balance; we are struggling with many deficits. However, prices may be decontrolled only where supply equals or exceeds demand. But even that is not always true in our economy.

With decontrol, prices may rise in our country even if supply exceeds demand. As a matter of fact, this is the

problem with monopolization. Let us say that the current plan compels the manufacturer to produce 60 tons of canned goods at a firmly fixed price, but the supply of such canned good is plentiful. If we cancel the plan, what can the manufacturer do? Without economic competition, he may raise prices and limit production. After all, that is the easiest way to earn profits. And so, contractual prices—indeed, but only in instances where supply exceeds demand and where there is at the same time some competition. Thus far that cycle is far too narrow. In my opinion, the range of contractual prices will not increase in near future much over its current situation. At present, it includes about 8 to 10 percent of the production volume.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] That is not a whole lot, especially if this is your assessment of our potential for expansion.

[Zak] I have issued instructions that contractual or, if you will, free prices be applied to a certain limited extent also in retail, for example, of goods made by the Jablonec Costume Jewelry Company or by Crystalex. However, thus far no one has reduced their retail prices—they only go up, in the given instances tolerably so. But why are they still going up? Because these manufacturers hold an exceptional position. In some cases, competition is generated by the activity of cooperatives; in others we are able to import goods, and here we may decontrol prices. Moreover, I am afraid of hidden price increases, and not just of retail prices. Once we made some calculations whose upshot was that hidden increases amount to 1.5 to 2.5 percent annually. However, today those data are not necessarily accurate. We must intensify control and improve price statistics.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Opportunities for competition develop also if other manufacturers find it easy to enter the sector. The government can facilitate that.

[Zak] Our government is trying to make that possible. Organizational structures are changing, the role of cooperatives and individual entrepreneurship is stronger. However, first such a situation must actually exist, and then prices may be decontrolled; there is no other way, even in case of nonessential goods, so long as their range is wide enough, because then outputs, among other things, may grow with prices, and with that, also the wages, which may lead to serious problems in our domestic market.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] The article which serves as our point of departure voiced the categorical opinion that restructuring equals contractual prices. Prices are the biggest iron in the fire.

[Zak] They are the key to the restructuring, but for us the important thing is to control them, so that they do not get out of hand.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] So that means that you will continue to have the authority to impose strict state price controls.

[Zak] Of course—certainly in first years. Look at the pressure from enterprises; they want us to raise prices, in other words, incomes, and then investments, and above all, wages.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Well, what then is the basis for restructuring, as far as state price control is concerned?

[Zak] It is the fact that although our new prices may not be ideal, they are of a better order than the old ones. Their criterial function has been enhanced.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] In other words, this is nothing more than another adjustment of the current system.

[Zak] We want to follow the path of continuous updating of prices by means of the plan for price development. We shall conduct more extensive annual price operations than in the past. However, the problem is that the plan still cannot work with current prices. For that reason, in past years price adjustments were one-shot affairs, and over the years they were kept at a minimum. Major changes called for agonizing revisions of the state plan, of budgets and of investments. Major changes of prices involved almost a new plan with all ensuing consequences for the quality of the plan—its destabilization continued for as long as a year. Price operations will be far more extensive, but at first they will be conducted under the guidance of central price agencies. Nothing can be done about that.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Will you use the updating mainly to correct deformations of the comprehensive restructuring?

[Zak] Deformations may stem from technical causes, but sometimes even enterprises tried to improve their prices in advance, playing some tricks with their lines of goods. For some enterprises costs were set firmly, for others loosely. So we must correct the deviations in wholesale prices after the restructuring, but with the changes of prices our first priority is to forecast economic development, so that prices would not just passively copy any kind of costs. To forecast, that means to exert pressure on price-cutting, better management, and more efficient production.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] No monopolistic manufacturer is interested in cost-cutting, and nobody forces him to do it.

[Zak] Within the plan for the price development we shall anticipate and influence the conditions for production

and implementation, which also means that we shall cut prices and urge the manufacturer to reduce his costs, if he wants to survive.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] However, wholesale and retail prices tend to encourage inefficiency and are not conducive to cost-cutting. Inefficient manufacturers get paid; just take a look at the increase in the retail price of milk.

[Zak] I think that our country's production is more cost-intensive than that of other modern economies. That includes our agricultural production as well. However, that is by no means the fault of our agricultural workers alone. We must be objective. If we have expensive machinery and expensive chemistry, then of course our agriculture must be expensive to operate. But the workers in our agriculture can be very wasteful; they have surplus funds. Still, half of our agricultural enterprises maintain that they are threatened with declining incomes because of the new procurement prices. That is true. We proceeded from average costs. We cannot have different prices for every enterprise. Better enterprises are better off, the inferior ones are doing poorly, but that is what economy is all about. Price has its own rationale.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] This is not so much a question of agriculture as of using prices to compel manufacturers to operate more efficiently.

[Zak] One cannot say that the new prices are bad, so long as they do not reflect, for instance, speculation. A manufacturer whose costs are below the Czechoslovak average earns more and forms more assets, and vice versa.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] It used to be said that prices must stimulate higher labor productivity, efficiency and cost-cutting, encourage rationalization, and that they must not reflect individual production costs, but rather national costs. We were told time and again that this is the goal and task of central price control. However, that was a failure. All that confirms that the options of the center are obviously not what they were supposed to be. Neither can it be assumed that the current methods could achieve that goal. Therefore, all economists who participated in our discussion—and not only in our discussion—clearly favored market-type reforms based on contractual prices.

[Zak] I accept that, and not only for the market. If the market does not really function—and so far we do not have a sufficiently advanced market—this premise is not valid and leads to inflation. I am for the greatest possible expansion of contractual prices, but in a situation where no monopoly prices will appear. Such prices may foster exploitation. We must not forget that prices may function only concurrently with other economic mechanisms, such as, for example, taxes, rates, credits and interest.

If we activate only one of the factors of the mechanism, it may be for nothing. It is extremely difficult to interrelate all elements of the economic mechanism. Many people fail to understand such a complex relation.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Of course, risks must be weighed, but price policies seem rather defensive. They are trying not to make the imbalance even worse and to prevent inflation, and so on. For that reason, one wonders whether we can be more successful if we use the old pricing method.

[Zak] I cannot say that prices will remain unaffected. We shall update them under the supervision of central price agencies. Prices cannot be rigid as in the past, but we shall not let them get out of hand. Pressures to increase them are tremendous, but with some exceptions, we shall not bother to discuss this with enterprises that cannot earn sufficient income because of their high expenditures and consequently, that have no funds left for investments, wages and so on. Here we must be uncompromising. Price is based on average costs. If we give in, the restructuring and updating of prices will as well as the whole economic reform will make no sense at all.

Sometimes enterprises find themselves in a difficult predicament; in some cases it will be really necessary to terminate their production if their consolidation programs fail.

In the past this policy would be abandoned at the first conflict. Cutbacks would be ordered. Instead of following with steps to gradual changes in production programs or of terminating unprofitable operations and creating other job opportunities, everything would be cancelled if the work team was against it, as it naturally would be. So what then is the enormous problem? It is actually a matter of changing the people's minds. Everybody says so, from the highest to the lowest sectors of our economic management, but what we need is that everybody share this idea.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] You say that with some exceptions, you will not bother to discuss anyone's problems with asset formation. Does that mean that it is wrong for people to argue that 4 to 5 percent return in prices is not enough?

[Zak] Of course, the initial reaction is to demand, "Change, that is, raise our prices!" However, we say that we must maintain a uniform standard for profits in all of our economy; in other words, income formation should be approximately the same in every branch of our national economy. If some production sector is too expensive and unprofitable for the CSSR, while for other, more efficient sectors the same amount of profits is sufficient, then it is clear who should be put down. But there may be some extraordinary reasons for us to plan the development of an unprofitable sector. In such cases, however, not the prices but rather subsidies are the solution.

Nevertheless, some sectors can gradually put everything in order and achieve a reasonable measure of profitability, while others reach the end of the rope. The problem facing the center is not to permit other than economic parameters in pricing, and to resist all pressures that will be exerted.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] For how long?

[Zak] Until the components of the new mechanism begin to function more efficiently. Then the conditions for the development of international division of labor will improve and resolve a number of problems, although that will not be easy.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] It may not always be simple to adhere to this principle in specific cases, especially if the monopolists are also supported by their ministries.

[Zak] We shall not permit any changes in the plan for price development without the consumer's approval. Very strong counterpressures develop here to prevent unilateral proposals from coming automatically from below. This could compel most manufacturers to give up such attempts. It is our intention to create an atmosphere of public control. We shall publicly expose every attempt to raise prices without any good reason.

I can tell you with all sincerity that our staff of 200 efficient price experts cannot do everything in a short time and that many things may escape our attention. For that reason we intend to beef up our central price control with additional temporary part-time help. Each of our experts was ordered to get out in the field every month. Many have forgotten what the inside of factories looks like. They must conduct inspections and audits. We want to be informed about what prices are doing better than people who are supposed to make proposals for changes. This we intend to do by means of control.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Except for the introduction, we have not mentioned retail prices. That may lead to an impression that nothing much can be said about them. What will happen next about them?

[Zak] We are preparing an analysis of the retail price system. You all know how it is with taxation of consumer goods and with subsidies for food, services or state housing. You are not alone when it comes to articles calling for the necessary changes in price relations between individual types of goods. However, this is an enormous operation in terms of prices and incomes and it would negatively affect a great part of our country's population. Moreover, there are shortages of goods in some communities.

If for example we would reduce retail prices of freezers which are subject to a high tax, we would aggravate our domestic balance even more. For instance, the idea has been proposed to raise the price of spare parts and to cut

the prices of automobiles. That may be fine and dandy, but it would increase the pressure on the automobile market. The situation of the relation between supply and demand is such that it would be better to raise the prices of automobiles.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Have you suggested that idea? After all, price has its regulatory purpose.

[Zak] No, this is not a simple matter. And the situation in the automobile market should gradually improve. However, in general we are in a situation where a couple of prices are changed and before long, a buying fever slowly sets in. What is important in this situation? To convince our public opinion gradually that, after all, once in a while some prices must change, but that must be done honestly and openly. For that reason, the governmental declaration orders to strip the cloak of secrecy from retail price policies, to discuss these matters in public, and to offer our public frank information about the extent to which those policies are fair or unfair.

Why should we pay subsidies, for example, Kcs 12 for a jar of blueberry jam or Kcs 6 for strawberry preserves, if they can be found only under the counter? Why should we pay Kcs 15 million annually in subsidies for carbon paper? Let people judge whether we should subsidize rents with Kcs 5.5 billion. Why should two-thirds of our people pay out of their pockets for residents in communal apartments? Not everybody there is a social case, and anyway, social cases may be helped in other ways. Is it wise? Let us find out whether it is wise, and if it is, let it be. If not, then we must deal with it. It is not only housing. Do you know, for instance, how much drinking water costs—and how is it conserved?

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Let us say that consumer prices, for instance, rents, will go up. Their increase does not guarantee at all that the management of housing resources will improve. Again, it will be poorly managed and even deteriorate if there are more funds. A leaking gutter will not be fixed and then replastering will be necessary. You are right about the waste of drinking water, but its consumption is anonymous because it is metered for a house and not for individual apartments. This cannot be helped even if you raise its price five times over. Who will give any thought to the other party?

[Zak] Interventions in prices cannot be separated from the function of the whole economic mechanism. Specifically, we plan to transfer enterprises of housing administration to self-financing—to *khozraschet*. We are looking for steps to develop facilities for repairs of buildings. I agree that pricing policies alone do not guarantee that tomorrow everything will start working. We need comprehensive solutions.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] However, such proposals should reach the people. Thus far there has been very little publicity about retail prices. It was taboo. Do you intend to continue that policy?

[Zak] The programmatic declaration of our federal government can answer that. To be sure, you did not pay any attention to taboos anyway when you published all kinds of information, for instance about incorrect price relations of goods or about deficient services and rents. Our public took notice. In a way, it was a breakthrough not so much for the public but rather for our state authorities.

Therefore, the standpoint is clear: The basis for price setting is price determined by calculated average costs carried by Czechoslovak manufacturers. Thus far our national economy lacks appropriate preconditions for far-reaching liberalization of contractual (free) prices.

Nevertheless, its aim is to set the kind of prices that will fulfill their economic functions, conform to national costs, and stimulate efficiency. But one must realize that price, even a good price, will achieve nothing without an efficient tax system, currency system, credits, interest, subsidies, appropriate control of investments, etc. We know in which direction the price bureau intends to guide prices. Its goal-oriented solution is aimed at more specific applications of the factors of the market mechanism. But it seems that this is a thing of the future. Therefore, even after this discussion we think that it is a moot question whether to wait for a full-blooded market and until then, to keep prices under tight control, or whether to decontrol prices so that they, together with other value mechanisms, may help balance our economy. For that reason, the next stage depends on the kind of specific measures the price agency will propose and enforce. That will determine the quality of our future price-setting.

HUNGARY

Newspaper Assesses Economic, Political Situation
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[Article by Ivan Lipovecz: "Party in Crisis: Who Is in Line?"]

[Text] How can one recognize a reformer in the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party]? Presumably, last week's personality changes in the CC [Central Committee] strengthened the reform center. On behalf of the cabinet, the prime minister could claim the same background. He is planning near term changes at the head of several ministries. Last weekend the MSZMP's so-called reform circles gathered at Kecskemet to draft a separate program. Meanwhile Parliament signaled alarm: the country's solvency was in danger.

It is a particularly essential structural element in modern political structures that in given situations politicians have a place to retreat. This protects the prevailing representatives of competing parties and political forces from disappearing into the depths of insignificance in the event they are beaten, and aware of this danger, it

keeps them from risking open political conflict from the outset. And insofar as the "players of the same team" are concerned, this element provides protection when exiting the course without any significant threat to their existence, in case their judgment says that they are no longer able to continue with a given trend. Nowhere do professional politicians step onto the stage by immediately seeking an emergency exit. Most of them do not even assess correctly the optimum moment for the unavoidable departure, but the signaling equipment built into the system usually begins to flash on time, leaving it to each individual's judgment how seriously he takes these indications.

In Hungarian public life the latest "changing of the cadres" already took place in the upper leadership echelon of the party in power, and it is about to happen in the cabinet. Undoubtedly the most apparent change in the MSZMP Politburo was the departure of Janos Berecz. The CC secretary, who just two months ago told the extraordinary general meeting of the journalists association that events in the process of democratization may also sweep him away, did not even want to stay in that position hereafter. An increasing number of conflicts arose in part between him and his fellow leaders, but mostly between him and various battalions of the Hungarian intelligentsia. (It is noteworthy, that in the very same CC, which in the course of the past months debated and adopted reports and documents submitted by Janos Berecz, the idea of once again nominating him mustered the support of only one third of the CC, according to reports.)

Meanwhile the Politburo shrank from 13 to 9 members. From among those elected four years ago at the 13th Congress, only two remained (Karoly Grosz and Csaba Hamori), and from among the CC secretaries—insofar as Janos Berecz and Janos Lukacs will also relinquish these functions in the near future, only Gyorgy Fejt represents continuity as compared to those elected at the June 1987 CC meeting and at the party conference of last May. Accordingly, "fluctuation" in party leadership is rather great, at least as great as the party policy course changes during the past year, and one cannot assume with any degree of certainty that with last week's changes, personal changes within the MSZMP have come to an end for some time. The party is still seeking to find itself (see our insert), simply because the May party conference served much more to start a process than to complete or to settle anything in the longer term. It appears that the removal of part of the old leadership blamed for past mistakes nurtured false illusions. The spasmodic attempts of the party to renew itself are accompanied by so many signs of being late and of a lack of self confidence. This, in turn further nurtures the collective crisis consciousness of society as a whole.

This political confusion would not facilitate the cabinet's situation even if its members, individually and collectively, would be at the height of their performance. One cannot even talk about the latter. Prime Minister Miklos

Nemeth openly discussed this matter in an interview granted to *MAGYAR HIRLAP* a week ago. Differences in views and in personal ambitions can be discovered both in the party leadership and the cabinet.

The vocal support of the reform spirit, which in itself deserves recognition, will suffice only to accomplish very little. The cabinet must now engage itself in real crisis management. Moreover, if possible, this should not be accomplished by warming up one of the forms of "hands-on management" with which we have become familiar once already during the first half of the 1980's. (This should not be done even if the external financial situation begins to ominously resemble the 1982 debt crisis, and even if several of those in leading positions acquired their initial direct experiences in that period.) Insiders' views are uniform in this regard: instead of instilling actual crisis management, work continues along the old bureaucratic scheme here and there. At most there is larger disorder than before. The reorganization—believed to be radical—of neither the central party apparatus nor the cabinet ministries, freed the necessary amount of surplus energy and preparedness to take risks. Without these the likelihood of successful crisis management is very small.

According to one bon mot heard the other day, the greatest problem of state administration is that persons in executive positions "came to power by using streetcar No. 2." This means that after completing their studies at the university of economics about 20 years ago—or after having taught there—their path from Dimitrov Square [where the university is located] took them straight to the Ministry of Finance, the Planning Office or the party headquarters [along the route of streetcar No 2]. And ever since that time they were unable to break away from the practices they were used to, and from the magic circle of the "centralist-directive" outlook acquired at the university. (Hungarian National Bank president Ferenc Bartha was asked on television whether he had any specific enterprise experience. He responded by saying that he worked as an unskilled laborer while studying at the university.)

It is not impossible that some practical experience would have benefitted the persons involved. At least their ability to resist pressures exerted by various lobbies would have heightened. In the present situation, however, the absence of experience in active political discourse, the missing bouquet of adventure-success-failure experiences acquired in real battles, and the insufficiency of moral reserves and critical outlook acquired from these resources appear as the greater void in the life of a generation which by all means is better prepared than the one before. This is so, even though there would be a particularly great need for this kind of background nowadays, when the government, having been forced to adopt a course of constraint must take a series of unpopular actions in the interest of a hoped for future stabilization and recovery from the crisis.

It is apparent that not a single rival (or alternative) political force desires to share this responsibility before a newly composed Parliament is convened. Moreover, it may be regarded as a high degree of indulgence on their part, if they assured the cabinet of their "tacit tolerance" during the period of transition. In order for this to come about, however, there would be a need to provide real publicity to certain fundamental interrelationships.

For example: what is the specific meaning of the drastic reduction of foreign exchange reserves, of the endangerment of the country's ability to pay? Is it true that the condition for consummating a new loan agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was that the IMF required a double digit devaluation? If this is so, why could this not be accomplished in one step, why was it necessary to devalue the forint twice in three weeks? What caused the fact that already at this point the state budgetary deficit is 15 billion forints larger than planned, and what specific ideas does the government have to make up the difference? Small and medium size enterprises are increasingly becoming the repositories of hope for economic growth. What should they count on, and who or what will be burdened as a result of subsidies provided to such enterprises? What investments or subsidies will be terminated—an action by which the cabinet could provide a sign of taking its promise seriously, insofar as discontinuing the waste of public funds is concerned?

Miklos Nemeth plans to present a new cabinet program to Parliament in July. He promises to provide a new list of ministers a month before that. In the FRG, a country which, in terms of its economy is incomparably more stable, Chancellor Kohl, with his tarnished image asked for two weeks time to reorganize his cabinet, upon his return from an Easter weight reduction plan. Nevertheless, instead of the asked for 14 days, he had to act 10 days later. Recognizing the fire power concentrated on the cabinet, Kohl's partners in coalition and his enemies within his own party did not grant him more time to think.

And If So, Why Not ...

We asked four large enterprise chief executives known for their reform mentality:

1. How do you view last week's personnel changes in the MSZMP upper leadership from the standpoint of consistently realizing economic reform?

2. What is your opinion of the new forint devaluation?

Mrs Pal Krauth, president, Masterfil Weaving Enterprise:

1. I do not see a change amounting to a breakthrough, one that could lead to real results. But this could be a subjective view. I believe that putting the economy in order should be expected primarily from the cabinet, by taking seriously the matter that the government is independent and that the party and state leadership are separated from each other.

2. This measure places us in an extremely difficult situation, and I do not believe that accomplishing devaluation drop by drop reflects appropriate conduct. Our greatest concern is that recently we initiated an enterprise development and efficiency improvement policy encouraged by the government. It involves the procurement of better quality imported materials and the organization of a joint enterprise which would enable us to import modern technology through leasing. And although we are among the best in the textile industry, at this point our situation may easily turn critical.

Bela Balogh, president, Microelectronic Enterprise:

1. The present changes will not suffice to accomplish an actual reform. In my view the problem is not what many believe to be the lack of a conception on part of the leadership. The problem is that they manifest a spasmodic adherence to the realization of a conception which is bad, and which has not been proven in real life.

2. The way I see it, this cabinet has been discredited already ..., this, however is not contradicted by the fact that I view the devaluation of the forint as a necessary measure. The method by which it was accomplished is debatable. It is possible, that considering the rate of inflation and the country's capacity devaluation must be accomplished in steps. But I also believe that true export incentives and a realistic forint value can be accomplished only by way of further significant devaluation. This measure affects us unfavorably because we are net importers. On the other hand it is true that in our current year plan we figured that in the course of the year a 62 forint per U.S. Dollar (USD) exchange rate would evolve.

Janos Vad, president, United Chemical Works:

1. I think it is probable that as a result of the changes the circle of apparatus minded leaders has diminished. Insofar as the newcomers are concerned, it is my view the principle of "put one here, and put one there" prevailed. It is yet another matter that I will believe that they actually want to accomplish reform only if they begin to rationalize the substance of economic management, and reduce expenses.

2. I view the forint devaluation as a reform measure, but I disagree with the devaluation rate and the method applied. Instead of administrative measures, market influence should determine the way the value of the forint evolves. Our enterprise finds itself in a less favorable situation as a result of the increased cost of imported materials. Since we have not been wasteful thus far either, we will be unable to absorb the increased costs. All we can do is to convey those increases to our customers. But since with increasing prices there is no real demand, a domestic shortage may result. What can we do under such circumstances? We constrain ourselves, reduce our personnel and hold back on production. But this is a defensive attitude! In contrast, if the

government wants to accomplish an actual breakthrough, it should not merely coerce enterprises, it should also stimulate the efficient enterprises.

Matyas Jakob, president, Machine Tool Industry Works:

1. The changes continue to raise my hopes that sooner or later the MSZMP will have a realistic economic policy, one that can be implemented.

2. Frankly, I am rooting for the reform wing of the government. I could say that I am on the side of the 40 years old group, because we must struggle with a very severe heritage, and the technique of change has not been tested anywhere in the world—there is no prescription to follow. But insofar as specific actions are concerned, it seems likely that it would have been better for them to build on the views of enterprises ["the real sphere"] before they made a decision, although devaluation itself could not be avoided. It is possible of course, that I am so understanding in this regard because our enterprise is increasing its profits as a result of the changes. Our sales income will increase, and we have purchased already the imported materials needed for exports. Thus we can largely avoid the increased expenses.

Reform Workshop: Break Up if You Can ...

If one could believe: in the midst of today's openness we no longer have to obtain information by virtue of denials. But the lead speakers at last week's Kecs-kemet reform forum registered such strong protest against the assumption of a party split that the uninitiated observer feels that there is some truth to this assumption. Perhaps the most likely truth is that in the case of the present party state, the breaking off of the reform wing cannot be merely an internal affair, and thus, it may not depend only on the endeavor of an anointed politician, but on the orientation of the party membership as a whole, and the extent to which the party membership is prepared to renew itself.

In the end, the fact that the reform wing within the MSZMP has not unfurled its banner may have mundane tactical reasons, and it is also possible that they did not (yet? already?) find the time suitable for such action, or that they did not feel strong enough to make a complete break. And quite naturally, it is equally conceivable that gaining strength within the party, the comprehensive reform of the MSZMP will be the long term strategy to be followed. Imre Pozsgay in principle did not rule out either the possibility or the societal need for a splitting of the party, but expressed the judgment that in the present situation of the country a split would not represent a realistic alternative. Rezső Nyers on the other hand, took a position clearly opposed to a break off, because such event would mean a substantial setback to the economic and social reform process, and, as he said, the party was progressing in the direction of becoming social democratic. In contrast to the restrained tenor of the two presenters who started the debate, they were followed by

far more sharply worded statements of this age. The radicalism of reform circle members commenting outdid the bulk of reports presented by social scientists willing to serve as advisers. It did so in terms of style, demands and degree of emotion. Not once, and not twice was it said that differences in opinion within the party are far greater than the differences between the MSZMP as a whole on the one hand, and the independent organizations on the other. For this reason, unless the reform wing does not gain greater strength or does not become independent, the chances of a coalition government may fade away, and the party will scuttle itself. Similar apprehensive remarks were made to the party's reform leadership saying that they permit the MSZMP reform circles to exist only as underground brooks, and that the reform leadership does not identify itself with the reform circles. The rather critical, occasionally impatient and distrusting remarks could have convinced the six hundred persons attending the conference billed as a scientific conference, but which in reality was an organizational meeting of the MSZMP reform wing seeking a platform, that there was not much time left: sooner or later the MSZMP must show its colors! Otherwise the distance between the reform leaders and the reform forces will be too great, and this, supposedly, would increase the chances of an opposition camp within the party, and would increasingly delay the possibility of achieving social and economic consolidation and reaching a consensus.

Regarded by Imre Pozsgay as the first forum in which dialogue took place, the conference provided a first opportunity for 80 representatives of the MSZMP's 30 reform circles to meet. The movement which is now coming alive issued a statement in which, among other matters, they had this to say:

1. Within the MSZMP as a whole reform thinking and reform action must become the rule. By helping the breakthrough as well as the organization for reform, the MSZMP leadership should recognize the existence of reform circles, and should provide for their operational needs, including the establishment of a horizontal structure. The reform circles should be able to use the central and local means and establishments available to the MSZMP.

2. Reform circles established thus far call upon the MSZMP members and organizations to establish reform circles and other organizations of similar character. Reform circles do not accept the stigma of having the character of a general faction, which lacks any practical experience.

3. The forums sponsored by the reform circles are open to all members of the MSZMP and to everyone, and will also cooperate with organizations and persons outside the MSZMP. Reform circles offer to everyone the opportunity to debate, to establish relations and to cooperate.

4. In the framework of their activities reform circles endeavor the evolution of a new kind of party unity within the MSZMP, the dynamic coexistence of individual trends, views and platforms, the primacy of real reform action, and the rethinking of the theoretical foundations.

5. Reform circles require open reform workshop conferences, and accept the responsibility for implementing in practice the leading ideas emerging from such reform workshops.

6. The representatives of reform circles accept and support the initiative of the MSZMP Budapest and Szeged reform circles for the organization of a national conference to be held in May 1989 in Szeged. This conference may be an important means by which reform forces within the MSZMP can formulate their platforms.

The statement indicates that reform circles express their concern about the unbalanced positions taken by the party leadership, its actions which lack courage, and the conduct it manifests which is pregnant with nostalgic feelings about old unity. In our view the confidence of the people and the country shows a gradual decline, international respect may be endangered, the party may lose its best forces, and the danger of falling apart is on the increase. For these reasons the reform circles are concerned that the party will be fully undeserving of holding power, and would be incapable of serving the uplift of the nation. For this reason they recommend that by Fall, 1989, a party congress should be convened.

Union Role, Representation Analyzed
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[Article by Zoltan Meixner: "SZOT Versus Government: Perhaps It's Good for the Devil Only]

[Text] One could tell during the past few weeks as SZOT [National Council of Trade Unions] leaders nervously watched every "move" made by the government. How in the world could they not be nervous at a time when all their suggestions were being accepted for consideration with seeming benevolence. But they were forgotten the instant the SZOT leaders left. One could even feel offended by such treatment. I do not know whether the SZOT leaders felt offended. But one matter is certain: They got fed up with the series of fiascos: The other day they announced that they will no longer play ball. They want to review previous agreements reached with the government, and they do not wish to negotiate with the present government regarding the merits of the issues. Why should they; rumors have it after all that quite a few ministers will be let go sooner or later. Sooner, rather than later. And even if there is a new Council of

Ministers, SZOT would sit at the green table only under certain conditions. I will not go into details concerning those details. The daily press presented these in their entirety.

The firm position taken by the SZOT presidium could be viewed as a model, because it has been such a long, long time since it represented employee interests that its action almost qualified as an act of the opposition. Much of this is blunted of course by the fact that by invoking a sense of responsibility it did not presage a strike. Instead it promised demonstrations, petitions and the rest. Just as an aside, I will mention that befitting today's situation it intends to transform the May Day festivities into a mass demonstration. What should it celebrate work for? It's bad enough that we have to work, and nowadays there is frequently no work. But a demonstration like this is very suitable for the expression of employee interests.

Otherwise, the general situation of today is well characterized by the way the government gets confused with the unions and the unions with the government. This is so because no one knows who supports whom. There are some who say that the party supports the government. But this can hardly be so, because the 800,000 party members are employees, and being pauperized by inflation, as well as members of the political organization. And if they have to compare their concerns for making a living with interests stemming from their party membership, they are likely to choose the former as more important. Regardless of this fact however, the party leadership may direct the government, if for no other reason, because of the overlap of membership in the two spheres, but this is not important. Namely, the driving force behind the government's actions cannot be narrowed down to a tight group, which, according to recent experience is divided anyway.

I have no reason to make a different assumption: The Council of Ministers acts in the interest of the country's salvation. It tries to keep the economy on its feet, stop the impoverishment of society. To put it simply: It wants to take the homeland on a path which will lead its citizens toward a more humane future. The trade unions—and let's stick to those operating in the SZOT framework—now are doing what they are meant to do. They are taking positions in defense of employee interests. These two factors are not the same, however, because the government must take into consideration many more goals and relationships than any trade union. And thus, although both parties consider the elevation of the nation as most important, they cannot avoid confrontation. But why not?

Because social conditions are unclear. This too serves as a reason for me to say that no one knows who supports whom. What interests motivate actions? And for this reason one cannot view the Council of Ministers simply as the government of the party or of the party leadership. In market economies the government leadership protects the employees' as well as the interests of capital. But

those governments view employee interests as the interests of the workforce, which is capital. That capital which is not used well reduces future capital, and through this cycle, harms the citizens, who in their quality of being citizens become poorer not only as employees but also in terms of maintaining their own welfare in a broad sense of the term. On the other hand, trade unions stand up to the government because they feel that as a result of government policies employees do not receive enough, and they also stand up to employers who offer less to their employees than they could, and withhold more for the government—more than what the trade unions deem to be desirable.

Expressed in these terms, the above is incomprehensible in Hungary. Because what kind of visible capitalist interests does the government represent? It does not even take into consideration the enterprise interests from whom it takes a huge bounty. But it does take into

consideration the interests of the state household and of the budget, which is supposed to satisfy in part the needs of employees (citizens) and in part the needs of its enterprises (capital). In the end, however, it is rather difficult, if possible at all, to feel which interest is against the other.

And thus on the one hand, the debate between the trade unions and the government takes place in the interest of employees, but on the other hand, one cannot tell to the detriment of what other interests such debates take place. And the time has come to clarify this matter. More specifically: the loss incurred by the nation (the economy and society) if employee interests acquire primacy and prevail. Without clarifying this matter debates will only continue and no agreement will follow. It is a situation which does not benefit the employees, the government, the party, the trade unions, the enterprises or anyone else. Perhaps only the devil benefits.

POLAND

Youth Interest in Alternative Opposition Groups Viewed

26000516 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
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[Interview with Dr Krzysztof Wielecki, Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, by Janina Paradowska: "The Youth Alternative, or There Is No Telling What Will Be"; date and place not given]

[Text] [ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The Orange Alternative, the White Alternative, street happenings that are sometimes funny, sometimes shocking and sometimes ending in something that the best-disposed person would be hardpressed to see as amusing—like the painting and ruining of the City Center Passage or the events in Krakow. Exactly what does all this mean? Is it running wild and barbarism as some say? Is it a crisis of values as others maintain? Or is it the normal course of events, some kind of evolutionary stage of youth movements?

[Wielecki] Rebellion, the young generation standing up to adults, is a story as old as the world. For the purposes of this discussion, however, it is necessary to back up only to 1968. Everything we are witnessing today in Poland has its roots back then. In that year (principally, but not only, in Western Europe) certain processes peaked and certain phenomena crystallized. These fundamentally affected the attitudes of youth, the shape of youth movements, the whole question that, speaking in the most general and abbreviated sense, we shall call youth.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] For the sake of recall, what was world youth concerned about in 1968?

[Wielecki] One of the principal causes of intergenerational social strife back then was the fact that social systems could not guarantee a job for all young people. As a solution to this problem (a serious problem, after all, since youth is a force capable of disturbing the existing order), a variant was selected that would seem to have been perfect, mild and seemingly not prejudicial to the interests of the young generation—the doors of the universities were opened wide. In the course of a few years, the number of students rose very rapidly.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The universities became a kind of storage room with rather good scholarships, splendid libraries and the opportunity for being immersed in culture?

[Wielecki] Exactly. The universities did not assume a good living, but they permitted students to live for a few years under relatively good conditions, and they awakened intellectual aspirations as well. It seemed like a good solution—the institution of learning as an instrument for lengthening the institution of youth. According

to this reasoning, it is not possible to guarantee a development of the country that would allow the intellectual potential of the young generation to find a productive outlet in the building of its own fortunes and the welfare of society. Therefore, this intellectual potential must be deposited in a safe siding.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] It proved to be an unsafe one. They say that the concentration of a large number of young people in one place contributed to the creation of an inflammatory situation.

[Wielecki] Still that was not the most important issue. For these places, after all, were not very long term storage rooms. Some universities furnished a pass to a career, the elites of society reproduced themselves, but significant numbers of young people of middle class origin (who were hence very essential to the social structure) found themselves overboard. Inflated aspirations (resulting also from their education) and ideology and propaganda that stressed economic success and development collided with reality. Entrance into the social system was, therefore, limited, and aspirations could not be realized.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] And that was the whole cause of the rebellion?

[Wielecki] It was one cause, but, in my opinion, an important aspect of the crisis. A second cause was the crisis of the institutions and the state in general. There is a truism that all big institutions, parties and labor unions, have a tendency toward constant growth and monopolization of influences. In time, they cease to fulfill the function of social integration to which they were called. They start blocking the possibility of satisfying the very needs that they were created to satisfy. They accomplish their own business in order to attain their own goals, and they organize society. This is a civilizing process whose effects can be observed in the whole world and in our country as well. Surrounding these institutions, a bureaucratic entity comes into existence with its bureaucratic culture. Could this sort of thing please a young generation that was increasingly frustrated, rebellious and in difficult circumstances materially?

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Wherever you looked you encountered the cogs of a bureaucratized mechanism...

[Wielecki] With the effect that the young generation concluded that the state did not exist for it, that it did not deliver on its promises—democracy and the good life. This gave rise to a rebellious attitude accompanied by a crisis in the value system. The young generation saw a certain hypocritical divergence between declarations and practice.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Between the good life and democracy, on the one hand, and bureaucracy and hopelessness, on the other?

[Wielecki] There could be many slogans—patriotism, freedom, equality, justice. However, state institutions did not implement these values. Not only the youth noticed that fact. Many philosophers and sociologists point out how every area of social life—science, education and culture as well—becomes an instrument of an authoritarian state, an instrument by which the state renders the citizen powerless. Slogans land on favorable soil, and an alliance of intellectuals and students is born. In the declaration of the Students for Democratic Society movement we read: "We are the representatives of a young generation that was raised under conditions of relative prosperity and that views with alarm the world we shall inherit."

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Is it that youth realizes the time is coming to bear the consequences of adult government and that it has no taste for it?

[Wielecki] It has but a slight ability to change the system itself. The government is stronger than it is. Students and intellectuals proved to be unequal to the task of breaking the social system against which they had rebelled. At that point they turned back from trying to undermine the basis of the system. The failures of the Soviet road to socialist revolution had an influence—but this is a big subject unto itself.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What was the significance of this turning back? Most often people say that the rebellion moved from the political sphere to the cultural sphere.

[Wielecki] There was a resultant appearance of a youth counterculture, hence a protest against existing values, manipulative culture, mass media contents and norms and customs that, apparently neutral, "serve" an unjust social order and the egotistical interests of the governing and moneyed elites. The field of culture, relatively free of the despised industrialization, appeared to be a field of battle that was both more promising and safer. It seemed that the struggle here could be successful. The intellectuals assured youth of that. The counterculture was, therefore, the next attempt at rebellion and destruction.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] And it also failed to bring the hoped for results?

[Wielecki] That is correct. A part of youth began, therefore, to take flight into various alternative movements, joined up with hippie groups, drug addicts and sexual communes. It was the reaction of a pained generation to the shocks that it had suffered. The alternative culture is the attempt to find in the social system chinks in which the beginnings of an entirely new and different life can be created.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] In other words, let the government have its institutions, and let us live alongside them, on our own account, according to our own conceptions about a worthy life?

[Wielecki] And even this sort of philosophy emerges: let the state do what it wants. The adults will eventually die off anyway, and we shall remain on the battlefield, and then life will be different. Young people believed that they could change the world simply by living differently themselves. "Keep your heart pure and your intellect fresh—today belongs to them, tomorrow will be ours" is the famous slogan of American protestors. There is also a very profound change in the value system of youth. The state, patriotism, the family, the desire to own something—all these are considered propaganda slogans. Young people replace them with pacifism, internationalism and the feeling of oneness with nature (hence the popularity of ecological movements). In place of "consumption" we see "self-realization" and the "creative life."

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The alternative movements and alternative culture are, consequently, a refusal to participate in the adult game. They have not changed the world, however. They have neither finished an old era nor begun a new one.

[Wielecki] They should not be overrated, but neither should we minimize the changes that alternative movements and culture have brought and will bring. Already new generations are growing, and it is increasingly difficult to ram through an armaments policy, to build nuclear power plants and to abuse great slogans. The generations grown up after 1968 are more relaxed and more natural. Therefore, it is increasingly difficult for institutions to force some kind of order upon the great masses of people.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Just what then are the movements existing in Poland—a destructive counterculture, alternative movements?

[Wielecki] I think that we are faced with a mosaic of various movements. What is the alternative to the alternative? Drug addictions, extreme opposition and an anarchist atmosphere. Hence in Poland we have movements that are alternative and radically in opposition. Purely alternative movements do not desire to govern, do not want to engage in high-level politics, and they think that society can be organized in a way that is entirely different than the status quo. We have many such movements.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] You traced the roots of the current Polish situation to the year 1968. Why did these phenomena appear in our country with such a delay?

[Wielecki] In general we are late with everything. That is not a joke. The movements in the West that protest against the industrial order of the world—Toefler's second wave—came up against industrial backwardness and a repressive system of organization in Poland. A protest whose essential thread was disillusionment with exaggerated industrialization and the subordination to it of all the spheres of life must have a specific variant in

our country, for we are not yet a country with an industrial civilization. A second peculiarity: every Polish social movement by its very nature must be an anti-Stalinist reaction. What is elsewhere a postindustrial phenomenon has in Poland a post-Stalinist character. Let us also take note that at the basis of protests, here and there, lies the inefficiency of the system and the profound economic crisis. In the West, protest is rooted in overproduction, but in our country, it stems from scarcity. The drama of our situation comes partly from the fact that what we encountered 20 years ago in the West comes to Poland at a time when the political situation has undergone liberalization, the barrier of fear has been lowered and young people are increasingly awakened politically. They are also frustrated and that frustration can safely be revealed.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] And constitute a danger to the changes?

[Wielecki] Yes, that can also occur, but more about that later. What do we have today? The system is liberalizing itself, but it is still not completely democratized. The young generation is already in revolt, but it is not building its role in a constructive way. The armistice is lengthening. The second cause of the delay you asked about is the fact that these processes began in Poland in 1968, which we must not forget, but that the counterreaction was so severe that it was not a time for painting flowers and saying we loved each other. The movement of that period was immediately pushed into the opposition, and repression began. The situation apparently quieted down, but the processes did not stop: they just ripened.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Now these processes have revealed themselves fully ripened, and the various moods undulate like fields of grain. Sometimes they become radical. What next?

[Wielecki] If our social system undergoes change and democratizes itself, then it will swallow up the alternative movements as a more or less agreeable element of our social life. They may even be allowed to exist on the fringe of that life without disturbing the status quo of the very essence of the social order or to gently and slowly replace an industrial and bureaucratic culture with a postindustrial alternative culture. A blockade of the democratizing processes will lead to a radicalizing of youth dispositions and the flight of youth from alternative movements into the regular political opposition. The key, therefore, is in the hands of the authorities. They will decide whether we are going to have merely a political opposition or certain elements of an alternative society as well.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Alternative movements already are opposition movements.

[Wielecki] That is true. Even those that limit their activity to the cultural sphere have a political character,

but they are not a factor in the political struggle, or at least for a long time they were not. The excessive nervousness of the authorities caused a lot of harm in this area. I shall give you one example: some young people come out into the street dressed up as St. Nicholases, the militia starts to arrest them, a march begins, people shout "Free St. Nicholas." The militia is an instrument of the authorities, and if it gets involved in such happenings and plays the role assigned to it from above, it compromises the authorities. Every government must compromise itself when it arrests St. Nicholas.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Painting the passage in Warsaw or the Krakow happening on the anniversary of the birth of the Red Army is not the same thing as St. Nicholases parading around Wroclaw.

[Wielecki] And it is also true that the various youth movements in Poland today constitute a mosaic that is probably not fully known by sociologists and the radicalization of movements is a fact that must be taken into account. Thus we have a Wroclaw Orange Alternative with its happenings that do not cross the line between culture and political culture, that bursts various balloons full of platitudes and organizes campaigns directed towards the traditions of post-Stalinist socialism. We have opposition groups, cultural protest groups, ecological groups and, finally, hooligan craziness and political troublemaking. These phenomena must be distinguished and not grouped together under a single heading. Additionally, not only student youth is in rebellion. The high school age youth are increasingly in revolt, a fact that receives little attention. The young workers also showed what they were capable of last August.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] How do you assess the chances for an evolution of moods and, thereby, an evolution of the various student movements?

[Wielecki] I recalled the world events of 1968, since these events and what followed them point clearly to the causes of the revolt and the later directions of the evolution. The harder it is for the young generation to enter into social life (and enter on its own terms), the greater the protest.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What does that mean—"on its own terms"?

[Wielecki] With its own way of thinking and its own value system. If, therefore, young people can attain their aspirations, their dreams about social success, they can, by the same token, enter the social bloodstream in a noncollisionary manner, create their own destiny, have an influence over it. Obviously, under those conditions, there is increasingly less protest counterculture and opposition. Finally, there is increasingly less alternative culture, which becomes absorbed into the traditional culture (including the political culture) and enriches that culture, effecting a more authentic relationship between

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